Anderson v. U.S., No. 77-3222
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before WRIGHT and TANG, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON; EUGENE A. WRIGHT |
| Citation | 612 F.2d 1112 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-3222 |
| Decision Date | 28 November 1979 |
| Parties | 21 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 990, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,594 Ina P. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
Page 1112
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,594
v.
UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Ninth Circuit.
As Amended Feb. 14, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1980.
Page 1113
B. Mahlon Brown, U. S. Atty., William C. Turner, Asst. U. S. Atty., Las Vegas, Nev., for defendants-appellants.
John F. O'Reilly, Las Vegas, Nev., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.
Before WRIGHT and TANG, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, Senior District Judge. *
EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
The government has appealed from a preliminary injunction which ordered the United States Air Force to hire no person other than appellee Anderson for a specific position, and ordered the transfer of Anderson to the position pending a final decision on the merits.
The government contends that (1) Anderson cannot seek a remedy in federal court because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; (2) the district court abused its discretion by ordering that Anderson be hired; and (3) the court abused its discretion in ordering the Air Force to hire no one other than Anderson. 1
In October 1976, Anderson, a GS-5 secretary, applied for the position of Management
Page 1114
Analyst at Nellis Air Force Base. The position was announced as a GS-7 position with a growth potential to GS-9. Anderson competed for it with five other women. She reported to the Civilian Personnel Office that the selection supervisor had said he preferred a man for the position and she later made a discrimination complaint to the Federal Women's Coordinator.The matter was handled as an informal complaint in accordance with Air Force Regulation (AFR) 40-713. The selection supervisor was required to choose only among the six original candidates, all female. Anderson was not selected.
She charged that she did not receive fair consideration because the officer knew of her complaint. She filed a formal discrimination complaint on March 31, 1977. The Air Force responded on June 6, giving her priority promotion consideration: "This final decision is that you will be given consideration for a promotion to a GS-07 position for which you are qualified before consideration (will) be given to other candidates." 2
Armed with this promise, Anderson applied in August 1977 for the position of Employee Relations Specialist but was not given priority promotion consideration for it. She failed to place among the top five candidates and was rejected on August 23rd. 3
Later that month she formally appealed the refusal to give her priority consideration for the position. The Air Force told her that she was not given priority because the new position had a higher target level (GS-11) than the Management Analyst position she had been denied (GS-9).
On September 1, Anderson filed this action seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. On that day, a temporary restraining order was issued prohibiting the hiring of anyone other than Anderson. On the following day, she filed a formal grievance with the Air Force pursuant to AFR 40-771. On September 16, the district court issued the preliminary injunctions challenged here. 4 Anderson has since occupied the position of Employee Relations Specialist.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
The government's principal contention is that the district court should not have granted an injunction because Anderson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Because we determine that the court erred in granting the preliminary injunction, we need not decide whether Anderson exhausted her administrative remedies.
II. The Granting of Mandatory Preliminary Relief.
The government next contends that a mandatory injunction is unwarranted. We agree.
Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo Pendente lite, is particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.
Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976); Exhibitors Post Exchange, Inc. v.
Page 1115
National Screen Service Corp., 441 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1971). The court stated in Clune v. Publishers' Assn. of New York City, 214 F.Supp. 520...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Elec. Co., No. 99-CV-5073.
...cases an injunction must not be granted "unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party." Id. (citing Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir.1979)). Plaintiffs contend that defendant's activities constitute unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices as wel......
-
CREDIT BUREAU CONNECTION INC. v. PARDINI, Case No. CV F 10-1202 LJO GSA.
...“ ‘goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo [p]endente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.’ ” Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir.1976)). CBC seeks both a prohibitory and mandatory injunction. ......
-
Diaz v. INS, No. Civ. S-83-436 LKK.
...preliminary injunction "should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party." Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the stringent standards for mandatory relief. For one thing, the hardship suffered by plaintiffs resul......
-
State of Ariz. v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., Nos. 79-3427
...to create a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the moving party. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1979); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, supra, at 1134. As the balance of hardships increases in favor of the moving party, th......
-
A. H. R. v. Wash. State Health Care Auth., CASE NO. C15-5701JLR
...not be issued "in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages." Anderson v. United States , 612 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1979) ; see also Little v. Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that "the movant must make a heightened showi......
-
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2323.
...333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir.2003); Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir.1995); Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir.1979). In fact, most courts decide whether a given preliminary injunction is "mandatory" or "prohibitory" by determining whether......
-
Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 84-5859
...quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th In the present case, the district judge applied the correct legal standard governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions. After c......
-
Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., CIV. S-89-1505 LKK.
...both the facts and the law clearly favor the moving party and extreme or very serious damage will result. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.1979). "In doubtful cases, or where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages" a mandatory injunction will n......