Anderson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | 4:15-CV-04180-KES |
| Parties | RUBY ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
MEMORADUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Ruby Anderson, initiated this action against defendant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Docket 1. Anderson alleges that Wal-Mart was negligent in the installation of a wheel and tire on her vehicle. Id. Wal-Mart moves for summary judgment arguing that Anderson cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence. Docket 27. For the following reasons, Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment is denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Anderson, the nonmoving party, are as follows:
As of December 7, 2014, Anderson owned a 1999 Dodge 1500 pick-up truck that she had owned for over a year after purchasing it in used condition. Docket 30-1 at 12:16-17. From the time Anderson purchased the vehicle until December 7, 2014, she did not buy any tires for the vehicle, and she did not have any problems with its existing tires. Id. at 12:20-25.
On December 7, 2014, Anderson brought her vehicle to the Wal-Mart store located in Watertown, South Dakota, for servicing to address a bubble in the front passenger side tire. Docket 29 ¶¶ 1-2. Initially, Anderson's plan was to have Wal-Mart replace the vehicle's front passenger side tire with the vehicle's spare tire. Id. ¶ 3. After observing a significant tread difference between the vehicle's front driver side tire and the vehicle's spare tire, however, it was decided that Wal-Mart would install a new tire on the front passenger side, remove the wheel and tire from the front driver side, and install the spare wheel and tire on the front driver side of the vehicle, which is what Wal-Mart did. Id. Upon return of the vehicle to Anderson, Wal-Mart indicated to her that the vehicle was fit to drive. Docket 1 ¶ 13. Anderson alleges that after her vehicle was serviced at the Watertown Wal-Mart on December 7th, it remained parked at her home in Brookings until December 14th.1 Docket 29 ¶ 5.
On December 14, 2014, Anderson drove her vehicle on Interstate 29 from Brookings to Watertown at approximately 2:30 a.m. Docket 29 ¶ 6. Anderson asserts that she was wearing a seatbelt and that she was driving at or just under the speed limit. Docket 30-1 at 6:12-22. Two of Anderson's daughters were with her in the car. Docket 29 ¶ 7. About 17 miles north of Brookings,2Anderson alleges that she heard a loud grinding noise. Id. ¶ 8. And within seconds, she felt the vehicle tip to the left. Id. Anderson then slammed on the brakes and maneuvered the vehicle from the right northbound lane to the shoulder of the left northbound lane where the vehicle came to a stop. Docket 30-1 at 7:7-8:8. At the same time, Anderson saw a wheel roll past them. Docket 28 at 2, 2 n.1. Anderson contends that when the vehicle suddenly tipped to the left, she struck her head and the left side of her body against the window of the vehicle. Docket 30-1 at 7:7-17.
Once the vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the interstate, Anderson called 911 while her daughters looked for the wheel that had rolled past them. Id. at 8:14-23. They were unable to find the wheel due to heavy fog. Id. at 9:22-25. Later the same day, Anderson and her daughters found a wheel in the median at approximately the same location on the interstate where the car came to a stop early that morning. Id. at 10:3-11; Docket 30-7. The wheel found in the median was subsequently evaluated by Anderson's expert and Wal-Mart's experts. See Docket 30-3; Docket 30-4; Docket 30-5. It is now undisputed that the wheel and attached tire that Anderson and her daughters found in the median are not the wheel and tire that were installed by Wal-Mart on Anderson's vehicle. Docket 30-7 at 1; Docket 30-5 at 21; Docket 30-4 at 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[A] party seeking summary judgmentalways bears the initial responsibility of . . . demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party must inform the court of the basis for its motion and also identify the portion of the record that shows there is no genuine issue in dispute. Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
The nonmoving party to a motion for summary judgement "must substantiate [her] allegations with 'sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [her] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.' " Moody v. St. Charles Cty., 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) () (quoting Gregory v. Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992)). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties is not sufficient by itself to deny summary judgment . . . ." Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). "Instead, 'the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.' " Id. (quoting Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1989)). Thus, "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," summary judgment is not appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Because federal jurisdiction in this action is based on diversity, the court applies South Dakota substantive law. Hammonds v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 991, 996 n.6 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) ("We apply South Dakota substantive law because this diversity action was brought in the District of South Dakota, and the district court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state in which it is located.").
DISCUSSION
"An action in negligence generally requires a plaintiff to prove 'duty, breach of that duty, proximate and factual causation, and actual injury.' " O'Day v. Nanton, 905 N.W.2d 568, 574 (S.D. 2017) (quoting Hamilton v. Sommers, 855 N.W.2d 855, 861 (S.D. 2014)). Here, Wal-Mart argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Anderson cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence. Docket 27. Specifically, Wal-Mart contends that Anderson is unable to prove the elements of breach of duty and causation. Id. Wal-Mart does not contest the elements of duty and injury in its motion and memorandum in support of summary judgment. Id.; Docket 28.
"[G]enerally, once a duty is established, whether a breach of that duty occurred is for the finder of fact, not for the court." Johnson v. Matthew J. Batchelder Co., Inc., 779 N.W.2d 690, 694 (S.D. 2010) (citing Casillas v. Schubauer, 714 N.W.2d 84, 88 (S.D. 2006)). Summary judgment on the issue of breach is only appropriate " 'when reasonable [people] can draw but one conclusion from facts and inferences that they become a matter of law and thisrarely occurs.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D. 1986)).
In Mitchell v. Ankney, the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, which found no breach on the part of defendants as a matter of law. Mitchell, 396 N.W.2d at 313. There, the parties disputed whether a hose on defendants' porch created an unsafe condition on the property. Id. The Supreme Court found the jury should have determined whether defendants breached their "general duty to exercise reasonable care." Id. Thus, summary judgment was improperly granted by the trial court. Id. at 313-14.
In Pierce v. City of Belle Fourche, 624 N.W.2d 353 (S.D. 2001), the South Dakota Supreme Court again reversed a circuit court's order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. There, the court first determined that, as a matter of law, defendant owed plaintiff a duty to "provide and maintain adequate tie-down ropes" to secure aircrafts that were parked at defendant's airport. Id. at 357. But the question of breach, the court held, was a matter for a jury because there was a dispute of fact. Id. at 357. The case was remanded for a factual determination of whether defendant breached its duty to the plaintiff. Id.
Here, a reasonable fact finder could draw more than one conclusion as to whether Wal-Mart breached its duty to act reasonably while providing services to Anderson. The report submitted by Wal-Mart's expert, Darko Babic, describes the standard procedure for wheel installation at Wal-Mart:
[A]fter the wheel installation lug nut torqueing, the vehicle is taken outside and driven in a figure eight, which is then followed by another lug nut torqueing. Subsequently, the vehicle is taken outside and driven in a figure eight again, which is followed by another lug nut torqueing sequence. This means that the lug nuts at the subject Wal-Mart store are torqued three (3) times in total before the vehicle is released to the customer.
Docket 30-5 at 6. From his review of the Wal-Mart surveillance footage, Babic concluded Wal-Mart employees followed this procedure when torqueing the lug nuts on Anderson's vehicle. Docket 30-5 at 7-11. Babic also concluded that Docket 30-5 at 22.
Anderson's expert, Mark Mandery, however, reached a different conclusion after reviewing the same video footage as Babic. Particularly, Mandery observed the following about the...
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