Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 12 March 1903 |
| Citation | 117 Ga. 255,43 S.E. 835 |
| Parties | ANDERSON. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
HOMICIDE—DYING DECLARATIONS—INSTRUCTIONS—SELF-DEFENSE.
1. In the trial of one accused of murder, evidence of declarations of the deceased as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him should be submitted to the jury, with proper instructions, when the preliminary evidence shows prima facie that these declarations were made when the deceased was in articulo mortis and conscious of his condition.
2. There is no merit in an assignment of error to the effect that a certain charge, correct in itself, is erroneous because the court failed to charge some other proposition of law applicable to the case.
3. In instructing the jury as to the law of
self-defense in a case of homicide, there is no error, though the accused be a woman, in charging that, in order to justify the killing, it must appear that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man— of one reasonably courageous and reasonably self-possessed—and not of a coward; the word "man" being used in its generic sense.
4. In the absence of a request to charge, a new trial will not be granted because of the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury fully as to the law applicable to the impeachment of witnesses.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Ware County; F. W. Dart, Judge.
Kizzie Anderson was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.
S. W. Hitch and Jno. T. Myers, for plaintiff in error.
Jno. W. Bennett, Sol. Gen., and J. Walter Bennett, for the State.
Under an indictment for murder, Kizzie Anderson was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. She moved for a new trial. The judge overruled the motion, and the movant excepted.
1. Evidence of certain declarations made by the deceased while he was in articulo mortis was admitted over the objection of the accused. The objection was that it did not appear that the accused realized at the time that he was in a dying condition. "Dying declarations, made by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, are admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide." Pen. Code 1895, § 1000. The evidence introduced in the preliminary examination to determine the admissibility of the declarations in this case was sufficient to show, at least prima facie, that the deceased was, at the time they were made, conscious of his condition. It was therefore not erroneous to allow them to go to the jury; the court instructing the jury in his charge that the declarations should be disregarded unless the jury determined that the deceased was in a dying condition, and conscious of his approaching death. See Varne-doe v. State, 75 Ga. 181, 58 Am. Rep. 465; Walton v. State, 79 Ga. 447, 5 S. E. 203. Complaint was also made in the motion for new trial that the court erred in charging on the subject of dying declarations, in that the charge left the jury free to consider such declarations as evidence for all purposes, when by law they should be considered only in investigating the cause of the death of the deceased, and who killed him. We think the charge is not subject to this criticism. After the court had quoted the Code section above set out, and had explained that the court's admission in evidence of the dying declaration was upon a prima facie showing, the charge continued as follows: "It is now for you to determine, first, whether the evidence sufficiently showed that he was conscious of hisapproaching death, and that his death was really approaching, to authorize the admission of said declaration; and, if not, you should disregard the dying declaration altogether; but, if you think such evidence was sufficient for the introduction of such declaration under the rules as I have given you, you should then consider such declaration as evidence in the case, together with the other evidence." When taken...
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Holland v. State
...or a drunken man, but the fears of a reasonably courageous and sober man." Without adjudging this reversible error (see Anderson v. State, 117 Ga. 255, 43 S. E. 835), yet under the peculiar facts of this case we may say that this sen-tentious form of expression is not unlikely to mislead an......
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Holland v. State
...or a drunken man, but the fears of a reasonably courageous and sober man." Without adjudging this reversible error (see Anderson v. State, 117 Ga. 255, 43 S.E. 835), under the peculiar facts of this case we may say that this sententious form of expression is not unlikely to mislead an avera......
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Baker v. State
...written request, the failure of the judge to so charge will not be held error. Watts v. State, 48 S. E. 142, 120 Ga. 496; Anderson v. State, 43 S. E. 835, 117 Ga. 255. 2. An accomplice is one who is present at the commission of the crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator. "Criminal inten......