Andresen v. Terex Advance Mixer, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-676 JD |
| Parties | KATHRYN ANDRESEN, Plaintiff, v. TEREX ADVANCE MIXER, INC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Now before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Ozinga Bros., Inc. (“Ozinga”). (DE 5.) Ozinga argues, in part, that the Plaintiff's sole claim against it seeking declaratory relief is not ripe. The Court agrees finding that any adverse legal interests are not of sufficient immediacy to make the claim ripe. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim and it must be dismissed.
Ozinga is in the business of selling and delivering cement. (DE 36 ¶ 6.) In the process of delivering cement, Ozinga uses cement-mixing trucks. (Id.) One of the mixing trucks used by Ozinga in its business was a 2015 FD5000 Glider (the “Mixer Truck”), which was designed, manufactured, and distributed by Terex Advance Mixer, Inc. (“Terex”). (Id. ¶¶ 8, 14.) The truck's mixing drum opened at the front of the truck and the cement discharged from a front-facing chute. (Id. ¶ 9.) Next to the drum was a mounted hopper which would raise and lower hydraulically and/or pneumatically, but contained no other safety mechanism. (Id.) Mixer operators had to clean the hopper, chute, and drum after each delivery. (Id. ¶ 10.)
On December 11, 2020, Jason Andresen was an employee of Defendant Ozinga. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) That day, he was cleaning the hopper, chute, and drum of the Mixing Truck when the hopper unexpectedly fell on him, crushing him between the hopper and the drum, causing his death. (Id. ¶ 15.) In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Andresen was caught by the rotating drum and trapped between the hopper and drum, causing his death. (Id.)
On September 13, 2021, Kathryn Andresen, as personal representative of Jason Andresen and his surviving spouse, filed her initial complaint. (DE 1.) The complaint named Terex Advance Mixer, Inc., Terex Corporation, and Ozinga as defendants. (Id.) Ms. Andresen asserted three claims against Terex Advance Mixer, Inc., and Terex Corporation for strict liability, negligence, and punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 21-38.) As relevant here, though, the only claim brought against Ozinga was for a declaration of a subrogation interest. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) In Count IV, because Ozinga had paid or would pay workers' compensation benefits to Ms. Andresen, Ms. Andresen requested that the Court issue “a declaration as to what (if any) right Ozinga has to” any recovered funds “in the event of a recovery [against Terex].” (Id. ¶ 40-41.)
Defendant Ozinga then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (DE 5.) In this motion, Ozinga argued (among other things) that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim seeking declaratory relief because the claim was not ripe. (DE 6.) Ms. Andresen then filed her response to this motion to dismiss (DE 18), and Ozinga filed its reply (DE 19), making the issue fully briefed.
In February, Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint. (DE 36.) This amended complaint added an additional claim against Terex for loss of consortium. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) Count V of the amended complaint asked for a declaration of a subrogation interest against Ozinga. (Id. ¶¶ 44-46.) This count was identical to Count IV in the original complaint.
“When an amended complaint is filed, the prior pleading is withdrawn and the amended pleading is controlling.” Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2008). “Courts routinely deny motions to dismiss as moot after an amended complaint is filed, unless a defendant wishes to apply that same motion to the amended complaint because the amended complaint has not remedied the previous deficiencies.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 2:17-CV-33-JPK, 2020 WL 1660044, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2020) (quoting Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc., No. 10 C 715, 2010 WL 3272842, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010)). Here, Ms. Andresen's amended complaint brings an identical claim to that brought against Ozinga in the original complaint. Therefore, Ozinga's arguments concerning ripeness brought in its motion to dismiss equally apply to the amended complaint. Accordingly, the deficiencies of the first complaint have not been remedied and the Court considers Ozinga's motion to dismiss.
The Court also notes that it has an independent obligation “to determine in every case whether it has subject matter jurisdiction and to dismiss the case if it concludes it does not.” Jaronik v. Town of Lakeville, No. 3:15-CV-623, 2017 WL 819696, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2017) (quoting Hertel v. Sweet, 2007 WL 2404804 at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 17, 2007). “[N]ot only may the federal courts police subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, they must.” Hay v. Ind. State Bd. Of Tax Com'rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 583 (1999)). Given this independent obligation, even if Ozinga had failed to file its motion to dismiss, the Court still would have had authority to examine its subject matter jurisdiction over the claim brought against Ozinga.
Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of claims over which the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Further, “[t]he district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Id. (citations omitted). The burden of establishing proper federal subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party asserting it. Muscarello v. Ogle Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 610 F.3d 416, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).
In her amended complaint, Ms. Andresen requests that the Court issue “a declaration as to what (if any) right Ozinga has to” any recovered funds “in the event of a recovery.” (DE 36 ¶¶ 40-41.) As Ms. Andresen recognizes in her amended complaint, Ozinga's potential right to recovery stems from it being an “employer” under the workers' compensation laws in Indiana. Therefore, prior to addressing whether Ms. Andresen's claim is ripe, the Court reviews the workers' compensation laws of Indiana.
(1) Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act
The Indiana Worker's Compensation Act requires that “employers . . . provide limited compensation to workers whose injuries arise out of and in the course of their employments.” Sprangler, Jennings & Daugherty P.C. v. Indiana Ins. Co. (Sprangler), 729 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ind. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Act created a novel remedy unknown to the common law and was designed to give compensation to injured employees without regard to fault. McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc., 659 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Ind. 1995) (); Waldridge v. Futurex Indus., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (). One benefit of worker's compensation is that it provides a prompt remedy guaranteeing some recovery to injured employees hurt in industrial accidents. Sprangler, 729 N.E.2d at 120 (“While it could take years to reduce a third-party claim to judgment, the Worker's Compensation Act requires that the employer provide medical treatment before the adjudication of permanent impairment.”).
Typically, an employee's recovery for job related accidents is limited exclusively to the remedies afforded under certain provisions in the worker's compensation scheme. Northcutt v. Smith, 642 N.E.2d 254, 256 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). However, an employee, or an injured employee's dependents, may wish to bring a third-party suit in order to maximize recovery, as workers' compensation is not meant to award damages for pain, suffering, or other monetary loss, but instead gives benefits “intended to replace the future wages that the employee would earn if he were able to continue work.” Sprangler, 729 N.E.2d at 121. Therefore, Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13 (“Section 13”) provides an exception to the general rule and “permits the injured employee [or the employee's dependents] to bring suit against individuals other than the employer or fellow employees.” Id. It is this exception which permits Ms. Andresen to file the instant action against Terex.
However, in some circumstances, an employer may pay benefits to an injured employee before that employee files a claim against a third party. Sprangler, 729 N.E.2d at 120. Therefore, when an employee who has already received worker's compensation sues a third-party tortfeasor, Section 13 seeks to prevent “double recovery by the employee” by providing the employer a lien on the amount received by the employee in that third-party suit. Niegos v. ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor LLC, 940 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010); see also Walkup v. Wabash Nat. Corp., 702 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind. 1998) (). In order to prevent this double recovery, the statute provides that:
[I]f the action against the other person is brought by the injured employee or the injured employee's dependents and judgment is obtained and paid, and accepted or settlement is made with the other person . . . then from the amount...
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