Anderson v. State, A95A2233
| Citation | 218 Ga.App. 872,463 S.E.2d 502 |
| Decision Date | 02 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. A95A2233,A95A2233 |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Jody Anderson, Waycross, pro se.
H. Lamar Cole, Valdosta, District Attorney, A. Scott Gunn, Moultrie, and J. David Miller, Valdosta, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Jody Anderson, who was sentenced to life imprisonment upon his second conviction for selling drugs, seeks to have his sentence vacated or modified on the grounds that it was racially discriminatory.
Anderson was indicted in three counts for violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, sale of cocaine, in January 1993. As appellant had previously pled guilty to one count of the same offense in April 1991, the State filed a notice of intent to seek life sentence pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30(d). On February 9, 1993, with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered his plea of guilty to one count of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, sale of cocaine. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the other two charges were then dismissed. Prior to entering his plea, Anderson was informed by the trial court no less than five times that a life sentence would be imposed should appellant plead guilty. Anderson was also questioned at length about the services supplied by his counsel, and Anderson expressed no displeasure whatsoever with the advice or investigation performed by his attorney. After determining that Anderson understood the charges against him and that his guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily, the trial court imposed a life sentence.
Over two years later, on May 1, 1995, Anderson, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to modify or vacate sentence or petition for writ of prohibition or in the alternative motion for leave for an interlocutory appeal in forma pauperis to the Georgia Supreme Court. The trial court denied the motion, determining that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The matter was initially appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court and was subsequently transferred here on jurisdictional grounds.
1. Anderson, who is black, asserts his life sentence was "motivated by evil intent and vindictive prosecution." Particularly, he asserts that OCGA § 16-13-30(d), which permits life imprisonment upon a second conviction for certain drug-related offenses, is applied in a racially discriminatory manner. Anderson makes the unsupported assertion that 99 percent of the persons sentenced to life imprisonment in Colquitt County pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30(d) are black. Assuming arguendo that appellant's statistic was properly supported in the record, this statistic alone would be insufficient to prove intentional discrimination. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995); see also Cain v. State, 262 Ga. 598, 422 S.E.2d 535 (1992). As no evidence has been offered that (1) blacks in general or (2) appellant in particular has been selectively prosecuted under this statute in Colquitt County, appellant's claim fails. Stephens, supra.
2. Appellant also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the time he entered his plea. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Halthon-Howard v. State
...does not support Howard's assertions. See Elliott v. State, 230 Ga.App. 855, 858(4), 497 S.E.2d 817(c) (1998); Anderson v. State, 218 Ga.App. 872, 873(2), 463 S.E.2d 502 (1995). "To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show trial counsel's performance wa......
-
Gomillion v. State
...resolve it. Brundage v. State, 208 Ga. App. 58, 60, 430 S.E.2d 173 (1993) (Beasley, P. J., concurring specially); Anderson v. State, 218 Ga.App. 872, 463 S.E.2d 502 (1995); Wright v. State, 211 Ga.App. 474, 477-478, 440 S.E.2d 27 (1993). If a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel......
- Early v. State, A95A1157