Andrew Aldridge and Others, Plaintiffs In Error v. Nathaniel Williams

Decision Date01 January 1845
Citation3 How. 9,44 U.S. 9,11 L.Ed. 469
PartiesANDREW ALDRIDGE AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR v. NATHANIEL F. WILLIAMS
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

'That, on their entry, the defendant exacted and required of the plaintiffs to pay, as and for duties on said goods, the sum of eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars and two cents, which the plaintiffs first refused to pay, but not being able to get their goods without paying the same, they did pay the same under protest; that the value of the goods, by the true invoice cost, adding freight and other charges, was thirty-six thousand six hundred and fifty-one dollars, ($36,651;) that the home valuation in Baltimore, as fixed by the appraisers, was forty-four thousand three hundred and forty-six dollars, ($44,346;) that the duties upon the invoice cost and charges would have been seven thousand three hundred and thirty dollars and twenty cents ($7,330.20).

'It is further agreed, that the duties, so collected as aforesaid by the defendant, were exacted under, and in pursuance of, orders and regulations from the Treasury Department of the government of the United States, and with the approbation, and sanction, and direction of the President of the United States.

'And it is also admitted, that the amount exacted as aforesaid by defendant of plaintiffs, and by them paid him as aforesaid, was deposited by the defendant in the Marchants' Bank of Baltimore, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, on the 29th August, 1842.

'It is also agreed, that the court may infer, from the facts hereinbefore agreed upon, whatever a jury might infer.

'If, upon the foregoing statement of facts, the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the above sum of eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars and twenty cents, ($8,869.20) or any part thereof, then judgment to be entered for the plaintiffs, for the amount so determined to be due, with interest; if they should be of opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover at all, then judgment to be entered for defendant.

'It is further agreed, that this court enter up a judgment upon the aforegoing case stated, for the defendant, and that the plaintiffs be at liberty to appeal, or prosecute a writ of error to the like effect and purport, as if the above facts were stated in a bill of exceptions, and judgment rendered upon them for the defendant.

'And it is further agreed, that either party shall be at liberty, in the Supreme Court, to raise and argue, in that court, any points or questions which, it may appear to that court, could be raised upon the aforegoing facts.

REVERDY JOHNSON, for plaintiffs,

Z. COLLINS LEE, U. S. Attorney.'

29th November, 1842.

The court below gave judgment for the defendant, and a writ of error brought the proceedings up to this court.

R. Johnson, for the plaintiffs in error.

Nelson, attorney-general, for the defendant.

R. Johnson made three points.

1. That when the duties were exacted of the plaintiff by the defendant, there was no law imposing any duties upon such an importation.

2. That if there was, there was no law authorizing their being levied on the home valuation, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference stated in the record of $1539.

3. That if such duties were in whole, or in part, exacted without law, the amount may be recovered in an action for money had and received, upon the facts of this case.

He said that the judgment below was pro forma, and the question raised by the first point was now for the first time brought before any court. The amount in all the cases is about a million and a half. Before 1842, all duties were levied upon foreign valuation. There are two constructions of the Constitution; one, that under it, there is a power to collect revenue for the sake of the revenue only; the other, for protection. The act of 1833 was a compromise between these two. Each class was supposed to surrender something. The law was intended to terminate at a certain period, viz., 30th June, 1842, and the question is, what was the condition of the revenue-system after that day. Was there any law to impose duties? We say not. From the history of the act and the act itself, we infer, that it was the intention of its framers to leave the subject wholly to Congress after 1842. The former attorney-general decided otherwise, and gave two opinions; but, upon examining them, we do not find that clearness of conviction which he always had when clearness was attainable. He evidently doubted upon the subject. The Secretary of the Treasury differed from him in opinion. The Committee of the House of Representatives reported unanimously that there was no authority to collect duties at all after the 30th of June, 1842. What is the construction of the act, taken by itself, apart from its history? The title is, 'An act to modify,' &c., showing an intention to change the entire system, and make it just what this law would leave it, as if all other acts were apecially repealed. The first two sections provide for the period anterior to June, 1842, without saying what shall be done afterwards; the third says, that, until that day, other laws, as modified by this act, shall continue in force. Congress, therefore, was not content with leaving the collection of duties as a matter of inference, but gave an explicit direction that they should be collected, showing its opinion to be that unless there was an express authority granted to the executive power to collect the modified duty, that branch of the government would not have it all. The...

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