Andrews v. State

Citation555 P.2d 1079
Decision Date18 October 1976
Docket NumberNo. F--75--272,F--75--272
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
PartiesDarrell Lee ANDREWS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
OPINION

BRETT, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Darrell Lee Andrews, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged with the crime of Murder in the First Degree, in Case No. HCRF--74--43, and Case No. HCRF--74--44 in the District Court, Okmulgee County, as the result of the deaths of Walter Hembree and Burton Brewer, a Deputy Sheriff. The cases were consolidated for jury trial and the defendant was convicted in each case. The defendant was sentenced to Death, the mandatory punishment imposed by the statute in effect at the time, 21 O.S.Supp.1974, § 701.3.

Hembree and Brewer were killed during a shooting at the house of Joe Brison, the defendant's grandfather. From the State's evidence, the jury could have found the following facts. Just before midnight on the night of July 25, 1974, the radio dispatcher for the Henryetta Police Department put out a call dispatching all cars to the Joe Brison residence because a report had been received that there was a man there with a shotgun, possibly holding a hostage. Richard Larney, Henryetta Chief of Police, and Walter Hembree, a wrecker driver who served as an auxillary law enforcement officer, were the first to arrive on the scene. Larney testified that he and Hembree approached the Brison house from the southwest. Larney knocked on the door while Hembree waited behind him on the steps located on the south side of the porch. Immediately a shotgun blast hit Larney in the face and shoulder. As he scrambled off the porch a second blast hit him in the left leg. Larney was knocked to the ground by the blast but was able to crawl to the west side of the porch where he saw Hembree lying in the yard on his back 15 feet or more from the front steps where he had stood. He testified that he had not seen Hembree shot but that the shots which had hit him had come from the east side of the house. Larney remained where he was for three or four minutes longer when he heard another shot followed shortly by still another shot and someone screaming 'I give up, don't kill me.' Everett Clayton, a Deputy Sheriff for Okmulgee County, arrived soon after Larney and Hembree. Clayton testified that as he got out of his car he heard a shot and turned to see Hembree fall. There was a second shot and he heard Larney call out. Clayton testified that at the time the shots were fired there were no other law enforcement officers on the scene. Almost immediately after the second shot, however, Dayle James, a Highway Patrol Officer, arrived. Shortly thereafter a number of other cars arrived. A few minutes after the second shot, Clayton heard a third and then a fourth shot. After the shooting had stopped someone told him that Deputy Brewer had been shot. Clayton went to Brewer's car, and saw the body lying close by the car. The car was parked approximately 30 feet south of an outbuilding, located to the east of the Brison house. Clayton then made a search of the area which yielded two spent shotgun shells found under a window at the south of the house, a loaded shell located to the east of the house, and another loaded shell located at the corner of the outbuilding. Clayton testified that he gave these shells to Ray Lambert for the purpose of ballistic tests and they were subsequently admitted into evidence as State's Exhibits Nos. 3, 4 and 5. M. F. Grace, Chief of Police of Morris, Oklahoma, arrived at the scene at the same time as Deputy Brewer. The two men stopped their cars east of the house approximately 60 feet apart. Grace watched as Brewer got out of his car and crouched beside it on the driver's side observing the house. Grace was also crouched beside his car when he saw someone run from the outbuilding toward Brewer's car. He shouted a warning to Brewer who turned around and was shot. Grace witnessed the shooting and testified that afterwards the assailant stepped from behind Brewer's car and Grace shot him. As Grace prepared to shoot again, the man screamed, 'don't shoot, don't shoot, I give up.' Grace identified the wounded man, who that night was wearing two bandoliers with shotgun shells in them, as the defendant, Darrell Lee Andrews. Tom Johnson, Okmulgee Police Officer, also witnessed the shooting of Deputy Brewer and testified to the same facts as Chief Grace. He identified the defendant as the person he saw shoot Deputy Brewer. Ray Lambert, a firearms examiner for the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, testified that he conducted certain ballistics tests upon the spent shells discovered by Officer Clayton. He concluded that those shells were fired from the shotgun taken from defendant on the night of the shootings.

Certain statements made by the defendant later that night were admitted into evidence against him. An ambulance attendant testified that on the way to the hospital the defendant asked 'how many of them son-of-bitches did I get.' When he was told two or three, the defendant responded 'is that all.' (Tr. 220) Officer Dayle James talked to the defendant in the emergency room at the hospital. He testified that the defendant said, 'I know you, your're Dayle James. I just wish my slug would have blown your guts out.' The defendant had also said that he hoped he hadn't shot any Okmulgee or Henryetta police officers. He threatened to make James his next victim, saying that if number four didn't die James would be number four, and if number four did die, James would be number five. The defendant also made certain statements to Jack Carter, an Okmulgee County Deputy Sheriff. While the defendant was in the emergency room he asked Carter, 'how many did I cream.' (Tr. 245)

Medical testimony that massive shotgun wounds caused the death of Hembree and the death of Brewer concluded the State's case.

The defense called a number of witnesses in support of the defense theory that, first, there existed a reasonable doubt that the men shot were shot in the midst of the confusion at the scene by someone other than the defendant and, second, that even if the defendant had done the shooting he was not responsible because he was mentally incapable of knowing right from wrong.

The State called a number of witnesses in rebuttal, including a State psychiatrist who testified that the defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the shooting and was competent to aid in his own defense.

In his brief on appeal the defendant argues six propositions for reversal: That the court erred in excusing jurors because of voiced objections or hesitation to give the death penalty; that the court erred in failing to grant a change of venue, and in proceeding to trial with the jury as presently constituted; that the court erred in failing to exclude those jurors having preconceived ideas, for which evidence would be required to change or alter; that the court erred in rejecting the testimony of the ballistics expert offered by the defendant; that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for dismissal for lack of prosecution; and, that 21 O.S., § 701.1 and § 701.2 are unconstitutional.

We consider first defendant's third proposition wherein he argues that the failure of the trial court to exclude from the jury those jurors who stated on voir dire examination that they had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant constituted reversible error. The defendant's argument here centers upon the testimony during voir dire examination of four jurors, each of whom stated that he or she had formed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant through conversations with other persons or through reading about the case in the newspapers. Of the four, three jurors were subsequently removed by peremptory challenges; the fourth remained to consider the case.

Any defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a jury composed of persons of a state of mind to accord him the presumption that he is innocent. That a juror be willing to be convinced that a defendant is innocent should the evidence so show is not good enough. On the other hand, a defendant is not entitled to a jury composed of persons entirely ignorant of the facts surrounding the case. Collecting such a jury has become in modern times a near impossibility for the notorious case. See, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S., 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751. Nor is such a jury necessary to protect the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence. A juror is not disqualified because he has formed an impression or a hypothetical opinion about the case through reading or as the result of general conversation. This much is provided by statute. Section 662 of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides in part:

'(N)o person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon rumor, statements in public journals, or common notoriety, provided it appears to the court, upon his declaration, under oath or otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be submitted to him. . . .'

In this case it is clear that the refusal of the trial judge to excuse for cause the jurors in question was a permissible exercise of his discretion within the limits of that statute. The four whom the judge refused to excuse upon the defendant's challenge for cause were prospective jurors Dillon, Devaughn, Siberts,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Bosse v. State, D–2012–1128
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • May 25, 2017
    ...or whether the circumstances are so different that the evidence will confuse the jury. Andrews v. State , 1976 OK CR 258, ¶ 14, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083–84. Bosse suggests that his case should be controlled by the result in Andrews , where the Court excluded the defense expert testimony because ......
  • Hale v. State, F-84-208
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • January 29, 1988
    ...appellant met his burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant the change of venue. Andrews v. State, 555 P.2d 1079 (Okl.Cr.1976). This assignment is without Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in not allowing individual sequestered voir di......
  • Bosse v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • October 16, 2015
    ...issue, or whether the circumstances are so different that the evidence will confuse the jury. Andrews v. State, 1976 OK CR 258, ¶ 14, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083–84. Bosse suggests that his case should be controlled by the result in Andrews, where the Court excluded the defense expert testimony bec......
  • Chaney v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • May 15, 1980
    ...denial of the defendant's motion for a change of venue. Such motions are directed to the trial court's sound discretion Andrews v. State, Okl.Cr., 555 P.2d 1079 (1976) and we do not find any abuse of that discretion in this case. The record makes clear that the judge was sensitive to the pu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • § 9.08 OUT-OF-COURT EXPERIMENTS
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 9 Relevancy and Its Limits: Fre 401-403
    • Invalid date
    ...to the actual conditions at the burglary scene, the district court did not abuse its discretion . . .").[180] E.g., Andrews v. State, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) ("The results of tests to determine the distance from which a weapon had been fired are admissible into evidence ......
  • § 9.08 Out-of-Court Experiments
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (2018) Title Chapter 9 Relevancy and Its Limits: FRE 401-403
    • Invalid date
    ...to the actual conditions at the burglary scene, the district court did not abuse its discretion . . ."). [181] E.g., Andrews v. State, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) ("The results of tests to determine the distance from which a weapon had been fired are admissible into evidence......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT