Anderson v. State

• Decision Date: 29 July 1896
• Parties: ANDERSON et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

20 So. 765

38 Fla. 3

ANDERSON et al. v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

July 29, 1896

Error to criminal court of record, Duval county; H. B. Philips Judge.

Leon Anderson and Edward Brown were convicted of receiving stolen goods, and bring error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Our statute (Rev. St. s 2451) which provides that 'whoever buys, receives or aids in the concealment of stolen money goods or property, knowing the same to have been stolen shall be punished,' etc., makes the buying and receiving of stolen goods, knowing the same to have been stolen, a substantive felony.

2. Where the offense of receiving stolen goods is a substantive felony, it is not necessary, in an information for such offense, to state the name of the thief who stole the goods nor the person from whom the same were received, nor that the names of such persons are unknown.

3. An information which charges that the defendants, 'on the 30th day of December, A. D. 1895, in the county and state aforesaid, did have, receive, and aid in the concealment of,' certain goods described in the information, the property of one B. M. Baer, 'well knowing that said property had before that been taken, stolen, and carried away, contrary to the form of the statute,' etc., is fatally defective, in not charging that the goods received by the defendants were stolen goods.

4. In a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, the fact that the goods received by the defendants were stolen goods is an essential element of the offense with which they are charged, and should be directly alleged. It must not be left to inference or conjecture from other facts which are stated.

COUNSEL John L. Doggett, for plaintiffs in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

LIDDON, J.

The plaintiffs in error were convicted upon the second count of an information presented against them and other persons in the court below. Said second count reads as follows: 'And your informant aforesaid further information makes that the said John Brown, William Scott, Charles Smith, Henry Alexander, Leon Anderson, and Edward Brown aforesaid, on the 30th day of December, A. D. 1895, in the county and state aforesaid, did have, receive, and aid in the concealment of nine pairs of pants, of the value of twenty-seven dollars; five dress coats, of the value of forty dollars; two overcoats, of the value of thirty dollars; all of the value of ninety-seven dollars, the property of one B. M. Bear; they, the said John Brown, William Scott, Henry Alexander, Leon Anderson, and Edward Brown, then and there well knowing that said property had before that been taken, stolen, and carried away, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida.'

After the verdict the defendants moved to arrest the judgment upon the grounds, among others, that the information does not charge from whom the alleged stolen goods were received, and that the information fails to allege that the goods were received with a felonious intention, and for other grounds apparent upon the face of the proceedings. The order overruling the motion to arrest the judgment is made the basis of an assignment of error.

It is argued that the information is fatally defective in not naming the person from whom the goods were received by the defendants. There is no merit in this contention. Formerly, in England, under the statute of 5 Anne, c. 31, § 5, and formerly, and perhaps now, in some states of this Union where the same statute prevails, the receiver of stolen goods was regarded as an accessory after the fact to the stealing. Upon this view it has been held necessary, in an indictment for the offense, to state the name of the person from whom the goods were received. State v. Ives, 13 Ired. 338; State v. Beatty, 62 N.C. 52. It seems that the Texas court, in a very brief opinion, without stating the reason inducing it so to do, has followed the North Carolina cases. State v. Perkins, 45 Tex. 10. The statute of Anne was afterwards, in England, superseded by the statutes of Wm. III. and Geo. II., which make the offense a substantive felony. Our statute (Rev. St. § 2451) provides that 'whoever buys, receives or aids in the concealment of stolen money, goods or property, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished,' etc. The...