Andrews v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 18 May 1897
• Citation: 47 N.E. 412,168 Mass. 266
• Parties: ANDREWS v. JACKSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

168 Mass. 266

47 N.E. 412

ANDREWS v. JACKSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 18, 1897

COUNSEL

W.P. Martin, for plaintiff.

Hollis R. Bailey and J.H. Appleton, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The principal question in this case is whether there was any evidence to warrant a finding that the false representations made by the defendant in regard to the notes were actionable. This finding is in these words: "I find that the defendant represented these notes to be as good as gold, and that that representation was intended by him and understood by the plaintiff not to be an expression of opinion, but a statement of a fact of his own knowledge. I find that the notes were worthless." It is contended by the defendant that such a representation is necessarily and as a matter of law a mere expression of opinion, for which, however willfully false, and however damaging in the reliance placed upon it, no action can be maintained. It is true that such a representation may be, and often is, a mere expression of opinion. But we think that it may be made under such circumstances and in such a way as properly to be understood as a statement of fact upon which one may well rely. In Stubbs v. Johnson, 127 Mass. 219, one of the representations in regard to a note was that it was "as good as gold," and the jury were instructed that, if this was intended as a representation of the financial ability of the maker of the note, it was a statement of a material fact, for which the defendant was liable. This instruction was held erroneous, "because a representation as to a man's financial ability to pay a debt may be made either as a matter of opinion or as a matter of fact; the subject of the statement does not determine which it is." "It is often impossible," says Mr. Justice Colt further in the opinion, "to determine as matter of law whether a statement is the representation of a fact which the defendant intended should be understood as true of his own knowledge, or an expression of opinion. That will depend upon the nature of the representation, the meaning of the language used as applied to the subject-matter and as interpreted by the surrounding circumstances in each case. The question is generally to be submitted to the jury." The opinion plainly implies that, if the jury had been left to determine whether there was a representation of the maker's financial ability to pay made as a matter of fact, and not as a mere matter of opinion, they might have found against the defendant on his false representation that the note was "as good as gold." In Belcher v Costello, 122 Mass. 189, there is also a strong intimation that the rule is as above stated. In Safford v. Grout, 120 Mass. 20, the representations set out in the declaration were that the maker of the note "was a person of ample means and ability to pay said note, and that the note was good." The plaintiff was allowed to recover. The court says of the representations: "We must presume that they were legally sufficient to support the action; that is to say, that they were statements of fact susceptible of knowledge, as distinguished from matters of mere opinion or belief." See, also, Teague v Irwin, 127 Mass. 217; Morse v. Shaw, 124 Mass 59. In two recent cases--Way v. Ryther, ...