Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 07 February 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 159,159 |
| Citation | 3 Md.App. 85,237 A.2d 813 |
| Parties | Robert Edward ANDERSON v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Carl A. Durkee, Pikesville, for appellant.
Henry J. Frankel, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Samuel A. Green, Jr., and Gary Huddles, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore County, respectively, Towson, on brief, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.
The appellant was found guilty of two offenses of grand larceny of an automobile in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, by the court sitting without a jury. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed 5 years on each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. The sole contention on this appeal is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the convictions.
The first count of indictment No. 31951 charged the appellant with the larceny, on February 9, 1967, of a 1964 Chevrolet Impala of the value of $100 or more belonging to William Hobson Spencer IV. The evidence before the court showed that about 7:45 P.M. on the date charged Mr. Spencer discovered his automobile, valued at about $1,800, to be missing from the parking lot in the vicinity of the Towson Armory. He had not given anyone permission to remove it. He went to the Baltimore County Police Department and reported the car as stolen. On February 10, 1967 (the time of day is not shown by the evidence), a patrolman of the Baltimore City Police Department, proceeding south on Greenmount Avenue in Baltimore City, saw the car going north on Greenmount Avenue at 25th Street. Noting that it turned east on 25th Street, the patrolman drove around the triangular shaped block at 25th Street and The Alameda and saw the car stopped for a red light. When the light turned green the car turned north on The Alameda. The patrolman pulled behind it and indicated by his red flashing light that he wanted it to stop. The car sped away. He radioed in the license tag and received information that the car was reported stolen. He pursued the car several blocks to Loch Raven Drive and The Alameda where it stopped long enough to allow two occupants to jump out and then again sped away. The chase continued until 'it stopped on a lawn' (the evidence does not show how far from the intersection of Loch Raven Drive and The Alameda) and the appellant, who was driving the car, was apprehended.
The appellant concedes that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of larceny of use (Md. Code , Art. 27, § 349) but urges that it was not sufficient to prove larceny (Code, Art. 27, § 340). We said in Gopshes v. State, 1 Md.App. 396, 398, 230 A.2d 475, 477
The appellant argues that the State failed to prove criminal intent, claiming that the evidence did not show that he intended to deprive the owner of his ownership in the automobile but only intended to take it 'for a ride,' concluding from the direction in which the car was proceeding that it was 'heading back toward Towson,' presumably to return it to the owner. He supports his contention by evidence produced by the State with regard to some six other like charges, on which stets were entered at the trial, showing that other automobiles which it was alleged he had stolen, had been abandoned in the general area from which they had been taken, five within a short time of the taking and the sixth eleven days thereafter. Even assuming such evidence of other larcenies to be relevant to the consideration of intent in the instant offense, which we do not decide (see Gorski v. State, 1 Md.App. 200, 228 A.2d 835; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.), § 237), we think there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support a rational inference that the appellant intended to deprive the owner of his ownership in the automobile. We note that there was no direct evidence to the contrary. See Weaver v. State, 226 Md. 431, 174 A.2d 76; compare Pachmayr v. State, 1 Md.App. 270, 229 A.2d 434. We cannot say that evidence that the appellant may not have had an intent to deprive the owners of other motor vehicles he may have stolen of their ownership by abandoning them compels the trial court to find such lack of intent here. His flight when accosted by the police and subsequently after h...
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