Hagenberg v. Avedisian

• Decision Date: 07 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2004-182-Appeal.,2004-182-Appeal.
• Citation: 879 A.2d 436
• Parties: Albert E. HAGENBERG v. Scott AVEDISIAN et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

879 A.2d 436

Albert E. HAGENBERG v. Scott AVEDISIAN et al.

No. 2004-182-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 7, 2005.

Eric H. Miller, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Diana E. Pearson, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 10, 2005, on cross-appeals by the plaintiff, Albert E. Hagenberg¹ (plaintiff or Hagenberg); and the defendants, the City of Warwick (city or Warwick), Scott Avedisian, in his official capacity as mayor of Warwick, David C. Olsen, in his official capacity as city treasurer, the Warwick Board of Public Safety (board), Michael Ryan, in his official capacity as chairman of the board, Marshall Martin and Leslie Waleska Baxter, in their official capacities as members of the board, and Oscar Shelton (Shelton), in his official capacity as director of the city's personnel department (collectively defendants). This dispute arose from a decision by the city to discontinue supplementary medical benefits for retired police and firefighters receiving disability pensions as a result of career-ending on-the-job injuries. The plaintiff appeals from the trial justice's denial of his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and the defendants appeal from the judgment granting the plaintiff's individual claim for continued benefits based upon a finding of promissory estoppel.²

Facts and Travel

This case was tried to the court on an agreed statement of facts. The plaintiff retired from his position as a Warwick police officer because of an on-the-job injury and began receiving disability pension benefits. For many years, he and the other retired disabled city police and firefighters enjoyed the benefit of health care coverage under the city's insurance plan (for those retirees under the age of sixty-five) or Medicare (for those over sixty-five years of age), supplemented by payments made by the city for any portion of their non-covered expenses, including copayments, for claims relating to the on-the-job injuries that precipitated their retirement. A letter from Warwick's then police chief, John F. Coutcher, dated June 28, 1979, was included with the agreed statement of facts; it provides, in part, as follows:

"As a result of [a meeting with Hagenberg, his attorney, and the Warwick Board of Public Safety], the [b]oard unanimously passed a motion that the city is indeed liable for the medical bills arising out of his service-connected illness. They also stated they felt that his illness was definitely service-connected, and he was entitled to these benefits under the Rhode Island General Laws, specifically, [§] 45-19-1."

By letter dated December 11, 2003, Shelton informed the disability pension recipients, including Hagenberg, that, as of January 1, 2004, medical payments for job-related injuries and illnesses would be treated the same as their non-job related ailments (Shelton's letter). Shelton purportedly based this policy change on this Court's opinion in Elliott v. Town of Warren, 818 A.2d 652 (R.I.2003). The city acknowledges that the new policy will result in increased costs to the retirees involved.

On January 20, 2004, plaintiff filed a verified complaint in Superior Court setting forth three claims. In count 1, plaintiff sought a declaration that, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 45-19-1, known as the Injured on Duty (IOD) statute, "the members of the [Warwick Retired Police and Fire Fighters Association (association)] retired on a disability pension are entitled to have 100 [percent] of their medical expenses for on-the-job injuries paid for by [d]efendants post retirement."³ Count 2 was a prayer for injunctive relief "temporarily and permanently restraining and enjoining [d]efendants from effectuating the policy set forth in [Shelton's letter]" or otherwise interfering with the provision of benefits described in § 45-19-1. Finally, in count 3, plaintiff requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus ordering the city to pay for certain medical bills that had been submitted for reimbursement. The plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants from implementing the policy set forth in Shelton's letter.

After a nonjury trial on an agreed statement of facts, the trial justice noted that the parties briefed an additional issue — the continuation of plaintiff's benefits under a theory of promissory estoppel. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial justice conformed the pleadings to the stipulated record and, sua sponte, added a promissory estoppel claim.⁴

The trial justice found that plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief failed as a matter of law. He remarked that "[t]he matter herein is yet another case in which a municipality is not obligated to provide benefits pursuant to provisions of [§] 45-19-1 when that municipality has adopted a pension system that makes its own provision for such benefits." The trial justice went on to say that the Superior Court lacked the authority to declare plaintiff's rights under § 45-19-1 because "(1) the statute does not confer such benefits in light of the pension plan adopted by the [c]ity and (2) the Supreme Court of this state has recognized that no such right would exist as claimed here[,] when a municipality has adopted its own plan."

However, the trial justice determined that plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief based upon promissory estoppel. He found that the stipulated facts established that plaintiff was told that all his medical expenses for his injury on duty would be paid after he retired. Based on those facts, the trial justice found that "if [plaintiff] had not been given that assurance, he would have chosen to challenge such determination or his disability status more generally, or would have acted to obtain supplemental benefits privately that may have been required." Therefore, the trial justice ruled:

"[T]he evidence clearly preponderates in [plaintiff's] favor that he was promised extended benefits, that the defendant[s] should have reasonably known that he would rely on said promise, that he did in fact rely on said promise to his detriment and that promissory estoppel is appropriately invoked to avoid the obvious injustice that would result if the promise were not enforced."

He also denied plaintiff's claim seeking a writ of mandamus, noting that "mandamus as a remedial measure has no application to either the statutory or contractual claims that are raised in this case."⁵

The trial justice entered judgment for defendants on count 1 (plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief), count 2 (plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief) — except as applicable to Hagenberg, individually — and count 3 (mandamus). He entered judgment for Hagenberg on count 4 of the amended verified complaint (promissory estoppel). The restraining order enjoining defendants from implementing the policy outlined in Shelton's letter was dissolved as it pertained to the association members, but remained in effect as it pertained to Hagenberg.

Both parties appealed; and plaintiff moved to stay the judgment pending appeal. The trial justice denied the stay request but ordered that the terms of the restraining order, which was liquidated by the court as it pertained to all association members, except Hagenberg, be honored by defendants until June 22, 2004. The plaintiff then filed a motion with this Court seeking a stay pending appeal. The defendants moved to vacate the trial justice's grant of injunctive relief to plaintiff.

This Court denied plaintiff's motion for stay and vacated the order of the Superior Court granting interlocutory relief to the association members. In addition, we granted defendants' motion to vacate the injunction granted to plaintiff based on the judgment in his favor on the promissory estoppel claim.

Issues on Appeal

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial justice abused his discretion and committed errors of law by denying plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief to restrain the city from terminating the medical benefits previously paid to its disabled and retired police officers and firefighters. The plaintiff contends that the city does not have a retirement program for its disabled workers and that "Warwick's disability retirement program for at least the last 25 years, has been exclusively § 45-19-1." Thus, plaintiff argues, the sudden refusal to pay the disputed medical expenses violates the IOD statute, because "there is no statute, ordinance, or collective bargaining provision relating to the issue and * * * the city has paid these medical benefits for more than twenty years." Consequently, plaintiff asserts, § 45-19-1 applies to him and the other association members, entitling them to declaratory and injunctive relief.

The defendants contend in their appeal that the trial justice correctly found that § 45-19-1 is not binding on the city because it has adopted a disability pension plan. However, defendants assign error to the trial justice's ruling in favor of plaintiff on the promissory estoppel claim, arguing that plaintiff failed to prove the necessary elements to support the judgment.

Standard of Review

A decision to grant or deny declaratory or injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion or the trial justice committed an error of law. DiDonato v. Kennedy, 822 A.2d 179, 181 (R.I.2003); Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I.1997).

This case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. As such, "our scope of review of the trial justice's decision is narrowly defined." Randall v. Norberg, 121 R.I. 714, 717, 403 A.2d 240, 242 (1979) (citing Prospecting Unlimited, Inc. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 116, 123, 376 A.2d 702, 706 (1977)). "An agreed statement of facts operates to submit a...