Anderson v. State

Decision Date07 September 1949
Docket NumberA-11000.
Citation209 P.2d 721,90 Okla.Crim. 1
PartiesANDERSON v. STATE.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

John A Anderson was convicted of manstaughter in the first degree in the District Court of Texas County, F. Hiner Dale, J., and he appealed.

The Criminal Court of Appeals, Powell, J., held that the admission into evidence of whiskey found on the defendant's premises after the shooting of deceased was error; reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for new trial.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. 'Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the following cases: * * * 2. When perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in the heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide.' Tit. 21 O.S.A. § 711.

2. Instructions to juries should be considered as a whole, and when so considered, and they harmonize with each other, and present the law of the case fully and fairly, they are sufficient.

3. Where there is a correct instruction upon a material question in a case, and in another portion of the instructions there is an incorrect statement of the law upon the same question it cannot be said that the law has been clearly and fully given to the jury, and reversible error has been committed.

4. Where the issue of self-defense is presented by the testimony, the court should instruct the jury that, if the testimony upon this point raises in their minds a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant at the time of the homicide, acted in good faith and upon reasonable appearances of danger of receiving great bodily harm or death at the hands of his assailant, the jury should resolve that doubt in favor of the defendant, and acquit him.

5. It is not necessary that the jury should find that a defendant was justified in acting in his own necessary self-defense before they can acquit him in a prosecution for murder, but if the evidence upon the subject of self-defense raises in their minds a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant was justified in acting in his own necessary self-defense, at the time he fired the fatal shot or struck the fatal blow, then the jury should resolve that doubt in favor of the defendant, and acquit him.

6. A liberal latitude should be given the defendant in the examination of jurors on their voir dire.

7. Proof by the state that officers searched defendant's cabin after he had been incarcerated in jail on a charge of murder, and there found 6 1/2 pints of liquor, is inadmissible in the trial on the charge of murder, unless from the evidence the liquor was shown to have some connection with the killing.

Hughes Ogden & Ogden, Guymon, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

POWELL Judge.

John A. Anderson was charged in the district court of Texas County with the crime of murder; was tried, found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentenced to serve four years and three months in the reformatory at Granite. From this judgment and sentence he has appealed.

In his brief, defendant sets out five propositions for reversal of this case. They are:

'Proposition No. 1: The defendant in murder prosecution had the right to ask each juror in his voir dire examination whether he believed in the law of self-defense and the law excusing, upon certain prescribed conditions and circumstances, the killing of a human being by another person and whether he believed a defendant is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

'Proposition No. 2: In a prosecution for murder, the admission in evidence of 6 1/2 pints of liquor found by officers in defendant's home after he was placed in jail was prejudicial error as it is fundamental that the State cannot show that the accused has committed other crimes so as to force a man to stand trial for two crimes which are wholly unconnected.

'Proposition No. 3: It is the duty of the trial court in a prosecution for murder to instruct the jury as to the law of the case on trial, and this includes a definition of the offense and included offenses sufficient to inform the jury what facts are necessary for the proof to establish in order to justify them in finding a verdict of guilty.

'Proposition No. 4. In a prosecution for murder where self-defense is pleaded, it is not necessary for a jury to believe that a defendant's cause of apprehension of danger was reasonable before they can acquit him; neither is it necessary for them to find that his defense has been established by the evidence before they can acquit him, but it is their duty to find him not guilty if there exists a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense.

'Proposition No. 5: In the instant case the verdict of the jury was clearly against the law of the case and the evidence and cannot be sustained.'

The information charges this defendant with having murdered one Bernice Bartley on October 30, 1946, by shooting him. Defendant did not deny having killed the deceased, and his plea was self-defense.

The record discloses that the defendant was by trade a 'pipe liner' and at the time of the tragedy was working for the Fulton & Brady Pipe Line Construction Company at Guymon, Oklahoma. He was living alone at the Guymon Courts, in a one-room cabin. The deceased also lived there, in an adjoining cabin. The defendant had been injured in World War I, and at the time of the difficulty suffered a fifty per cent disability in both knees, due to such injury.

The defendant testified that he returned to his cabin, from his work, about 7 o'clock in the evening of the trouble, cooked his evening meal and went to the rest room to take a bath. As he returned to his cabin, about 9 o'clock, Bartley was leaning against the cabin, and accused the defendant with having 'run his girl off.' Bartley was drunk, and defendant told him he did not know anything about his girls, and went on into his cabin and sat down to remove his shoes. Bartley followed him in, cursing and accusing defendant with being responsible for his girl leaving the camp, and finally knocked the defendant down, and 'clinched him.' Defendant testified that he thought Bartley had a knife and was trying to cut him. They fought on the floor, and defendant got loose and got up, and Bartley barred the only door so that he could not get out. He testified that Bartley kept repeating that he was going to kill defendant before he got out of the cabin. Defendant reached for his gun, which was on a shelf, and testified that he shot three times over Bartley's head, in an effort to frighten him, and make him leave the cabin, and that when Bartley came at him again, he shot to hit him. When shot Bartley did not say a word, but turned and ran out the door to his own cabin. Defendant did not know how badly he had hurt Bartley. He reloaded his gun, locked his cabin and immediately left. He went to the home of Clyde Parten, with whom he worked, and told him what he had done, and asked him to take him to the sheriff's office. Mr. Parten lived in Guymon and knew the officers, and defendant did not. When they got to the sheriff's office, no one was present, and they returned to the camp and found the sheriff and highway patrolman there, and defendant gave himself up. Defendant knew the deceased, had never had trouble with him before, liked him, but knew he was quarrelsome when drinking, and considered him dangerous. Bartley had showed him an array of knives he owned, and defendant had one time seen him try to cut a man.

The State used seven witnesses. Eldon R. Walsh, a highway patrolman, testified that he received a call from the Guymon Courts, picked up the sheriff and went out, arriving there about 9:15, in the evening. Defendant's cabin was locked, and they went to the cabin of deceased, and found him lying on the floor, dead. There were two other men in the cabin, on the bed, and they both said they were asleep. A few minutes after they arrived the defendant came up and gave himself up to the sheriff. He testified to finding bullet holes in the cabin, and his testimony relative thereto was practically the same as that of the sheriff.

Ed Smith, who was sheriff of the county at the time, corroborated the testimony of the patrolman. He stated that the defendant told him the gun he had used was in Mr. Parten's pick-up truck. It was turned over to the sheriff, fully loaded, and was introduced in evidence. Defendant told him that he had shot three times over the head of Bartley in an effort to frighten him away, and finally shot to hit him. He testified to finding three bullet holes in the cabin as described by defendant, one in a rafter having been shot about straight up, one in the ceiling and the other above the door. They found a box of shells for the gun. The trial court, over the objections of counsel for the defendant, permitted to be introduced in evidence six and one-half pints of liquor identified as having been found in defendant's cabin by the officers on a second trip to the cabin following the killing.

Willis Forbes, chief of police at Guymon, went with the sheriff and patrolman when they returned to search the cabin after taking defendant to jail, and corroborated the sheriff and patrolman with reference to the location of the bullet holes in the cabin.

Kenneth E. Smith, caretaker at the cabins, testified that he heard the shots and called the officers. He had heard a scuffle in defendant's cabin before he heard the shots.

Dr. D S. Lee was called to the courts, but the body of deceased had been taken to the mortuary, and he went there and examined it. He...

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1 cases
  • State v. Jordan, 1101
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1958
    ... ...         The law is well settled that a defendant on trial for his life or liberty should be allowed the privilege of making reasonable and prudent inquiries of jurors on voir dire so that he may intelligently [83 Ariz. 253] exercise his permptory challenges. The case of Anderson v. State, 90 Okl.Cr. 1, ... 209 P.2d 721, at page 726, succintly states this rule as follows: ... 'A liberal latitude should be given the defendant in the examination of jurors on voir dire to the end that it may be ascertained whether there are grounds for challenge for either actual or implied ... ...

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