Andrews v. C.B.S. Division, Maule Industries

• Decision Date: 12 February 1960
• Parties: Willie ANDREWS, Petitioner, v. C.B.S. DIVISION, MAULE INDUSTRIES and Corporate Croup Service, Inc., and Florida Industrial Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 206

118 So.2d 206

Willie ANDREWS, Petitioner, v. C.B.S. DIVISION, MAULE INDUSTRIES and Corporate Croup Service, Inc., and Florida Industrial Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 12, 1960.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1960.

Harry Goodmark, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Jones, Adams, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for C. B. S. Division, Maule Industries and Corporate Group Service, Inc.

Paul E. Speh and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission, respondents.

DREW, Justice.

This cause is before the Court on petition for certiorari to review an order of the full commission affirming an award of the deputy commissioner on the ground that such award was supported by competent, substantial evidence.

The question we have for decision, therefore, basically is whether there is substantial, competent evidence in accordance with logic and reason to sustain the finding of the deputy commissioner ¹ that there was no causative connection between the accidents and the petitioner's (hereinafter designated as claimant) rheumatoid arthritis and that the claimant reached maximum improvement on January 20, 1958 without permanent partial disability. The evidence before the deputy commissioner was the claimant had been in excellent health before he suffered two accidents on the job. The claimant was a block mover working in dampt, wet and sometimes cold conditions. The first accident was on November 11, 1957 when claimant fell from a concrete block injuring his right ankle. The second accident was on December 20, 1957 about which the deputy failed to adduce testimony. Claimant was treated and advised to return to work but his condition after the second accident was diagnosed as rheumatoid arthritis. This diagnosis was not made until April 17, 1958. Claimant was unable to work after that date. While six doctors testified in the hearings before the deputy commissioner, such deputy commissioner relied primarily to support his findings upon the testimony of only three, ² failing in any way to give the testimony of the other three doctors the benefit of his judicial opinion in accordance with the requirements of Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 503, 505. ³

Moreover, the deputy commissioner failed to consider, in the weighing of the evidence and making reasonable deductions therefrom, the relative merits of the individual accidents, i. e. the first accident of November 11, 1957 and the second accident of December 20, 1957 as to the question of whether the condition of the claimant was aggravated by the second accident or whether the condition of the claimant as alleged arose from either the alleged pre-existing condition plus the first accident, the alleged pre-existing condition plus the second accident or the alleged pre-existing condition plus the first and second accidents. In these respects, at least, the order of the deputy commissioner is inadequate to a proper judicial review.

We now come to the question of whether there is substantial, competent evidence which accords with logic and reason to sustain the finding of the deputy commissioner that there was no causative connection between the accidents and the petitioner's rheumatoid arthritis and that the petitioner reached maximum improvement on January 20, 1958 without permanent partial disability.

In the instant case, the record shows that the medical evidence of the three physicians relied upon by the deputy commissioner to support his findings is in fact contradictory to such an extent that it, without the medical evidence submitted by the claimant and the claimant's own testimony, coupled with the consistent, steady and uninterrupted deterioration of claimant's condition brought on by the spread of the arthritis, ⁴ could not have been considered as 'competent, substantial evidence' since it did not establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue could have been reasonably inferred. In other words, the evidence relied upon by the deputy commissioner and interpreted by him when considered with the other evidence in the record neither discussed nor referred to by the commissioner ⁵ was not such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion at which he arrived and, therefore, neither the evidence relied upon nor the conclusion reached thereon was in accord with logic and reason as the law requires. ⁶ Most of the cases of this Court concerning this question use the expression 'such order must be supported by 'competent, substantial evidence which accords with logic and reason.'' While, of course, the evidence must accord with logic and reason (otherwise it would not be competent) it is really the result that must attain that quality. To put it another way, if the evidence is not logical and reasonable, a finding based on and supported by such evidence would be based on incompetent evidence and hence be contrary to law.

The responsibility of the deputy commissioner to evaluate all of the testimony takes precedence over the legal theory that the opinions of medical experts are not in and of themselves conclusive in matters wherein they are called to testify. The weight of all the opinions of medical experts must be considered in the order of the deputy commissioner before such order may be considered as having been supported by competent, substantial evidence or, it must appear from the deputy's order that some basis existed for rejecting--or qualifiedly considering medical testimony that otherwise appears to be valid and acceptable. In the instant case, the order fails to recognized the opinions of the medical experts testifying on behalf of the claimant other than by inference, or to give any weight to them or explain why they were not recognized and considered along with those of the other physicians. ⁷ The order should have considered all of the evidence which included the opinions of those physicians relied upon by the claimant as well as those relied upon by the commissioner in support of his order so, as we have stated, a reviewing tribunal can properly evaluate the correctness of the deputy's findings and determine, in fact, whether such order is supported by the quantity and quality of evidence which the law requires. ⁸

We need not delve into the record as to the matter of aggravation itself except to point out the great weight of authority in such cases is to the effect that where an employee inflicted with a disease, known or unknown, receives a personal injury under such circumstances that he might have appealed to the workmen's compensation act, F.S.A. § 440.01 et seq. for relief on account of the injury had there been no disease involved, but the injury aggravates or accelerates the progress of the disease materially contributing to hasten its claimination in disability, there may be a compensation award. ⁹

The evaluation of conflicting medical opinions in these cases has been a source of much litigation and dispute. Many years ago this Court laid down the rule that such expert testimony should be weighed and evaluated by the deputy commissioners as other testimony, and that the competent, substantial evidence rule was applicable in reviewing a deputy commissioner's findings thereon. There are necessary limitations, however, upon that broad pronouncement. In...