Anderson v. State
| Citation | 196 S.W.3d 28 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 87060.,SC 87060. |
| Parties | Terrance ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
William J. Swift, Office of Public Defender, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty., Gen., Andrew H. Hassell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard A. Starnes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
A jury convicted Terrance Anderson of two counts of first-degree murder for the homicides of Debbie and Stephen Rainwater. The jury recommended Anderson be sentenced to death for the murder of Mrs. Rainwater and to life without probation or parole for the murder of Mr. Rainwater. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal in State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. banc 2002).1
Anderson sought post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15, and after an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied him relief. Anderson now appeals the motion court's decision. Because Anderson was sentenced to death, this Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10; order of June 16, 1988.
This Court finds that the motion court properly denied Anderson's post-conviction claims relating to his guilt, but wrongly denied him post-conviction relief relating to the imposition of the death penalty. The motion court's decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this cause is remanded. On remand, a properly selected jury may again consider whether the death penalty is warranted for the killing of Debbie Rainwater.2
Review of denial of relief under Rule 29.15 is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Mo. banc 2005). The motion court's findings are presumed correct. Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Mo. banc 2004). The motion court's disposition will only be disturbed if, after a review of the entire record, the reviewing court is left with the definite impression that a mistake has been made. Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 572.
Anderson is entitled to post-conviction relief if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances and (2) his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 572-73.
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Anderson must overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 573. This standard is met by identifying specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. It is presumed that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective. Id.
Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. Id. "[S]trategic choices made after a thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to plausible opinions are virtually unchallengeable[.]" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Where counsel has investigated possible strategies, courts should rarely second-guess counsel's actual choices." Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 736 (Mo. banc 2003). It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial strategy. Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 573.
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, Anderson is required to show that "`there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Middleton, 103 S.W.3d at 733 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "To prove ineffectiveness with regard to death penalty sentencing, [the defendant] must show that, but for his counsel's ineffective performance, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, death was not warranted." Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Mo. banc 2001).
Anderson makes five claims relating to the guilt phase, which are now addressed.
Anderson claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on the grounds of section 552.020.14, RSMo 2000,3 when the State called Dr. Byron English as a rebuttal witness in the guilt phase and he testified as to statements Anderson made during his section 552.020 competency examination.
Dr. English, a Department of Mental Health psychologist and forensic examiner, was designated to evaluate Anderson pursuant to section 552.020 to determine if he was competent to proceed to trial. The State called Dr. English during the guilt phase to rebut the evidence presented by the defense's two expert witnesses, Drs. Pincus and Lewis, who opined that Anderson suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crimes.
Before the rebuttal phase of the trial began, defense counsel twice objected to the State calling Dr. English as a rebuttal witness because he had stated in his deposition that he was unable to render an opinion as to Anderson's mental state at the time of the crimes. The trial court overruled the objections, stating that it could not determine if Dr. English had relevant information until he testified. The trial court advised defense counsel to make clear on cross-examination Dr. English's inability to testify about Anderson's mental state at the time of the crimes, if his testimony raised that issue.
Dr. English was the state's only rebuttal witness. His testimony discussed the various types of tests he had Anderson perform and the results of some of those tests. He testified that he tested Anderson for somewhere between two to two and a half hours in 1999.4 When asked if his evaluation indicated that Anderson suffered a mental disease or defect, Dr. English responded, "No."
On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr. English stated that his evaluation did not "go into" Anderson's mental status "when the crime took place." Defense counsel elicited that Dr. English could not rule out that Anderson had a mental disease or defect that would manifest itself when he was under severe stress.
During redirect examination, however, the prosecutor asked: "Doctor . . . the defendant denied any symptoms indicating depression, brain damage or any other mental disease or defect, didn't he?" Dr. English responded: "Yes, he did." The prosecutor highlighted this testimony during closing arguments, stating: "[Anderson] told Dr. English he didn't have any of the symptoms of any of those psychiatric disorders that the experts from the East Coast says he has."
Anderson argues that section 552.020.14 prohibited Dr. English's testimony and a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances would have objected on that ground.
Section 552.020.14 provides:
No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination or treatment pursuant to this section and no information received by any examiner or other person in the course thereof, whether such examination or treatment was made with or without the consent of the accused or upon his motion or upon that of others, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter pending in any court, state or federal. A finding by the court that the accused is mentally fit to proceed shall in no way prejudice the accused in a defense to the crime charged on the ground that at the time thereof he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, nor shall such finding by the court be introduced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury.
552.020.14 (emphasis added).
This section prevents testimony about statements made by the accused or information received during a section 552.020 examination being used as evidence on the issue of guilt.5 Contrary to the State's assertions, portions of Dr. English's testimony were inappropriate under the prohibitions of section 552.020.14, particularly his testimony regarding Anderson's denial during the evaluation that he suffered a mental disease or defect. Dr. English's testimony was presented by the State as proof of Anderson's guilt—to show he was capable of deliberation. A reasonably competent defense counsel in similar circumstances would have objected to those portions of his testimony that violated section 552.020.14. The first prong of Strickland is met.6
Although Anderson satisfied the first prong of Strickland on this issue, he is unable to satisfy the second prong in that he cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to Dr. English's testimony on the basis of section 552.020.14. Defense counsel ensured that Dr. English made clear that his evaluation of Anderson did not relate to Anderson's mental state at the time of the crimes. Dr. English testified that he could not rule out that Anderson suffered a mental disease or defect that would manifest itself under severe stress.
While there was little relevance in Dr. English's testimony, and indeed portions of it were prohibited under section 552.020.14, Anderson has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the result of his trial would have been different.
Anderson further...
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