Andrade v. Town of Lincoln

• Decision Date: 06 May 2014
• Docket Number: C.A. No. PC 2012-5720
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Parties: JOSPEH ANDRADE and KIMBERLY ANDRADE v. TOWN OF LINCOLN, and ELAINE MONDILLO, in her capacity as the TAX ASSESSOR FOR THE TOWN OF LINCOLN, and JOHN WARD in his capacity as FINANCE DIRECTOR FOR THE TOWN OF LINCOLN

JOSPEH ANDRADE and KIMBERLY ANDRADE v. TOWN OF LINCOLN, and ELAINE MONDILLO,in her capacity as the TAX ASSESSOR FOR THE TOWN OF LINCOLN,and JOHN WARD in his capacity as FINANCE DIRECTOR FOR THE TOWN OF LINCOLN

C.A. No. PC 2012-5720

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

FILED: May 6, 2014

DECISION

CARNES, J. Before the Court is Joseph Andrade and Kimberly Andrade's (Plaintiffs) Complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding their entitlement to a homestead exemption for the tax year 2012. The Defendants—the Town of Lincoln; Elaine Mondillo, in her capacity as the Tax Assessor for the Town of Lincoln; and John Ward, in his capacity as Finance Director for the Town of Lincoln (Defendants)—assert that Plaintiffs were not the owners of the property in question as of the date of assessment, and so, are not entitled to the homestead exemption for the tax year 2012. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1.

IFacts and Travel

Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint demonstrates the absence of factual issues before the Court as Defendants admit all the allegations essential to this Court providing declaratory relief to the parties. The facts of the case are set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows:

"1. Plaintiff, Joseph Andrade is a resident of the State of Rhode Island.

"2. Plaintiff, Kimberly Andrade is a resident of the State of Rhode Island.

"3. The Town of Lincoln is a town established by home rule charter in the state of Rhode Island.

"4. Defendant, Elaine Mondillo is the tax assessor for the Town of Lincoln.

"5. Defendant, John Ward is the finance director for the Town of Lincoln.

"6. This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.

"7. The Plaintiffs jointly own [a] home located at 2 Lauretta Lane in Lincoln, Rhode Island.

"8. The subject property was purchased in the beginning of 2012.

"9. Plaintiffs filed for a Homestead Exemption with the Town of Lincoln in March of 2012.

"10. On April 9, 2012 the Plaintiffs received a letter from Elaine Mondillo indicating that because the Plaintiffs were not the owners of record on December 31, 2011, they were ineligible for the Homestead Exemption or a pro rata share thereof for the year of 2012. (Pls.' Mem., Ex. 2.)

"11. In the letter, tax assessor Mondillo, specifically references R.I.G.L. § 44-5-1.

"12. R.I.G.L. § 44-5-1 refers to the date of assessment of any property in a city or Town. This section of law does not discuss ownership interest in said property.

"13. On Oct 17, 2006, the Town of Lincoln adopted article 8, entitled Homestead Exemption, and enumerated a procedure for requesting and obtaining a Homestead Exemption. (Pls.' Mem., Ex. 1.)

"14. The ordinance indicates that a taxpayer shall file an application on or before April 15 of the year the Homestead Exemption is being requested.

"15. The Plaintiffs followed the ordinance of the Town of Lincoln and completed all applications correctly and within the proper time frame."

In their petition for declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs aver that they are eligible for the Homestead Exemption or a pro rata share of the exemption for the year 2012. In addition,Plaintiffs argue that they fulfilled the requirements of art. 8, §§ 228-30 and 228-31, which are the Town of Lincoln's Ordinances that enumerate the procedure for requesting and obtaining a homestead exemption. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that they were the record owners of the property when they applied for the exemption, that their application was timely, and that as a result, the homestead exemption should have been applied to the property for the year 2012. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the Tax Assessor's reliance on § 44-5-1 as the basis for her denial of the requested exemption was an error of law because the statute is inapplicable to homestead exemptions.

Defendants claim that the Town lawfully denied Plaintiffs' application for the homestead exemption for the year 2012 because Plaintiffs were not the record owners of the home on the date of assessment for the year 2012. In particular, Defendants maintain that the date of assessment for 2012 was December 31, 2011, that the owner on the date of assessment for 2012 was Deutsch Bank National Trust (not entitled to homestead exemption), and that consequently, taxes were issued against the subject property for 2012 without any homestead exemption. Furthermore, Defendants allege that the tax assessor for the Town of Lincoln properly relied upon § 44-5-1 as both property tax liabilities and benefits are assessed against the record owner as of the date of assessment, defined in § 44-5-1. Additionally, Defendants assert that a homestead exemption cannot be apportioned between Plaintiffs and the former owner because there is no State statute granting the Town the authority to apportion exemptions in this manner, and the Town has no authority to grant a tax exemption without express authorization from the Legislature. Finally, Defendants aver that Town Ordinance art. 8, § 228-31 describes the procedure for applying for a homestead exemption and as a result, it cannot displace state law mandating the date of assessment for tax liabilities and benefits.

IIStandard of Review

Pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the Superior Court is vested with the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Sec. 9-30-1. Thus "the Superior Court has jurisdiction to construe the rights and responsibilities of any party arising from a statute pursuant to the powers conferred upon [it] by G.L. chapter 30 of title 9, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act." Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 478-79 (R.I. 2000). Specifically, § 9-30-2 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides as follows:

"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or legal relations thereunder."

"This statute gives a broad grant of jurisdiction to the Superior Court to determine the rights of any person that may arise under a statute not in its appellate capacity but as a part of its original jurisdiction." Canario, 752 A.2d at 479 (citing Roch v. Harrahy, 419 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 1980)); see also Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997). '"A decision to grant or deny declaratory relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion or the trial justice committed an error of law."' Panarello v. State, Dep't of Corr., - A.3d -, 2014 WL 1349491, at *9 (R.I. Apr. 7, 2014) (quoting Hagenberg v. Avedisian, 879 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 2005)).

Moreover, "[a]ny taxpayer claiming entitlement to a statutory tax exemption carries the burden of proving that the assessment in question falls within the terms of the exemption." KentCnty. Water Auth. v. State Dep't of Health, 723 A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I. 1999) (citing Dart Industries, Inc. v. Clark, 696 A.2d 306, 310 (R.I. 1997)). Our Supreme Court "repeatedly has held that [this court is] constrained to strictly construe statutory tax exemptions in favor of the taxing authority." Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001) (citing Preservation Soc'y of Newport County v. Assessor of Taxes of Newport, 104 R.I. 559, 564-65, 247 A.2d 430, 434 (1968)).

IIIAnalysis

In support of their request for declaratory relief, Plaintiffs argue that this Court need look no further than Town Ordinance art. 8, §§ 228-30 and 228-31, in order to determine the rights of the parties. Article 8, § 228-30 states that the Town Council is adopting a "uniform procedure for the application of the homestead exemption." Town Ordinance art. 8, § 228-31, "Procedure," reads, in relevant part, that:

"Applicants for the homestead exemption shall submit completed application forms to the Office of the Tax Assessor on or before April 15 of the tax year for which the exemption is sought. For illustrative purposes, taxpayers seeking the homestead exemption for the tax year from January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2007, with the first quarterly payment due by July 31, 2007, would be required to file a completed application on or before April 15, 2007."

In response, Defendants assert that this Court must interpret Rhode Island General Law §§ 44-5-1, 44-4-4, and 44-9-1 in pari materia to determine Plaintiffs' rights. Pursuant to the doctrine of in pari materia, "statutes on the same subject . . . are, when enacted by the same jurisdiction, to be read in relation to each other." Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 301 (R.I.2007) (citing Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 233 (1975)). Section 44-5-1 provides that:

"The electors of any city or town qualified to vote on any proposition to impose a tax or for the expenditure of money, when legally assembled, may levy a tax for the purposes authorized by law, on the ratable property of the city or town, either in a sum certain, or in a sum not less than a certain sum and not more than a certain sum. The tax is apportioned upon the assessed valuations as determined by the assessors of the city or town as of December 31 in each year at 12:00 A.M. midnight, the date being known as the date of assessment of the city or town valuations." (Emphasis added.)

Section 44-4-4, "Assessment of real estate taxes against owner," states, in pertinent part, that "[t]axes on real estate are assessed to the owners." (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that when interpreting §§ 44-5-1 and 44-4-4 in pari materia, our Supreme Court has steadfastly held that tax liabilities and...