Anderson v. State, CR
| Decision Date | 21 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 311 Ark. 332,842 S.W.2d 855 |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Parties | Ricky ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 92-841. |
Jack W. Barker, El Dorado, for appellant.
Kent G. Holt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant was arrested for tampering with physical evidence and possession of a controlled substance. He twice confessed to both felonies and was charged and convicted of both crimes. He appeals and argues that the trial court made two erroneous rulings. We affirm the convictions as there was no reversible error.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial following a comment by the prosecutor. We do not reach the issue because the appellant did not make an objection that would apprise the trial court of the argument he now makes. We have consistently held that an objection below must be sufficiently specific to inform the trial judge of the error complained of on appeal. Kittler v. State, 304 Ark. 344, 802 S.W.2d 925 (1991).
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress both of his confessions because he was under the influence of cocaine and was unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. A court may properly conclude that the accused has waived his Miranda rights only if the "totality of the circumstances" reflects he possessed the requisite level of comprehension. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Whether an accused had sufficient capacity to waive his constitutional rights, or was too incapacitated due to drugs or alcohol to make an intelligent waiver, is a question of fact for the trial court. McDougald v. State, 295 Ark. 276, 748 S.W.2d 340 (1988); Baker v. State, 289 Ark. 430, 711 S.W.2d 816 (1986); Abdullah v. State, 281 Ark. 239, 663 S.W.2d 166 (1984); Fuller v. State, 278 Ark. 450, 646 S.W.2d 700 (1983); Hunes v. State, 274 Ark. 268, 623 S.W.2d 835 (1981). While we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, we will not reverse the trial court unless its determination is clearly erroneous. Graham v. State, 277 Ark. 465, 642 S.W.2d 880 (1982).
The arresting police officer testified that at the time of appellant's first confession, appellant was unsteady on his feet, slurred some of his words, and appeared to be somewhat intoxicated and possibly high on cocaine, but that he was coherent, understood the process, and understood his constitutional rights and his...
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