Goleta Union Elementary School Dist. v. Ordway
| Decision Date | 12 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-99-07745 DDP.,CV-99-07745 DDP. |
| Citation | 166 F.Supp.2d 1287 |
| Parties | GOLETA UNION ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al., Plaintiffs, v. Andrew ORDWAY; et al., Defendants. and Related Counterclaims. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Sharon A Watt, Andrew V Arczynski, Filarsky & Watt, Ojai, CA, for Goleta Union Elementary School Dist., Hope Elementary School Dist., Santa Barbara High School Dist., Santa Barbara County Special Education Local Plan Area, Santa Barbara County Office of Education.
Steven M Wyner, Steven M Wyner Law Office, Manhattan Beach, CA, Cynthia Ordway.
Barry A Zolotar, California Department of Education, Sacramento, CA, Marsha A Bedwell, Department of Education, Sacramento, CA, Joyce O Eckrem, Joyce O Eckrem Law Offices, Sacramento, CA, for California Special Education Hearing Office.
Barry A Zolotar, California Department of Education, Sacramento, CA, Marsha A Bedwell, Department of Education, Sacramento, CA, for California Dept. of Education.
This matter comes before the Court on the counter-defendant Diana Rigby's motion for summary judgment. After reviewing and considering the materials submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court denies Rigby's motion for summary judgment.
This action stems from an administrative hearing appeal regarding alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. ("IDEA"). The plaintiffs and counter-defendants were the Goleta Union Elementary School District, the Hope Elementary School District, the Santa Barbara High School District ("SBHSD"), the Santa Barbara County Special Education Local Plan Area ("SELPA"), and the Santa Barbara Office of Education ("SBCOE"). The defendants and counter-claimants are Andrew Ordway ("Andrew"), and his mother, Cynthia Ordway. Andrew has been a special education student since 1993. (Counter-Cl.'s Stmt.Gen.Iss. at 1.)
The plaintiffs and counter-defendants filed this action on July 27, 1999 in order to appeal the April 30, 1999 decision of a California Special Education Hearing Officer (the "Hearing Officer"). The Hearing Officer found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs failed to offer Andrew a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") as required by IDEA, and that one or more of the plaintiffs should be required to reimburse Cynthia Ordway for Andrew's residential placement. (See Compl., Ex. 1 at 19-21.) The plaintiffs sought to set aside the Hearing Officer's findings, as well as additional declaratory relief and attorney's fees. (See Compl. at 13-15.)
On September 24, 1999, defendants California Department of Education and California Special Education Hearing Office filed an answer to the complaint. On October 18, 1999, defendant Cynthia Ordway filed an answer and a counterclaim. The counterclaim named the plaintiffs as counter-defendants, as well as Marcia McClish, both individually and as the director of SELPA, and Diana Rigby, both individually and as the Director of Student Services for the SBHSD. The counterclaim included the following allegations and causes of action: (1) the counter-defendants violated Ms. Ordway's rights under IDEA; (2) the counter-defendants violated Ms. Ordway's rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) the counter-defendants "acted in bad faith in denying Counterclaimant her statutory rights under IDEA, and thereby violated Section 1983"; (4) the counter-defendants "acted with intentional disregard for Counterclaimant's statutory rights under IDEA, and thereby violated Section 1983"; (5) the counter-defendants "acted in bad faith in denying Counterclaimant her statutory rights under Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and thereby violated Section 1983"; and (6) the counter-defendants "acted with intentional disregard for Counterclaimant's statutory rights under Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and thereby violated Section 1983." (Counterclaim at ¶¶ 97-108.) Subsequently, Ms. Ordway agreed to dismiss her second, fifth, and sixth counterclaims. (See Opp.Mot.Dism. at 8-9.)
On August 10, 2001, the Court affirmed the Hearing Officer's findings in favor of defendants/counter-claimants on all grounds, with the exception of the finding that the AB 3632 assessment was completed in a timely manner.1 The Court reversed the Hearing Officer's decision regarding the assessment and found in favor of the Ordways on that issue. The Court affirmed the Hearing Officer's monetary award and granted SEHO's and the Department of Education's motions for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that Andrew Ordway's rights secured by IDEA were violated.
This matter is presently before the Court on a motion for summary judgment by counter-defendant Diana Rigby ("Rigby"). Rigby asserts she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on three grounds: (1) a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be maintained based upon a violation of IDEA; (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars the instant action against Rigby to the extent that she is sued in her official capacity; and (3) Rigby is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity to the extent that she is sued in her individual capacity.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's claim is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Congress enacted IDEA in order to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free [and] appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs ..." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see also Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-84, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). "The Act gives disabled students a substantive right to public education and conditions federal assistance upon a State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the Act." Straube v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.Supp. 1164, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). "The primary mechanism for delivering a free appropriate education is the development of a detailed instruction plan, known as an Individual Education Program (`IEP'), for each child classified as disabled." W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir.1995). As one court explained, IEP's are developed as a result of the combined efforts of the school district, the child's teachers, and the parents:
[IEPs are] prepared at meetings between the school district, the child's teacher, and the child's parents or guardians, [and] define[] the child's present educational performance, establish[] annual and short-term[] objectives for improvements in that performance, and describe[] the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives.
Straube, 801 F.Supp. at 1173 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)). IDEA requires that IEPs be reviewed at least annually. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(6).
The goal of the IEP requirement and of IDEA is to meet the unique educational needs of each child. Toward that end, IDEA recognizes that the school district itself, may not be able to meet the needs of all children. See Straube, 801 F.Supp. at 1172. Accordingly, IDEA provides the states with various private placement options. See id.
Rigby moves for summary judgment on the grounds that a violation of IDEA does not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Mot. at 2.) According to Rigby, "the exclusive remedial provisions of IDEA cannot be subverted by an action under Section 1983 for monetary damages." (Id. at 8.) The Court has already ruled that:
With respect to the more general preemption question that is before the Court on this motion, the Court finds that IDEA does not foreclose all remedies under Section 1983. As noted in Emma C., the Northern District of California case which addressed this issue, in adding Section 1415(f) to IDEA in 1986, "Congress has specifically authorized § 1983 actions predicated on the IDEA." Emma C., 985 F.Supp. at 945.
(6/21/00 Order Den.Mot.Dism. at 14.) At that time, the Court found that one critical issue was not suitable for resolution in the context of a motion to dismiss.
In the present matter, the Court need not address the issue of whether the counter-claimant must prove more than a "simple" violation of IDEA in order to recover damages pursuant to Section 1983. The counter-claimant alleges that the counter-defendants acted in bad faith and with intentional disregard for Andrew's right under IDEA. On a motion to dismiss, this pleading is sufficient to meet even the heightened standard endorsed by the Massachusetts District Court in Andrew S., in which plaintiffs may only recover Section 1983 damages for IDEA violations of "constitutional proportions."
(Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).)
The question now before the Court is whether the Ordways must plead more than a "simple" violation of IDEA in order to recover damages pursuant to Section 1983. The Court finds that the plaintiffs may recover under Section 1983 for statutory violations of IDEA.
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