Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 16 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 22 Sept. Term, 2002.,22 Sept. Term, 2002. |
| Citation | 812 A.2d 1016,372 Md. 285 |
| Parties | Wendell Daniel ANDERSON v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Thomas S. Hood, Towson, for petitioner.
Kathryn Grill Graeff, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued Before: BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
In this case, we must decide whether petitioner, a high school teacher, was a person with responsibility for supervision of a child, within the meaning of Md.Code Ann., Art. 27, § 35C(b) (2001 Supp.).1 We shall hold that under the circumstances presented herein, the evidence was sufficient to establish that petitioner was a person having temporary responsibility for the supervision of a child within the contemplation of the statute.
Wendell Daniel Anderson, petitioner, a high school teacher, was convicted of child abuse and several related sexual offenses.2 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, Anderson v. State, 142 Md. App. 498, 790 A.2d 732 (2002), and we granted Anderson's petition for writ of certiorari. Anderson v. State, 369 Md. 178, 798 A.2d 551 (2002). We shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals.
The victim, a fourteen-year-old girl, was a ninth grade student at Kenwood High School. She met petitioner, a math teacher at the school, through one of her teachers, Ms. Riggs. The victim was not in any of petitioner's classes or a participant in the extracurricular activities he ran. Petitioner would sometimes see her in the halls of the school, however, and would come into Ms. Riggs' classroom where the victim helped out after school, occasionally helping the victim with math problems. Petitioner also drove the victim home from school two or three times.
At trial, petitioner testified that he knew the victim had developed a crush on him. During the year, he talked to her about her relationships with boys, discussed with her his own interest in a romantic relationship with Ms. Riggs, and criticized her for her provocative choice of clothing. Petitioner testified that when the victim confronted him about her affections for him, he told her "sometime in the future there may be a chance, but right now you are way too young."
The sexual encounter between petitioner and the victim occurred on the last day of the school year, when petitioner gave the victim a ride home from school. Although he had driven her home from school on prior occasions, the victim's mother was unaware of this practice. The victim's mother testified that she believed that her daughter either took the bus, got a ride home from a friend, or called her for a ride. She testified that she entrusted Kenwood High School with the care of her daughter, but had never asked any of the teachers explicitly to be responsible for her supervision after school.
The high school principal testified about the supervisory responsibilities of the teachers. She stated that all teachers Asked about responsibility for "[a]ny scenario on school campus," the principal stated that all teachers "are responsible to assure the safety of the students." On cross-examination, however, the principal agreed that teachers have no responsibility for students they meet after the school day ends, not in connection with an academic activity.
The evening before the last day of the school year, the victim phoned petitioner to ask him for a ride home from school the following day. The Court of Special Appeals summarized the events of the following day as follows:
When [petitioner] asked [the victim] if she wanted a ride home, she accepted his offer. Sometime after 2 p.m., [petitioner] and [the victim] left the school in [petitioner's] car. While driving [the victim] home, [petitioner] asked her if she wanted to play a game of pool at his house; she replied that she did. [Petitioner] then drove [the victim] to his house. Anderson, 142 Md.App. at 503-04, 790 A.2d 732 (footnote omitted).
In the course of the ensuing investigation, Baltimore County Police Detective Joseph Donahue recorded a telephone conversation between petitioner and the victim. According to his testimony, he believed he was investigating a case of child abuse. Pursuant to the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md.Code (1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), §§ 10-401 et seq., Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the officer obtained consent to record the conversation from the victim. The officer did not obtain petitioner's consent to record the conversation, nor did he have a court order. Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress the taped recording of this conversation and to sever the child abuse charge from the sexual offense charges. Both of these motions were denied.
Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Baltimore County and proceeded to trial before the court. He maintained that he could not be convicted of child abuse because he did not have the requisite statutory responsibility for the care of a child. He also denied any sexual contact. The trial judge found that petitioner fit within the statutory definition of child abuse and believed the testimony of the victim. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of incarceration.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court noted that the "principal issue presented by this appeal is whether consensual sexual intercourse can constitute `child abuse' under Maryland law." Judge Peter Krauser, writing for an unanimous panel, noted:
"Because we find that a parent impliedly consents to a teacher taking all reasonable measures to assure the safe return of his or her child from school, including personally driving that child home; because [petitioner] assumed that responsibility when he agreed to drive the child home; because the events leading up to this unfortunate occurrence were set in motion on school property; and because, at the time of the offense, there had been no temporal break in the teacher and student relationship that existed between [petitioner] and the victim, we shall affirm [petitioner's] conviction for child abuse."
Anderson, 142 Md.App. at 501, 790 A.2d at 734-35. This Court granted Anderson's petition for writ of certiorari. Anderson v. State, 369 Md. 178, 798 A.2d 551 (2002).
Petitioner contends before this Court that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charge of child abuse because a necessary element under the statute was missing, namely, that he was either a parent, household or family member or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child. Petitioner acknowledges that a teacher is responsible for the supervision of a child at those times and places where he or she is acting as a teacher and that when the teacher is at school or is with a student off school premises for a school related activity, he "has responsibility for supervision as part of his job." He recognizes that these circumstances would fit within the notion of implied mutual consent between the parent and the school authorities. He argues, conversely, that when a teacher is with a student off school grounds, for a non-school related activity, the implied consent rationale is inapplicable and that once a teacher is no longer acting as a teacher, he or she does not have responsibility to supervise the student.
Article 27, § 35C(b) states that "[a] parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a child or a household or family member who causes abuse to the child is guilty of a felony...." Whether a teacher has responsibility for the supervision of a child, i.e., a student under eighteen years of age, is a factual question, dependent upon the particular circumstances.
It is uncontested that the act of sexual intercourse by an adult with a fourteen-year-old girl qualifies as "abuse" under the statute. Although petitioner was neither a parent nor household or family member of the victim, the Circuit Court found that petitioner had "responsibility for the supervision" of the victim at the time of the alleged misconduct. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, and held the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction. We agree.
Petitioner contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for child abuse. The standard for determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction "is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 272, 696 A.2d 443, 452-53 (1997); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994). Whether a person has responsibility for the supervision of a minor child in contemplation of Art. 27, § 35C, is a question of fact for the jury. See Newman v. State, 65 Md.App. 85, 99, 499 A.2d 492 (1985)
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