Anderson v. State, 1182
| Decision Date | 23 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 1182,1182 |
| Parties | William R. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 436. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Paul Levy, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Schuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant, William R. Anderson, was charged with count one of murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1(1) and count two of robbery, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1. The State dropped count two pursuant to a plea agreement. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to count one which was accepted by the trial court. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years.
Appellant raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in concluding that appellant's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent where the record is without conflict that the trial court failed to personally address appellant and advise him that by his plea he was waiving his right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt according to Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3.
The facts relevant to the issue show that on February 5, 1979 William R. Anderson tendered a plea of guilty to murder in the Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division Two, pursuant to a written plea agreement whereby the State would dismiss a separate count charging robbery, and make no recommendation as to the sentence. The trial court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced appellant to a term of forty years which sentence was subsequently modified to thirty years. At the hearing on the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, the trial court made the transcripts of appellant's guilty plea and sentencing a part of the record. The transcripts indicate that appellant was not advised that he was waiving his right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
A plea of guilty is an admission or confession of guilt made in court before a judge. It is also a waiver of specific constitutional rights. Fundamental due process requires that a criminal charge be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, In Re Winship, (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, and a defendant's waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and appear affirmatively on the record of the guilty plea proceedings. Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. In order to uphold a guilty plea as knowing and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tumulty v. State, 48A02-9409-CR-539
...the required sequence appear of record. A guilty plea operates as a waiver of specific constitutional rights. See Anderson v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1101, 1102. Among those rights is the fundamental due process requirement that the criminal charge be proved beyond a reasonable doubt......
-
Martin v. State
...a departure from earlier cases, see, e.g., Austin v. State, (1984) Ind., 466 N.E.2d 445, on rehearing, 468 N.E.2d 1027; Anderson v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1101; Carr v. State, (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 343; Early v. State, (1983) Ind., 454 N.E.2d 416, in which we applied the strict Ge......
-
Martin v. State
...advisement failure by court, notwithstanding a record reflecting knowledge and understanding of the rights, are: Anderson v. State (Decided July 23, 1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1101 (guilty plea February 5, 1979); Davis v. State (Decided April 13, 1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1317 (guilty plea prior t......
-
Crocker v. State
...a departure from earlier cases, see, e.g., Austin v. State, (1984) Ind., 466 N.E.2d 445, on rehearing, 468 N.E.2d 1027; Anderson v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1101; Carr v. State, (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 343; Early v. State, (1983) Ind., 454 N.E.2d 416, in which we applied the strict Ge......