Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 08 April 1946 |
| Docket Number | 36055. |
| Citation | 199 Miss. 885,25 So.2d 474 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. STATE. |
Herbert Holmes and Dick R. Thomas, both of Senatobia, for appellant.
Greek L. Rice, Atty. Gen., and R. O. Arrington Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Anderson was indicted for and convicted of the murder of Vera Evans and sentenced to the state penitentiary for life, the jury disagreeing as to the punishment.
He assigns a number of errors, but the conclusion we have reached makes it necessary that we pass upon only three of them.
The principal witness for the State was Bessie May Evans, a negro girl, eleven years of age, the daughter of Clyde Evans, and step-daughter of Vera Evans, the second wife of Clyde Evans. Appellant contends that Bessie May Evans was not qualified to be a witness, and that without her testimony there was no evidence to convict appellant of any crime under the indictment herein. He says she did not have the capacity to understand questions and frame and express intelligent answers, nor did she possess a sense of moral responsibility to speak the truth. Peters v. State, 106 Miss. 333, 63 So. 666; Jackson v. State, 158 Miss. 524, 130 So. 729. On her preliminary examination in the absence of the jury, when asked by the district attorney what happens to little girls who tell stories, she replied 'They gets a switching.' Again 'Do you know where bad little children go when they die?' and she replied 'To the devil.' On cross-examination, she said she did everything her father told her to do and she would tell whatever her father told her to say; that her father had told her what to say in this case and she would tell that and stick to it, and that if she said what her father told her to say she thought she would be doing no wrong. The district attorney then examined her in detail as to the events of the homicide and she gave clear and intelligent answers; she explained where she went to school; said she could read and write; that she could multiply some but didn't know much about adding and subtracting. She then said she would tell the truth regardless what her father had told her to say. The learned trial judge then asked: 'Is the testimony you are going to give here something your father told you, or what you yourself saw?' Answer: 'What I Saw.' 'And you are going to tell that and that alone?' Answer 'Yes, sir.' The court then permitted her to testify before the jury. The testimony she then gave shows she understood and grasped the questions asked her, and her answers were as clear and intelligent as is usual for one of her age, race and schooling.
The only serious question about her capacity as a witness is her answer, made to a question asked by able counsel for appellant, that her father had told her what to say and she would say that regardless of the truth of it. Later, she said he had not told her what to say and that she was going to tell what she saw. We do not think this alone disqualified her as a witness. It would be interesting to know the percentage of children eleven years of age who would follow the lead of truth rather than the command of father. This child was before the learned trial judge. He saw and observed her. He heard her words and noted her actions. He was in much better position than is this Court to say whether she was qualified as a witness. That was a question of fact, 'the decision of which, in the language of Mr. Justice Brewer in Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 16 S.Ct. 93, 40 L.Ed. 244, 'rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous.'' The common sense of the ordinary juror is also a protection against error in this regard. They see and hear the child testify and are in position to evaluate the accuracy and weight of the testimony. It is usually more a question of credibility than of qualification. We cannot say the court erred in permitting her to testify.
Appellant further says no conviction can be had in this proceeding because the proof fails to show that the wound inflicted by him upon Vera Evans caused her death. We will summarize the evidence on that question. Anderson stabbed Vera Evans in the chest with the sharp point of a file. This instrument was about ten inches long, and tapered to a point at one end. It was the usual file used in this State for sharpening hoes. It was introduced in evidence and the jurors saw and examined it. The stabbing took place in a field where Vera was hoeing cotton in June 1945, at about 6 o'clock in afternoon. When the wound was inflicted, she cried out and started from the scene across the field and fell face down when she had gone a short distance. She was unable to rise without aid. Blood was coming from the wound. She was carried to her home in a wagon. About midnight, she was taken to Dr. W. D. Smith. He testified he found: ; that it was merely a flesh wound. He was asked whether that wound of itself would have caused her death. He replied: Just what he meant by the last statement is not clear. He dressed the wound and told her husband to take her home; that he did not think the wound was serious or that there was any need for her to be brought back to him, and that her death was a surprise to him. Vera died around 8 o'clock the next morning at her home. Clyde Evans testified that after leaving the office of Dr. Smith she had great difficulty breathing; that she grew worse and became unconscious and was never again in condition 'where she could talk right'; that she was bleeding profusely from the wound, and, as stated, died around 8 to 9 o'clock the next morning. He further said Vera was five to six months with child; that she was in good health and had worked regularly at manual labor in the fields during that year. There is no intimation that there was any cause for her death other than the wound inflicted by appellant. That question was specifically submitted to the jury by an instruction granted the defendant, and the jury found that the wound inflicted by appellant caused her death. We think there was ample evidence to sustain that finding.
Appellant next contends that the evidence in this case fails to show that he had any malice towards Vera Evans, but, if so, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Witherspoon v. State of Illinois
...N.E.2d 819 (1945), Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 298 Mass. 562, 11 N.E.2d 799 (1937); Mississippi: (no degrees of murder) Anderson v. State, 199 Miss. 885, 25 So.2d 474 (1946); Montana: State v. Le Duc, 89 Mont. 545, 300 P. 919 (1931); State v. Miller, 91 Mont. 596, 9 P.2d 474 (1932); New Jerse......
-
Wells v. State
...he acted not in necessary self-defense, but in the heat of passion without malice, were questions for the jury. Anderson v. State, 199 Miss. 885, 25 So.2d 474 (1946). Accordingly, the court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether appellant was guilty of murder. Jones v. Stat......
-
Harris v. State
...know whose it was, but there is no testimony that anybody other than Johnny brandished a pistol inside the cafe. In Anderson v. State, 199 Miss. 885, 25 So.2d 474 (1946), a case in which the accused and one Vera Evans had just engaged in a quarrel, and the accused was walking past her, we s......
-
Bandy v. State, 56510
...(1954); McNally v. State, 213 Miss. 356, 56 So.2d 834 (1952); Yarbrough v. State, 202 Miss. 820, 32 So.2d 436 (1947); Anderson v. State, 199 Miss. 885, 25 So.2d 474 (1946); Fairley v. State, 152 Miss. 656, 120 So. 747 (1929); Peters v. State, 106 Miss. 333, 63 So. 666 (1913). In none of the......