Anderson v. State

• Decision Date: 24 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 711,2010.,711
• Citation: 21 A.3d 52
• Parties: Valerie I. ANDERSON, Respondent Below, Appellant,v.STATE of Delaware, Petitioner Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

21 A.3d 52

Valerie I. ANDERSON, Respondent Below, Appellant,

v.STATE of Delaware, Petitioner Below, Appellee.

No. 711

2010.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: April 20, 2011.Decided: May 24, 2011.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. N10A–04–004.Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant.Paul R. Wallace (argued) and Elizabeth A. Powers, Esquires, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee.Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.JACOBS, Justice:

The State of Delaware, as petitioner-below appellee, filed an habitual driving offender petition in the Court of Common Pleas against the respondent-below appellant, Valerie I. Anderson (“Anderson”), under Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Motor Vehicle Code.¹ Hours after declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, the Court of Common Pleas, sua sponte, vacated its earlier judgment, holding that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Anderson's case was inconsistent with the State's prosecution of other habitual driving offender petitions heard that same day. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the Court of Common Pleas' decision as an abuse of discretion, and reinstated the judgment declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender. We agree with the Superior Court that the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its earlier order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, and therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2006, the State petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for an order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender under 21 Del. C. § 2802.² Although the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) had recommended Anderson to the Attorney General for prosecution on three previous occasions,³ the December 7, 2006 petition was the first time the State had filed an habitual driving offender petition against her.

At a hearing on the petition held on October 26, 2007, the Court of Common Pleas granted the State's request for a four-month continuance to allow Anderson to secure counsel.⁴ The court rescheduled the hearing for February 29, 2008. At the rescheduled hearing, the Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) prosecuting Anderson's case withdrew the petition “after review of [the] petition and record.” Withdrawal of the petition made Anderson eligible to reinstate her driver's license, which she did in April 2009.

Thereafter, the State received a fourth recommendation from the DMV, and filed a second habitual driving offender petition against Anderson on August 10, 2009. On September 25, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas conducted a hearing on the State's second petition. At that hearing, Anderson did not dispute the three convictions that formed the basis for that petition, nor did she dispute that her driving record qualified her as an habitual driving offender. Rather, she argued that revoking her driving privileges would create a hardship, because she was responsible for picking up her grandchildren from school and, moreover, she worked three days a week. The court noted that it understood the hardship that might be created, but stated that it “really [did not] have a choice” since the General Assembly “provided [no] discretion ... as to whether it is or is not fair.” Accordingly, the trial court granted the State's petition and declared Anderson an habitual driving offender under 21 Del. C. § 2807.⁵

That same morning, the trial court heard several other habitual driving offender petitions the State had prosecuted against other drivers. In one of those proceedings, the State requested a six-month continuance, which the trial court granted. Immediately thereafter, the trial judge called the DAG to a sidebar conference, and the following conversation ensued:

THE COURT: So the lady with the three kids and a job, and the grandkids; you couldn't do that for her?

DAG: No.

THE COURT: What's the difference?

DAG: Because we did it once for her.

THE COURT: Oh, you already did it once.

DAG: That's correct. The thing was submitted.

THE COURT: Got it.

After the conclusion of the habitual driving offender calendar, the trial court conducted, sua sponte, its own review of Anderson's driving record and compared it to the records of the other drivers offered a six-month continuance by the State that same day. The Court of Common Pleas found that it could not distinguish Anderson's driving record “from other persons who were offered the opportunity to continue the hearing for six (6) months to avoid new traffic charges....” ⁶ Accordingly, that court vacated its earlier judgment declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, on the ground that “justice demands fairness, including a consistent application of prosecutorial discretion ... [but] the exercise of [that] prosecutorial judgment as to [Anderson] was not consistent....” ⁷

Thereafter, the State next moved the Court of Common Pleas to vacate its September 25, 2009 order and reinstate the judgment declaring Anderson as an habitual driving offender. The court denied that motion, for two reasons. That court first determined that the DAG had made “inaccurate representations” at the September 25, 2009 hearing, because the State had not offered Anderson a “standard” six-month continuance when it prosecuted its 2006 habitual driving offender petition against her.⁸ Therefore, the DAG's explanation—that the State did not offer Anderson a continuance in the 2009 petition because “we did it once for her”—constituted a misrepresentation.⁹

The Court of Common Pleas then concluded that it had the “express and inherent” judicial authority to vacate its own order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender.¹⁰ The court held that the DAG's statement constituted a “misrepresentation” within the meaning of Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 60(b)(3), and provided the necessary legal basis for vacating its earlier judgment under Rule 60(b).¹¹ The court also determined that the interests of justice required the exercise of its inherent power to vacate its earlier order sua sponte, because it was “patently unfair for the [State] to offer ‘standard’ [six-month] continuances to other respondents whose drivers' records were worse than Anderson's record,” ¹² such “that [the State's] exercise of prosecutorial judgment as to Anderson violated principles of justice.” ¹³

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas had abused its discretion by vacating its order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender.¹⁴ Finding that the trial court had “misinterpreted the interaction between prosecutorial and judicial discretion,” ¹⁵ the Superior Court explained that “Delaware courts' deference in reviewing prosecutorial enforcement decisions extends to decisions regarding whom to prosecute as an habitual driving offender and how such prosecutions proceed,” and that those prosecutorial decisions are “not subject to judicial oversight unless they violate equal protection or due process principles.” ¹⁶ The Superior Court determined that the Court of Common Pleas also had “exceeded the scope of its inherent and express authority,” ¹⁷ because neither the “interests of justice” nor the “misrepresentation” exceptions of Rule 60(b) were implicated by the facts of this case.¹⁸ Anderson appeals from that Superior Court ruling.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Anderson claims that the Superior Court erred by reversing the Court of Common Pleas' order vacating its judgment. She first argues that the Court of Common Pleas properly exercised its authority to vacate her habitual driving offender status, because that was done to correct “an unfair application and enforcement” of the habitual driving offender statute. Anderson also contends that the Court of Common Pleas, having relied on the State's “calculated misrepresentations,” had the authority to vacate its previous order under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules 11 and 60(b)(3).

This Court's review of the Court of Common Pleas' decision mirrors that of the Superior Court.¹⁹ We independently review the Court of Common Pleas' determination for “whether there is legal error, whether the trial court's factual findings are sufficiently supported by the record, and whether those findings are the product of an orderly and logical reasoning process.” ²⁰ We review de novo the Court of Common Pleas' formulation and application of legal principles,²¹ but will not overturn the trial court's factual findings unless those findings are “clearly wrong.” ²²

I. There Was No “Wrong” Requiring A Remedy

A. Anderson's Argument

Anderson first claims that the Superior Court erred in finding that the State has discretion under Section 2804 of the habitual driving offender statute to decide whether or not to bring an habitual driving offender petition against a respondent.²³ She argues that the statutory language “[t]he Attorney General, upon receiving the abstract from the [DMV], shall forthwith file a petition ...” requires the State to institute a petition every time the DMV makes a recommendation.²⁴ Because the State did not obey that mandate, but instead exercised its prosecutorial discretion in determining which petitions to bring, the Court of Common Pleas had the inherent power to vacate her adjudicated habitual driving offender status to remedy “an unfair application and enforcement” of Section 2804.

Anderson's claim rests on an incorrect premise, namely, that the State's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion constituted a “wrong” that required a judicial remedy. Article III, Section 17 of the Delaware Constitution provides that it is the role of the executive to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” ²⁵ Thus, “[t]he decision as to which crimes and criminals to prosecute is entrusted ... not to the judiciary, but to the executive who is charged with seeing that...