Andre v. Chater, IP 94-1567-C M/S.
| Decision Date | 18 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. IP 94-1567-C M/S.,IP 94-1567-C M/S. |
| Citation | 910 F. Supp. 1352 |
| Parties | Burke ANDRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Kenneth J. Falk, Jamie Andree, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana, for Plaintiffs.
Sue Hendricks Bailey, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, Indiana, for Defendant.
ORDER ON CLASS CERTIFICATION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Burke and Justin Andre, by their mother and next friend, Doris Andre, brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).2 The proposed class action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. The proposed class is defined as:
All children, past, present and future, both of whose parents are disabled and who have been, are being, or will be denied child's insurance benefits drawn on the account of their parent with a lower primary insurance amount (PIA) because their parent with the higher PIA has had his or her benefits suspended during an extended period of eligibility.
The Court has jurisdiction of this matter under Section 205 of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3 The proposed class challenges the methodology used by the Commissioner to determine when, how and whether dually entitled children's eligibility for benefits can be transferred from the account of the parent with the higher PIA, whose benefits have been suspended during an extended period of eligibility, to the account of the parent with the lower PIA.
Burke and Justin Andre are the minor children of Doris and George Andre, who are divorced. They live with their mother, Doris, in Sunman, Indiana. Both Doris and George have been determined to be disabled by the defendant, and were receiving Social Security benefits prior to the events underlying the dispute in this action. The children received benefits on the account of their father, who had the higher PIA, until January 15, 1992, when the Social Security Administration (the "Administration") notified them that their benefits would cease because George was no longer considered disabled. Having completed a nine month trial work period in October, 1991, George became entitled to an extended period (thirty-six months) of eligibility.4 As a consequence, neither George nor the children could receive benefits unless George ceased working and was determined again to be disabled. R. 72-76, Exs. 16 and 17.
After receiving the notice of suspension of their benefits, the Andres asked for reconsideration and a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The initial denial of benefits was affirmed on reconsideration, but the ALJ, without a hearing, reversed that decision and issued a fully favorable decision for the Andres on May 26, 1993. R. 9-15. The ALJ created a record of all the pertinent documents and found that Burke and Justin Andre's eligibility for benefits should be transferred to their mother's account, and that they were eligible for benefits from her account beginning in January, 1992, when their father's benefits ceased.
On October 15, 1993, the Appeals Council notified the parties that it had decided to reopen the ALJ's decision. After allowing the Andres time to respond, the Appeals Council reversed the ALJ's decision September 9, 1994, and held that the children may not elect to receive child's insurance benefits on the account of their mother. That decision, which was based in part on Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 83-23a, became the final decision of the Commissioner. The policy revealed by this decision is applied uniformly to all children who are similarly situated to the Andres. Answer, ¶ 27.
The Andres timely commenced this civil action on November 1, 1994, seeking this Court's review of the actions of the Appeals Council. They claim that their due process rights were violated when the Appeals Council decided sua sponte, more than sixty days after the ALJ's decision, to review that decision. Alternatively, they argue that the Appeals Councils' action violated the Agency's own regulations, specifically 20 CFR §§ 404.987-989, which provide the grounds for and timing of a decision to reopen a determination. Beyond this procedural claim, the Andres contend that the Appeals Council decision to deny the children the opportunity to transfer their benefits from their father's account to their mother's, was a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 402, which authorizes the payment of child insurance benefits in circumstances such as these. Finally, the Andres claim that the Commissioner's continuing policy of refusing to allow children to receive benefits on the account of their parent with the lower PIA, when the parent with the higher PIA ceases to receive benefits but remains technically eligible, is arbitrary, irrational and in violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The issues have been fully briefed and this matter is now ripe for resolution.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
When the standard embraced in Rule 56(c) is met, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.1992). As stated in Celotex, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55; see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991).
The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment; disputed facts must be outcome determinative. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Schroeder v. Barth, 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.1992). The party opposing a summary judgment motion bears an affirmative burden of presenting evidence that a disputed issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1992). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir.1992).
Before resolving the pending motion for summary judgment, and to determine the number of persons affected by any decision on the merits, the Court must first consider the arguments regarding class certification. Plaintiffs have moved for prospective relief for all members of a defined class, and have also sought retroactive relief for themselves and others similarly situated. Specifically, the Andres ask this Court to reverse the decision of the Appeals Council on two separate grounds. First, the Andres seek reinstatement of the ALJ's decision in their individual claims on grounds that the Council's review of that decision was untimely. Second, on grounds applying to the entire class, the Andres seek a holding that the policy used to defeat their claims for benefits is unlawful.
In essence, plaintiffs are asking this Court to pave the way for all who are similarly situated to them (i.e. that have been denied children's benefits when one of their two disabled parents returns to work), to obtain their children's benefits under the Act. They also seek an injunction that will ensure that no children in the future, who find themselves in the same position as the Andres, will have their benefits denied for the same reason the Commissioner uses here.5
Two key inquiries must be pursued to determine whether class certification is proper in this case. First, the Court must assure itself that it has jurisdiction to decide the merits, and second, the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be met. Defendant urges that the Court may have jurisdiction to resolve the Andres's individual claims, but that jurisdiction does not exist to resolve the claims of many of the members of the class.
Citing the requirements of § 205(g) of the Act, Defendant argues that members of the proposed class fail to meet certain of its jurisdictional requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("§ 405(g)"). Section 405(g) jurisdiction depends on two primary requirements. First, to invoke a court's jurisdiction a social security claimant must have received a final decision from the agency (the "Final Decision Rule"). Johnson v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 346, 352 (7th Cir.1990). Second, the claimant must file an appeal with a district court within sixty (60) days of that final decision (the "Sixty Day Rule"). Id.
The Final Decision Rule likewise consists of two separate inquiries, the first being presentment, and the second, exhaustion of administrative remedies. Presentment, which is jurisdictional and nonwaivable, means that the claimant has presented a claim for benefits to the Administration. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, ...
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...the Social Security Act is "construed liberally in favor of beneficiaries to effect the act's remedial purpose." Andre v. Chater, 910 F.Supp. 1352, 1365 (S.D. Ind. 1995). d. Mr. Bibbs's Impairment and Medical Records With respect to listing 7.05A, the ALJ made no express findings. The ALJ d......