Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 42093,42093 |
| Citation | 254 Ga. 470,330 S.E.2d 592 |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael C. Clark, court appointed, Clark & McLaughlin, Lawrenceville, for Brian Gerard Anderson.
W. Bryant Huff, Dist. Atty., Lawrenceville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Dennis R. Dunn, Sr. Atty., for the State.
On February 21, 1984, the defendant left his home in South Bend, Indiana and drove to Atlanta to visit his mother, traveling fifteen hours without rest. Once in Atlanta, the defendant's stepfather met him to lead the defendant to his mother's new home. Instead of following his stepfather, the defendant drove into Gwinnett County, stopping at a convenience store on Georgia Highway 20. There the defendant climbed on top of a parked tanker truck transporting propionic acid and opened the dome of the cargo tank. When the driver forced him down, the defendant lay under the wheels of the truck. When coaxed from that position, the defendant stood in the center of Highway 20. The defendant eventually entered his automobile and drove north on Highway 20. The evidence is undisputed that the defendant drove, at a speed of 68 miles per hour, across the center line striking head-on a 1984 Buick station wagon, without attempting to brake his vehicle or otherwise avoid the collision. The driver, Frances Crymes, who was enroute to Lawrenceville to serve as a juror in Gwinnett Superior Court, was killed. Her passenger, James Savage, suffered severe injuries, the treatment of which required a month of hospitalization. When police arrived at the scene of the collision, the defendant stated Later the defendant stated to Gwinnett County detectives, In the emergency room the defendant stated to the attending nurse "something told me to pull in front of this car."
The defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of the malice murder of Frances Crymes, and guilty but mentally ill of the aggravated assault of James Savage.
1. The defendant maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict as to the charge of malice murder, arguing the evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to support the verdict. Defendant's position is that the evidence supports, at most, a conviction of homicide by vehicle, OCGA § 40-6-393(a). 1 The defendant concedes he acted with "reckless disregard for the safety of" others, OCGA § 40-6-390(a), 2 in driving head-on into the victim's automobile, but maintains he did not cause her death with either express or implied malice aforethought, OCGA § 16-5-1(a), 3 such that he is guilty of malice murder. Defendant maintains he intended to take his own life, but did not intend to take the life of another.
The parties are in agreement that the evidence does not show "express malice" as defined by OCGA § 16-5-1(b), 4 and that if the conviction for malice murder is to stand, it must be predicated on implied malice. Section 16-5-1(b) of the Official Code of Georgia states that "Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." The defendant's statement to law enforcement officers that he regretted the victim's death, "but it had to be somebody," is evidence of an intent to kill someone else in order to take his own life. That the primary purpose of the defendant's action was to take his own life does not preclude a finding of malice where he chose a method resulting in the taking of the life of another and failing to take his own. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to the count of malice murder. OCGA § 17-9-1(a). Furthermore, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with malice aforethought, caused the death of Frances Crymes. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); OCGA § 16-5-1(a).
2. The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to the charge of aggravated assault of James Savage. "A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults: (1)...
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