Andrew S. ex rel. Margaret S. v. School Committee

• Decision Date: 05 August 1999
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.95-30025-MAP.
• Citation: 59 F.Supp.2d 237
• Parties: ANDREW S., By and Through his next friends MARGARET S. and James S., Plaintiffs, v. THE SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF THE TOWN OF GREENFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

59 F.Supp.2d 237

ANDREW S., By and Through his next friends MARGARET S. and James S., Plaintiffs, v. THE SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF THE TOWN OF GREENFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, Defendant.

Civil Action No.95-30025-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

August 5, 1999.

Stewart T. Graham, Jr., Hampden, MA, for Andrew S., by and through his next friends Margaret S. and James S., Plaintiffs.

Peter L. Smith, Paroshinsky Law Offices, Springfield, MA, for School Committee of Town of Greenfield, Mass., Defendant.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

(Docket Nos. 86 & 97)

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case raises an issue of first impression within the First Circuit, and one that has bedeviled other Courts of Appeals: whether an individual seeking a remedy for straightforward violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., may simultaneously seek compensatory and punitive damages for those same violations under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, this court will hold that, on the facts of this case, no section 1983 cause of action is available. The defendant's motion to dismiss this count of the complaint will therefore be allowed.

Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of the attorneys' fees expended by them to obtain relief for the violations of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (Supp.1999). As will be seen, plaintiffs did prevail, though only in part, in their claim against the Greenfield School Committee under the IDEA. The motion for fees will therefore be allowed, in part. Defendant's motion to dismiss this count of the complaint will be denied, but the court will, sua sponte, dismiss this count as moot in view of the ruling on the motion for fees.

II. FACTS

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept the facts as asserted in the complaint as true. See Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1992). The motion must be denied unless the court finds "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The facts set forth below are considered in accordance with this standard.

Andrew, a child diagnosed from birth with autism, received services from an independent program in Amherst, Massachusetts called the Early Childhood Learning Center (ECLC) up to the age of three. At that time the defendant Greenfield School Committee, the so-called Local Educational Agency ("LEA"), assumed responsibility for providing Andrew a free, appropriate public education. Amended Complaint (Docket No. 27 at ¶ 16). A disagreement arose during the 1993-94 school year between Andrew's parents and the defendant over whether Andrew should continue at ECLC or receive his schooling through a specialized program offered within the public school. The controversy was over whether an "integrated" or "non-integrated" program was appropriate for Andrew.

At first, Andrew was placed in the Greenfield integrated program. Plaintiffs charge that the program failed to address Andrew's needs, most significantly as a result of inadequate staff training. Negotiations and discussions took place between the parents and school officials throughout the academic year 1993-94 and into the summer. An independent evaluation of the program resulted in recommendations for increased staff training that, plaintiffs allege, never occurred. (Id. at ¶¶ 33 and 40).

In the fall of 1994 Andrew was again placed into the allegedly inadequate Greenfield program, and the parents requested a hearing before the Massachusetts Board of Special Education Appeals (BSEA), seeking placement of Andrew into either ECLC or another off-site program, the River Street School in Windsor Locks, Connecticut. (Id. at ¶ 53).

In January of 1995, after hearing a number of witnesses, the BSEA hearing officer found against the parents in a preliminary order, declining to order Andrew's placement in an off-site program but requiring some improvements in Greenfield's program. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-61).

On February 2, 1995 plaintiffs filed their original complaint with this court seeking a declaration that the BSEA decision was arbitrary and capricious, and an order requiring the defendant to place Andrew in the ECLC program. Complaint (Docket No. 1 at 9). On February 6, 1995 the court heard plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking immediate placement of Andrew in a new off-site program, the New England Center for Autism.¹ The motion was denied on February 21, 1995.

Proceedings before this court and the BSEA thereafter continued in tandem. On August 4, 1995 the BSEA hearing officer issued her final opinion concluding as follows:

1. The 1993-1994 502.8(b) Individualized Education Plan proposed by Greenfield was reasonably calculated to ensure the maximum feasible educational benefit to Andrew, in the least restrictive setting 2. The 1994-1995 502.8(b) Individualized Education Plan as written by Greenfield was reasonably calculated to provide the maximum feasible benefit to Andrew in the least restrictive setting. Implementation of that IEP was hampered however, by inadequate staff training and insufficient home-school coordination. To remedy this Greenfield must, within ten days of the date of this decision, arrange for a comprehensive training of preschool teachers, aides, supervisors, and providers of related therapies in the techniques of behavioral teaching. This training must be substantially equivalent in nature, scope, and length to the training provided to the teachers at the Early Childhood Learning Center and the New England Center for Autism. In addition Greenfield must provide independent supervision, monitoring, and consultation to all preschool service providers by a teacher certified in special education with training and experience in both autism and behavioral teaching principles. This supervision/consultation shall take place, at a minimum, one full school day per week.

In addition, a systematic, written, home-school coordination plan must be developed....

3. The River St. School is inappropriate and unduly restrictive for Andrew S.;

4. The parent is entitled to an independent psychological evaluation funded by the Greenfield Public Schools.

(Docket No. 88, Exhibit 6).

On September 13, 1995 plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, contending that the August 4, 1995 decision of the hearing officer was "contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, not based on the facts adduced at the hearing nor on the applicable law and violates [Andrew's] right to a free, appropriate education." Amended Complaint (Docket No. 27 at ¶ 87). This amended complaint for the first time asserted a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought, in addition to the remedies under the IDEA, compensatory and punitive damages, and a jury trial.

The court thereafter made extensive efforts to assist the parties in mediating their dispute. Eventually, a neutral expert was retained to assist the court and counsel in reaching a resolution in the best interests of Andrew. This expert, whose credentials were approved by both sides, concluded, like the BSEA officer, that placement outside the Greenfield school system was not appropriate and recommended certain changes in the existing program. The changes were effected, and Andrew did in fact attend the Greenfield program for the latter part of the 1995-96 school year. He has since transferred to another school district.

On the face of it, the eventual effectuation through the IDEA process of acceptable changes in the integrated program, and Andrew's participation in it, would appear to resolve the issues raised by the complaint, but two counts do remain.² First, in Count Four, plaintiffs claim that the LEA intentionally denied Andrew a Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE") as required by the IDEA and that as a result plaintiffs suffered emotional distress for which they are entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id., at ¶¶ 101-102).

For purposes of the discussion to follow, it is important to underline here that plaintiffs' grievance against the Greenfield School Committee, or LEA, arises solely from their dissatisfaction with the nature of the educational services offered Andrew, particularly inadequate staff training. Defendant of course disputes this allegation, denying any inadequacy and contending that teacher training was enriched, partly as a result of ongoing staff support, and partly to address the parents' concerns, but not as a result of the litigation. Whatever the parties' dispute, however, it is noteworthy that no broad due process or equal protection claim is asserted, and no allegation is made of any widespread or longstanding pattern and practice in this regard in Greenfield. Moreover, no claim is made that the LEA utterly turned its back on Andrew, flatly refusing to recognize his disability, or trivializing it, or declining to offer any substantial special services. The section 1983 claim contained in Count Four is that the specific services offered to Andrew by the LEA were not, in plaintiffs' view, adequate and thus did not provide him a FAPE.

The second remaining claim, in Count Five, is that plaintiffs were — substantially, if not entirely — the "prevailing party" during the 1995 BSEA proceedings and are, therefore, entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under the IDEA directly. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (Supp.1999). Defendant has moved to dismiss both Counts Four and Count Five. Plaintiffs have filed a separate motion for fees.

III. DISCUSSION

A. SECTION 1983 AND THE IDEA

It is well established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not confer substantive rights, but rather provides a vehicle to redress...