Anderson v. State

• Citation: 95 S.W. 1037
• Parties: ANDERSON v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 23 May 1906
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

95 S.W. 1037

ANDERSON v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 23, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Bastrop County; Dyer Moore, Special Judge.

Connie Anderson was convicted of robbery, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Page, Miley & Price, for appellant. J. E. Yantis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of robbery, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of 20 years, hence this appeal.

Prosecutor, Joe Evans, testified substantially: That he was a fisherman by occupation, and was camped on the Colorado river, some three miles above the town of Bastrop. That on the day of the alleged robbery he had gone down the river to Bastrop, and sold some fish. That he had gone home to his camp, arriving there late in the evening, and, finding he needed some tobacco and other things, returned to Bastrop. There he got his tobacco and other articles, and started back to camp, about 8 o'clock. Shortly after leaving the town, and in the suburbs, he was set upon by two persons, who knocked him down and robbed him of some $11. That it was dark and he could not see the parties, but heard them talking. After the robbery he came to town, notified the officers, and R. E. Buchanan (the accomplice) was arrested that night. At the scene of the robbery Evans found some cuffs or collars which had the initials of Buchanan on them, and they were afterwards identified as his property. For the conviction of appellant the state relied mainly on the testimony of the witness Buchanan, who stated that he and appellant were sitting in a saloon, when they observed prosecutor, Evans. Appellant told him that Evans had money and said that they should rob him. They followed him out in the suburbs and robbed him. As to the identification of appellant being one of the parties engaged in the robbery, the corroborating testimony relied on by the state was to the effect that appellant and Buchanan were seen together shortly before the alleged robbery, and were seen together afterwards. Furthermore, Evans stated on the trial that he recognized appellant as one of the robbers by his voice. Appellant's theory of defense was the want of identification, and that the state's case, as made out by the accomplice, was not sufficiently corroborated. This is a sufficient statement of the case to discuss the assignments.

On the trial the state introduced the evidence of Buchanan, to the effect that he made to the sheriff and others the same statement that he testified to on the trial concerning the circumstances of the robbery. This was objected to by appellant on the ground that it was not made in the presence of appellant, and appellant could not be bound thereby. According to the bill of exceptions (which was reserved in the statement of facts, and is in rather a confused condition), it seems that said testimony was admitted, or the witness allowed to corroborate himself in this manner, because he had been attacked in the cross-examination; that is, he stated, in response to counsel during cross-examination, that he had at first told lies about the robbery, and denied having been engaged in the robbery and claimed he was innocent. It is also made to appear in this cross-examination that this witness was induced to turn state's evidence by being informed by the officers that it might go better with him and he would get less punishment if he would tell the truth about it. They also stated to him that they had found his cuffs or collars, and had sufficient evidence against him. As to the admission of this character of testimony, we understand the rule to be that, where a witness has been impeached by showing that he made other and different statements in regard to the matter than that testified to by him on the trial, he can be corroborated by showing that he made similar statements to that testified to by him recently after the occurrence, or where evidence has been introduced tending to show that the testimony given by the witness has been recently fabricated, or that he has been induced to testify under improper influences or motives, he may be corroborated by showing that he made a similar statement to that testified to by him before any inducement was offered to so testify. Sanders v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 525, 21 S. W. 258; Riojas v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 182, 36 S. W. 268; Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. R. 118, 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. W. 638, 70 Am. St. Rep. 719. No testimony was introduced by the appellant showing that the accomplice had made a statement as to the facts attending the robbery different from those testified by him on the trial. Appellant merely showed by this witness on cross-examination that for a time he denied all participation in the robbery. In this attitude of the case the state was permitted to show that he made a similar statement to that testified to by him to the sheriff and others; but in that connection it was shown that this statement was subsequent to some inducement offered by the officers, as that the case would go lighter with him, if he told the truth about the transaction, and he was also told that they had evidence against him. He then, according to...