Andrews v. City of Mentor

• Decision Date: 25 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-4030,20-4030
• Citation: 11 F.4th 462
• Parties: Charles M. ANDREWS, Sr., TRUSTEE OF the GLORIA M. ANDREWS TRUST DATED APRIL 23, 1998, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MENTOR, OHIO, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

11 F.4th 462

Charles M. ANDREWS, Sr., TRUSTEE OF the GLORIA M. ANDREWS TRUST DATED APRIL 23, 1998, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.CITY OF MENTOR, OHIO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-4030

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: August 25, 2021

ON BRIEF: J. David Breemer, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, Sacramento, California, Kenneth J. Fisher, KENNETH J. FISHER CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Steven D. Strang, Nicholas G. Anhold, GALLAGHER SHARP LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: BOGGS, MOORE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BOGGS, J., joined, and LARSEN, J., joined in part. LARSEN, J. (pp. 478–83), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Charles Andrews, Sr., Trustee of the Gloria M. Andrews Trust Dated April 23, 1998 ("the Trust"), appeals from a final judgment entered against the Trust by the district court after it granted the City of Mentor, Ohio's ("the City") motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Trust takes issue specifically with the district court's resolution of the Trust's claims arising under the Takings Clause and Equal Protection Clause, both of which stem from the City's denial of the Trust's application for rezoning of approximately sixteen acres of real property. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

For over fifty years, the Andrews family has owned "three (3) contiguous parcels of real property located at 8180 and 8188 Garfield Road, Mentor, Ohio consisting of approximately 16.15[ ] acres." R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 16–17) (Page ID #5). The property—currently held by the Trust—sits near the western terminus of Norton Parkway, a road completed in 2006 that connects Garfield Road to Center Street. Id. at ¶ 21 (Page ID #6); R. 1-9 (Map) (Page ID #68). Center Street, in turn, connects to Interstate 90 via an interchange completed in 2005. R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 19) (Page ID #5). According to the Trust, the completion of Norton Parkway and the Center Street interchange "has dramatically changed the character of the area from a rural residential setting to a mixed-use area that includes industrial, office, commercial, medical, senior living and a variety of residential types and uses." Id. at ¶ 23 (Page ID #7). Sensing opportunity, the Trust has explored developing its property for residential use.

This dispute arises from the Trust's failed attempt to have its 16.15 acres rezoned under Mentor's Code of Ordinances from "Single Family R-4" to "Village Green – RVG." Whereas the R-4 zone allows for low-density single-family residences with a lot size of at least one-half acre, the RVG zone allows for higher-density development of three-to-five residential units per acre with fifteen percent of the total acreage designated for open space. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 18 (Page ID #3, 5); R. 1-7 (Comprehensive Plan at 65–69) (Page ID #60–65). Rezoning the Trust's property to RVG would allow the Trust to develop forty single-family residences on its property with about five acres left as designated open space. R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 28) (Page ID #7–8). Without the rezoning, and subject to ordinances limiting the length of cul-de-sacs to 600 feet, the Trust could develop only thirteen single-family residences on seven acres, allegedly leaving the remaining nine acres undevelopable. Id. at ¶ 40 (Page ID #10–11). The difference is significant for the Trust, which expects sales of approximately $4,000,000 if the property is rezoned to RVG, compared to sales of $1,560,000—at a loss to the Trust—if the land remains within the R-4 zone. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 41 (Page ID #8, 11).

The Trust submitted its application for rezoning on August 2, 2019, seeking rezoning of its property from R-4 to RVG and approval of a forty-unit RVG subdivision that the Trust refers to as the Echo Hill Manor Subdivision. Id. at ¶ 28 (Page ID #7–8). According to the Trust, its Echo Hill Manor Subdivision plan is materially identical to a plan that the City approved for rezoning and development in 2017, known as the "Woodlands of Mentor." Id. at ¶ 30 (Page ID #8). Nevertheless, the City Planning Commission unanimously recommended denial of the Trust's application for rezoning, and City Council adopted that recommendation by a four-to-three vote on November 6, 2019. Id. at ¶¶ 38–39 (Page ID #10). According to the Trust, this is the first time that the City has denied an application for rezoning to RVG since 2004, and the City has approved nine comparable applications in the time since (with three applications pending) consistent with its express preference for RVG zoning as reflected in the City's 2011 Comprehensive Plan. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14–15 (Page ID #3–5).

Having been rebuffed by the City, the Trust turned to the courts, filing a complaint against the City on January 10, 2020. Broadly alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments without precisely identifying the constitutional theories supporting its claims, the Trust sought declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 15–16 (Page ID #15–16). After answering the Trust's complaint, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Trust's lack of a property interest in its land as rezoned RVG was fatal to all of its claims, whatever theories those claims might be based upon. R. 12 (Answer) (Page ID #107); R. 13 (Mot. J. Pleadings at 1) (Page ID #113). The Trust opposed the motion, clarifying that it was alleging violations of the Takings Clause, the Equal Protection Clause (on theories of fundamental rights and "class of one"), and the Due Process Clause (substantive due process). R. 14 (Opp. at 8–15) (Page ID #136–43). In its reply, the City reiterated its argument that the Trust lacks a property interest in its land as rezoned RVG and argued that the Trust failed to allege facts sufficient to state a class-of-one equal-protection claim. R. 16 (Reply at 3–9) (Page ID #149–55).

On September 10, 2020, the district court granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Beginning with the Trust's substantive-due-process claim, the district court held that the Trust had failed to state a claim, reasoning that the Trust lacked a property interest in its land as rezoned RVG because rezoning is a "discretionary benefit." Andrews v. City of Mentor , No. 1:20-CV-00058, 2020 WL 5423964, at *5–6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2020) (quoting EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo , 698 F.3d 845, 857 (6th Cir. 2012) ). The district court applied the same reasoning to dismiss the Trust's takings claim for lack of a cognizable property interest. Id. at *7–8. Turning to the Trust's equal-protection claim, the district court held that the Trust failed to state a claim because it failed to establish (1) that the City's denial of its rezoning application burdened a fundamental right and (2) a viable class-of-one claim because the Trust failed "to negate potential explanations for the City's decision" to deny the Trust's application for rezoning while granting a similar request associated with the Woodlands of Mentor development. Id. at *13. However, the district court granted the Trust leave to amend its complaint to allege facts negating potential explanations for the City's differential treatment of the Echo Hill Manor Subdivision and Woodlands of Mentor properties. Id.

Instead of amending its complaint, the Trust elected to stand upon its allegations and moved for issuance of a final judgment and appealable order. R. 19 (Mot. for Final J. at 1–2) (Page ID #187–88). The district court obliged the Trust's request and entered judgment in favor of the City on all claims. R. 20 (J. at 1–2) (Page ID #190–91). This timely appeal followed, see R. 21 (Not. of App.) (Page ID #192), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review de novo a grant of judgment on the pleadings," Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc. , 983 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 2020), applying the same standard that we would for a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Hindel v. Husted , 875 F.3d 344, 346 (6th Cir. 2017). Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all factual allegations as true, we ask whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

III. DISCUSSION

The Trust raises two arguments on appeal. First, it argues that the district court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Trust's takings claim because the Trust's ownership of the sixteen acres is a sufficient property interest to support its takings claim. Second, the Trust argues that it does not need to plead facts negating every possible explanation for the City's differential treatment between the Trust's property and the Woodlands of Mentor for its class-of-one equal-protection claim to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Taking the Trust's arguments in turn, we conclude that both have merit.

A. Takings Claim

"The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not ‘be taken for public use, without just compensation.’ " Murr v. Wisconsin , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942, 198 L.Ed.2d 497 (2017) ; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374, 383, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) (Takings Clause applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment). Takings claims come in a few shapes and sizes. First, there is the quintessential takings claim based on "direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. , 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (20...