Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 07 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–17–402,CR–17–402 |
| Citation | 538 S.W.3d 279 |
| Parties | Cameron Mikkail ANDERSON, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Potts Law Office, by: Gary W. Potts, Monticello, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Kathryn Henry, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Cameron Anderson was found guilty after a jury trial in Desha County Circuit Court for the crimes of aggravated robbery, theft of property, and attempted capital murder. Anderson appeals the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence gained in a search of an apartment in Monticello, Arkansas. The search was initiated after one of the apartment residents had given his consent to search. We hold that the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm.
Our standard of review for a trial court's action granting or denying motions to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search requires that we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, giving respectful consideration to the findings of the trial court. Love v. State , 355 Ark. 334, 138 S.W.3d 676 (2003). We give considerable weight to the findings of the trial court in the resolution of evidentiary conflicts and defer to the superior position of the trial court to pass on the credibility of witnesses. Breshears v. State , 94 Ark.App. 192, 228 S.W.3d 508 (2006). Illegal entry by law enforcement officers into the homes of citizens is the "chief evil" the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect against and therefore is of the highest degree of seriousness. Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Warrantless entry into a private residence is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Latta v. State , 350 Ark. 488, 88 S.W.3d 833 (2002). Nonetheless, that presumption may be overcome if the police officer obtained consent to conduct a warrantless search. See Stone v. State , 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002). Consent to search the premises can be given only by a person who, by ownership or otherwise, is apparently entitled to give or withhold consent. Ark. R. Crim. P. 11.2(c) (2017). The determination of third-party consent, like other factual determinations relating to searches and seizures, must be judged against an objective standard. See Hillard v. State , 321 Ark. 39, 900 S.W.2d 167 (1995). The test is whether the facts available to the police officer at the moment would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises. Id.
Because Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are personal in nature, a defendant must have standing before he or she can challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds. Ramsey v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 669, 476 S.W.3d 214. It is well settled that the defendant, as the proponent of a motion to suppress, bears the burden of establishing that his or her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. Embry v. State , 70 Ark.App. 122, 15 S.W.3d 367 (2000). A defendant may testify at a suppression hearing regarding the proprietary or possessory interest necessary to establish standing without danger of self-incrimination. Ramage v. State , 61 Ark.App. 174, 966 S.W.2d 267 (1998). A person's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated by the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property. Id. One is not entitled to automatic standing simply because he or she is present in the area or on the premises searched or because an element of the offense with which he or she is charged is possession of the thing discovered in the search. Id. A visitor usually lacks a rightful expectation of privacy when present in the home of another unless the visitor stays overnight. See Minnesota v. Carter , 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) ; United States v. Hood , 551 F.Supp.2d 766 (W.D. Ark. 2008). The pertinent inquiry regarding standing to challenge a search is whether a defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Littlepage v. State , 314 Ark. 361, 863 S.W.2d 276 (1993) ; Anderson v. State , 103 Ark.App. 137, 286 S.W.3d 763 (2008).
The facts presented at the suppression hearing were as follows. Anderson was a person of interest in the investigation of an August 21, 2015 armed robbery of a Sonic in Dumas, Arkansas. The Monticello police had received a tip that Anderson might be at a particular apartment in Monticello on Gabbert Street. At that time, Tyrequs Davis and his brother, Jarius McCraney, were living at that apartment, located at 517 South Gabbert, Apartment B. McCraney's mother had paid the bills on the apartment for the month of August. Davis and McCraney each had his own bedroom; McCraney occupied the master bedroom, which had a closet. No one else lived in that apartment during August 2015.
The police chief of Monticello, Eddie Deaton, testified that he and other officers went to the apartment and made contact with Davis at the door. Deaton told Davis that they had received information that Anderson might be at this apartment and that they would like to come in to look if Davis would consent. According to Deaton, he obtained Davis's consent without using any coercion, threats, or harassment. Deaton asked Davis to sign a written consent if he agreed to it. Davis signed. Upon entry into the living room where two other men were playing video games, Deaton and Captain Carlos Garcia smelled the odor of marijuana, which odor Deaton mentioned to Davis. Garcia testified that Deaton was the one who spoke with Davis, and Garcia confirmed that consent was obtained before they entered the apartment and smelled marijuana. The officers went through the living room and kitchen, searched Davis's bedroom, and then went into the other bedroom, where they found Anderson hiding in a closet under some clothing. Anderson was taken into custody.
Deaton testified that they were also looking for weapons related to the...
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