Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 28 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D99-2389.,4D99-2389. |
| Citation | 780 So.2d 1012 |
| Parties | Eston E. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Cherry Grant, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Frank J. Ingrassia and Consuelo Maingot, Assistant Attorney Generals, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
We reverse Anderson's conviction for violation of section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), felony fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer, because the jury was erroneously instructed on the elements of the offense.
At trial, Officer Pope testified that while on patrol in a marked Lake Worth police vehicle, he observed Anderson commit a traffic infraction. Pope pulled in behind Anderson's car and, turning on his emergency lights, tried to conduct a traffic stop. Pope also activated his siren to let out a "brief wail." Anderson did not stop but continued on his way, proceeding through a stop sign without stopping completely.
Pope continued to follow Anderson as he approached another intersection, where Anderson again failed to come to a complete stop. Pope hit his siren again to make a "yelp or slow bursting sound." According to Pope, Anderson's speed at the time was approximately twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. Pope continued following Anderson until he eventually came to a stop, several blocks later, in the driveway of his residence.
After parking, Anderson got out and began yelling and demanding to speak with a supervisor. Pope and Officer Donte, who was assisting, drew their guns. Anderson was told to place his hands on the roof of the car, which he did. Donte approached Anderson and told him he was going to handcuff him. Anderson began to flail his arms to keep from being handcuffed. Pope tried to assist Donte by physically grabbing Anderson, but Anderson broke loose and ran toward the front door of the house. Anderson was unable to get inside the house because Pope caught him at the front door.
At trial, Officer Donte admitted that he had previously stated in his deposition that he never felt Anderson was trying to get away from him. When Pope later asked Anderson why he did not stop, Anderson said that he thought Pope was a different police officer with whom Anderson had had previous problems. According to Anderson, he had had run-ins with another identified officer of that department and wanted to make sure that he was protected by the presence of witnesses when he was stopped.
In charging the jury, the trial judge read the following instruction on fleeing and eluding:
As to Count I, before you can find the defendant guilty of fleeing or attempting to allude [sic] a police officer in a marked unit, the State must have proven these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. That Eston Anderson was operating a motor vehicle in Florida; that a duly-authorized law enforcement officer directed Eston Anderson to stop or remained stopped; that Eston Anderson, knowing he had been directed to stop by a duly-authorized law enforcement officer, willfully fled in attempt to allude [sic] the police officer after having stopped; and that the law enforcement officer was in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with sirens and lights activated.
(emphasis added)
We find no error in the trial court's denial of Anderson's motion for judgment of acquittal, notwithstanding Officer Donte's belief that Anderson was not trying to get away, as the state is not bound by his legal conclusion. See Knox v. State, 689 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
We reverse, however, as the jury instruction included an additional non-existent element to the crime by providing that Anderson could be found guilty of the offense if he fled or attempted to elude "after having stopped."
The statute at issue, section 316.1935, provides for the misdemeanor and third-degree felony commission of the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer as follows:
§ 316.1935(1) and (2), Fla.Stat.
Subsection (1) of the statute provides that a misdemeanor is committed if the defendant, knowing he had been directed to stop, either (1) fails to stop or (2) having stopped, flees in an attempt to elude the officer. See § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. Subsection (2), which defines the third-degree felony, provides that the offense is committed when the person "willfully flees or attempts to elude" and the police officer is in a jurisdictionally marked vehicle with sirens and lights activated. See § 316.1935(2), Fla.Stat. Notably, the language "having stopped, flees in an attempt to elude ..." does not appear in subsection (2). While evidence that ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Harrison
...including that the offender "willfully refused or failed to stop the vehicle in compliance with the order"); Anderson v. State, 780 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.2001) (identifying prosecutor's charge that defendant Anderson's failure to stop "formed the basis for the Florida courts di......
-
Rowley v. State
...elude a law enforcement officer who was "in a jurisdictionally marked vehicle with sirens and lights activated." Anderson v. State, 780 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The only defense to the charge was necessity, also called duress, compulsion, or coercion. See Mickel v. State, 929 S......
-
Garzon v. State
...gun was "other deadly weapon" under statute prohibiting possession of a concealed weapon by convicted felon); Anderson v. State, 780 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (concluding fundamental error occurred when court instructed jury on "non-existent element" of crime of fleeing and eludi......
-
King v. State, 5D00-3801.
...crime charged. Davis v. State, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D2385, ___ So.2d ___, 2001 WL 1190941 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct.3, 2001); Anderson v. State, 780 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). If the trial court issues an incomplete or inaccurate jury instruction, fundamental error may occur if the error relates ......
-
Unpreserved issues in criminal appeals.
...760 So. 2d at 98, if appellate courts fail to address unpreserved harmless errors. A similar error occurred in Anderson v. State, 780 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001), which held that fundamental error "is subject to the harmless error rule. See Brown v. State, 501 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 3d D.......