Anderson v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 17 May 1912 |
| Parties | F. L. ANDERSON and H. A. STEARNS as Executors of the Will of JAMES B. WILSON, deceased, Appellees, v. WILLIAM M. WILSON and others, Appellants, and JOHN H. WILSON and others, Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. W. N. TREICHLER, Judge.
ACTION in equity to obtain a construction of the will of James B Wilson, deceased. From the findings and decree entered therein, two of the defendants, William M. Wilson and James R. Hanna, appeal.
Reversed.
Clark & Clark for appellants.
F. L Anderson for appellees.
James B. Wilson died, testate, December 28, 1908, leaving surviving him neither widow nor issue. His only living heirs at law were William W. Wilson and Sarah E. Leo, his brother and sister of the full blood, John H. Wilson and A. C. Woody, his brothers of the half blood, and William M. Wilson, the son of a brother of the half blood, who died some years before the making of the will in controversy. William M. Wilson having assigned his interest under the will to James R. Hanna, the latter is made a party to the proceeding.
The will, which has been duly probated, is (omitting the merely formal parts) as follows:
1st. I give and bequeath to G. A. Rigby, now in my employ, providing he is in my employ at the time of my death, the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars.
2nd. I give, devise and bequeath to my sister, Mrs. Sarah E. Leo of Cedar Rapids, Iowa all the proceeds of all life insurance policies held by me at the time of my death upon my life.
3rd. If my brother, William W. Wilson, survives me, then I give, devise and bequeath to my sister, Sarah E. Leo, in trust for the use and benefit of my brother, William W. Wilson, the east fourteen (14) feet and six inches of lot seven (7) and the west seven (7) feet six inches of lot eight (8) in block (13) in the original town now city of Marion, in Linn county, Iowa including the building and fixtures and the counters, shelvings, show cases, radiators, soda fountain and safe located therein, subject to and charged with any incumbrance thereon at the time of my death; and I direct that the rents and income from said property after the payment of taxes, insurance, interest on incumbrances and expenses of repairs shall be paid monthly to my said brother, William W. Wilson, during his natural life, and I authorize and empower said trustee or her successor as may be appointed by the court in case of her demise, to sell and dispose of said property at any time during such trusteeship if deemed proper by such trustee, and in case of such sale then I direct that the proceeds thereof, after the payment of incumbrances, shall be held by such trustee in trust for the use and benefit of my said brother, William W. Wilson, he to be paid the interest thereon during his natural life, and at his death said property or the proceeds thereof in case it has been sold, shall go, a one-half interest to my sister, Sarah E. Leo, and the other one-half interest to my brothers of the half blood equally and in case any are then deceased his share to go to his children equally. But in case my said brother, William W. Wilson, does not survive me, then I give, devise and bequeath said property, a one-half interest to my sister, Sarah E. Leo, and the other one-half interest to my brothers of the half blood equally and in case any are then deceased his share to go to his children equally.
4th. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real and personal, wheresoever situate, I direct shall be sold by my executors and after the payment of the legacy, costs of administration and lawful debts, be divided equally between my brothers and sister of the full and half blood equally, but if any be then deceased such share to go to his or her children equally.
The one question presented by this controversy is whether the son of the predeceased half-brother of the testator is a devisee under the provisions of the third and fourth paragraphs of the will above quoted. It is the contention of the executors that the benefits provided for in said paragraphs are given exclusively to the brother and sister of the full blood and the two brothers of the half blood, who were living at the date of the will, and that the son of the predeceased half-brother is given nothing. This position is contested by William M. Wilson and his assignee, claiming that under a proper construction of said devise he is given a share therein in equal proportions with John H. Wilson and A. C. Woody, the surviving half-brothers of the testator. The trial court held, with the executors, that William M. Wilson is not a beneficiary under said will, and, having entered a decree accordingly, the said William M. Wilson and James R. Hanna appeal.
This case has been twice argued to this court, and counsel on either side have collected the authorities and presented their views with marked thoroughness of preparation. The question presented is a debatable one, and reasons having much of plausibility and force may be advanced in support of either conclusion; but, after mature deliberation, we find ourselves unable to agree to the correctness of the decree below.
It is a universally accepted rule of the construction of wills that the words of the testator will be given effect according to the approved usage of the language, unless the context or the peculiar circumstances under which the instrument was executed make it reasonably certain that the words were employed by him in some other or more restricted or more enlarged sense. The third clause of this will, dealing with certain specific property, provides that, upon the happening of a certain event, the one-half thereof shall go "to my brothers of the half blood equally and in case any are then deceased his share to go to his children equally." Providing for another contingency in the same clause he repeats that the one-half interest shall go "to my brothers of the half blood equally and in case any are then deceased his share to go to his children equally." In the fourth paragraph, he provides for the division of all the residue of his estate, not otherwise disposed of, to be divided between his brothers and sisters of the full blood and half blood equally; "but if any be then deceased such share to go to his or her children equally." The will, of course, speaks from the death of the testator; and, having been duly probated, and the estate being ready for distribution, we must look to its provisions for the designation of the persons entitled to share therein. But two devisees are there mentioned by name--William W. Wilson and Sarah E. Leo. The remaining devisees are mentioned only by what we may call class description, and they are "my brothers of the half blood and in case any be then deceased his share to go to his children equally." The appellant William M. Wilson was, at the date of the testator's death, the surviving son of a deceased half-brother, and therefore within the literal description by which the testator designated the beneficiaries of his gift. Upon what sound principle of construction shall the court say the testator did not mean precisely what he said? Let us suppose that when the will became effective all the half-brothers were dead; each leaving one or more surviving children. Now, if all these children appear at the distribution, each proving his identity as the child of a deceased half-brother, and therefore by the same title and description within the class designated by the will, by what authority shall the executors draw a line of distinction between the child of one half-brother and the child of another, admitting the one as a devisee and excluding the other from any share in the estate? It is the exclusive province of the testator to designate the class of persons to whom his gift is made, and, having designated a class, each member thereof takes by a title no less complete than he would had he been mentioned by his individual name.
But the proposition of the appellees is, as we understand it, that the context of the words of the devise, taken in connection with the admitted fact that the father of the appellant was already dead at the date of the will, requires us to restrict its application to the half-brothers living at that date and the children of such half-brothers as may die after the date of the will, but before the testator's death. It is argued that our decision in Downing v. Nicholson, 115 Iowa 493, 88 N.W. 1064, is in point upon this proposition, and governs the construction of this will. An examination of that precedent will disclose that it is not a parallel case with the one at the bar; and neither its reasoning nor conclusion is controlling here. The devise there in question was to "all my nephews and nieces." There was no attempt by the testator to enlarge the class to include the children of a deceased nephew or niece. The claimants did not claim any right to take as devisees under the will, but by statutory substitution. Code section 3281. In this case, the appellant makes no claim by virtue of the statute, but asserts that the devise, of which he claims the benefit, is made directly to him as one of a class which the testator has designated and described. The distinction between the claim which was adjudicated in the Nicholson case and the one we have here to pass upon is quite obvious. At the risk of wearisome repetition, we recall once more the words of the will, "to my brothers of the half blood equally and in case any are then deceased, his share to go to his children equally." This is not a designation of two classes to take in succession, but of a single class, the membership of which is composed of his half-brothers and the children...
To continue reading
Request your trial