Pachmayr v. State

• Decision Date: 10 May 1967
• Docket Number: No. 126,126
• Citation: 229 A.2d 434,1 Md.App. 270
• Parties: William Vincent PACHMAYR v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 270

1 Md.App. 270

229 A.2d 434

William Vincent PACHMAYR v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 126.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 10, 1967.

Roland Walker, Baltimore, for appellant.

Robert C. Murphy, Atty. Gen. (former) William T. S. Bricker, Spec. Atty., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Raymond Faby, Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Baltimore, for appellee.

Before ANDERSON, MORTON and ORTH, JJ., and WALTER M. JENIFER, and JAMES MacGILL, Special Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury on April 22, 1966 of larceny after trust and sentenced to eighteen months in the Maryland House of Correction, dating from February 5, 1966. He contends on this appeal from that judgment (a) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in that there was no proof of any intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, and (b) that the court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the case on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The essential facts are these: Appellant was employed as an automobile salesman by Federal Motors, Inc. on January 5, 1966. A 1966 Mercury Comet sedan was assigned to him as a 'demonstrator' for the purpose of inducing sales of his employer's automobiles. Appellant was permitted, however, to use the car for his own personal needs. He worked steadily for one month. On Monday, February 7, 1966, he phoned his employer advising that his brother was ill, and was told to take the day off. Appellant phoned his employer again the next day, stating that he had been up with his brother the previous night, and was told by his employer 'to get some sleep and come in later on.' Appellant phoned his employer again on Wednesday, February 9, stating at that time, according to the testimony of Mr. Sandidge, formerly Sales Manager at Federal motors, that appellant's brother had died. Appellant, in his testimony, deined that he told his employer that his brother had died. In any event, appellant was again told that he could remain away from work. Appellant phoned his employer again either late Wednesday afternoon or Thursday morning, February 10, at which time he was told 'to bring the car in' which, according to Sandidge's testimony, meant that appellant's employment was being terminated. Appellant phoned his employer again on Friday, February 11, advising that he would return the car on Saturday, February 12. He was then told, according to Sandidge's testimony, to return the car that day. Appellant did not return the car that day but, instead, phoned again the following Monday morning, February 14, at which time he told his employer that he would return the car that evening, are would bring with him some potential customers who were interested in purchasing a car.

Appellant testified that prior to February 11, he was not told to return the car by his employer, and that, at least prior to the late afternoon of Monday, February 14, he did not think that his employment had been terminated. He testified that he told his employer that he was unable to return the car on Friday, February 11; that he had every intention of going back to work at Federal Motors; that he parked the car on the street in front of a used furniture business, where he worked 'on the side'; that the owner of that business was one Conway Ward; that the car was removed from that address sometime between 9:00 a. m. and 3:20 p. m. on February 14; that he reported the car stolen at that time and advised police that he thought Conway Ward had taken the car; and that the police told him that their investigation indicated that Ward was seen driving the car on Monday, February 14. In reporting the car missing, appellant listed the owner as Federal Motors, Inc. That appellant reported the car as stolen on the afternoon of Monday, February 14, was corroborated by a witness who overheard him make the phone call to police. Police records indicated that appellant had not reported the car as stolen, but rather requested police assistance in locating the car for the owner, Federal Motors, it then being missing.

Appellant was arrested on February 17 upon a warrant sworn out for his arrest by his employer. At that time, he told police that the car had been stolen and that he did not know the whereabouts of the vehicle.

The vehicle was recovered in Anne Arundel County on February 18 in a wrecked condition, the tires and wheels having been removed. Damage to the vehicle amounted to $533.54.

Upon this evidence, the trial judge found appellant not guilty of false pretenses, larceny and unauthorized use of the vehicle. In convicting him of larceny after trust, the trial judge stated that he believed from the evidence that appellant was told to return the car and that he understood that by reason of such demand his employment had been terminated. The trial judge further stated that while appellant had obtained the car lawfully, he did not have it lawfully after 5:00 p. m. on Friday, February 11; that it was a 'violation of law' for appellant to fail to return the car when asked to do so, and that even assuming that the car was misplaced or stolen on February 14, appellant having had no right to keep the car from February 11 to February 14 was nevertheless guilty of larceny after trust. It appears therefore that the conviction was predicated entirely upon appellant's refusal or failure to return the car...