Andrews v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.
Citation | 504 F.Supp.2d 1329 |
Decision Date | 24 August 2007 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:07-CV-72-WCO. |
Parties | Ed ANDREWS and Laura Andrews, Plaintiffs, v. ATLAS VAN LINES, INC.; Daniel Moving Systems, Inc.; Atlantic Relocation Systems; John Doe 1; and Doe 2, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
James Lloyd Bass, Office of James L. Bass, Blue Ridge, GA, for Plaintiffs.
David Michael Van Sant, Scott W. McMickle, Dennis, Corry, Porter & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
The captioned case is before the court for consideration of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims [2-1].
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that, in July 2006, they contracted with defendant Atlas Van Lines, Inc. ("Atlas") for the transport of their household goods from Madisonville, Louisiana to Mineral Bluff, Georgia.1 According to plaintiffs, their possessions were destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered unusable as the result of defendants' alleged negligence. On June 1, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Fannin County, Georgia, alleging state law claims of gross negligence against defendants. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for their actual pecuniary loss and mental anguish; they also seek attorneys' fees, costs of litigation, and exemplary damages.2
Defendants removed the case to this court on June 29, 2007, asserting that federal jurisdiction existed because plaintiffs' claims arose exclusively under the Carmack Amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13101 et seq. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss in which they argue that plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment. Plaintiffs filed no response to the motion to dismiss, indicating that they do not oppose this motion. LR 7.1B, NDGa. Nevertheless, the court must determine whether dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claim is appropriate.
Defendants' motion to dismiss relies on the premise that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment, which governs a motor carrier's liability for the loss of or damage to goods shipped in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 14706. It is well-established that the Carmack Amendment preempts state law claims arising from failures in the transportation and delivery of goods. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913) (); Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948 (1916) ( ).
It is clear that plaintiffs' state law claims all arise from defendants' failure to transport and deliver their possessions in accordance with the contract; plaintiffs have not alleged any conduct that is separate and distinct from defendants' failure to transport and deliver their possessions. Therefore, the Carmack Amendment preempts plaintiffs' state law claims for negligence. Smith v. UPS, 296 F.3d 1244, 1249 (11th Cir.2002) (). Plaintiffs' claim for "exemplary damages" is also preempted as it is based on defendants' alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in the transport of their possessions. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Furthermore, plaintiffs' state law claim for attorneys' fees and costs (Compl. ¶ 11) is preempted because it alleges liability relating to defendants' failure to adequately resolve plaintiffs' claim for damages that arose from the transport of their possessions. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir.1997) ( ).
Although plaintiffs' state law claims are clearly preempted, the court must determine whether plaintiffs' complaint was properly removed. While both parties seem to accept that the court has jurisdiction over this case,3 the court must answer this question for itself. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ().
As pled, the complaint does not clearly set forth a federal claim. On its "face," the complaint asserts only a state law cause of action for negligence. Ordinarily, a plaintiff is the "master of the claim" and may choose to rely on state law, despite the fact that he may have a cause of action under federal law as well. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). A defendant cannot usually remove a case brought solely pursuant to state law simply by asserting a federal defense, even the defense of federal preemption. BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir.1999).
Obviously, if the court were to apply these general rules, it would have to conclude that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist: the parties are not diverse, and the complaint's face reveals only state law causes of action. But the court is not being asked to and need not apply these general rules. Indeed, plaintiffs' complaint may actually arise under federal law if the court finds that the complete preemption doctrine, an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, applies in this case. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425; see also Metropolitan Life Ins Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (). Complete preemption occurs when "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has considered whether the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Carmack Amendment. The two Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue, however, have found that the doctrine does apply. Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683 (9th Cir.2007); Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769 (5th Cir.2003).
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit stated that complete preemption was "narrowly drawn" and observed that it had been applied "hesitatingly" by the Supreme Court with "no enthusiasm" for extending it to other contexts. BLAB T.V., 182 F.3d at 854-56. In 2003, however, the Supreme Court extended the doctrine of complete preemption to claims preempted by the National. Banking Act. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). The Supreme Court explained that in determining whether the complete preemption doctrine applied to a particular statute, "the proper inquiry focuses on whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than on whether Congress intended that the cause of action be removable." Id. at 9 n. 5, 123 S.Ct. 2058. In Hoskins, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its previous position regarding the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment in the aftermath of Beneficial and ultimately held:
We are persuaded ... that Congress intended for the Carmack Amendment to provide the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods arising from interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier. Accordingly, we hold that the complete pre-emption doctrine applies [and] ... find that [the plaintiffs] claims "only arise[] under federal law and could, therefore, be removed under § 1441."
343 F.3d at 778 (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 11, 123 S.Ct. 2058). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, the only other court to consider this issue, found that the federal court had jurisdiction over plaintiff s complaint alleging a breach of contract action that was completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment. Hall, 476...
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