Andrus v. Business Men's Accident Association of America
| Decision Date | 25 June 1920 |
| Citation | 223 S.W. 70,283 Mo. 442 |
| Parties | CORA I. ANDRUS v. BUSINESS MEN'S ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. E. E. Porter-field Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Solon T. Gilmore and Gilmore & Brown for appellant.
(1) An allegation that the insured committed suicide does not state a cause of action under a policy insuring against death resulting from accidental means. Defendant's objection to the introduction of any evidence, for the reason that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, should, therefore, have been sustained. Brunswick v. Ins. Co., 213 S.W. 45; Logan v Fid. & Cas. Co., 146 Mo. 114; Laessig v. Assn., 169 Mo. 272; Travelers Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661; Whitlatch v. Casualty Co., 149 N.Y. 45; Tuttle v. Assn., 132 Iowa 652; Accident Co. v Crandall, 120 U.S. 527; Blackstone v. Ins. Co., 74 Mich. 592; Insurance Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414. (2) Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of Missouri, includes freedom of contract. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Ex parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763. (3) Freedom of contract is inviolate except as it may be restricted and abridged by the State under its police power. State ex inf. v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1; Ex parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763. (4) The police power is the power to prescribe regulations for the public safety, the public health the general welfare and the public morals. Sloan v. Railroad, 61 Mo. 24; State ex rel. v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188; State ex rel. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410; Powell v. Railroad, 255 Mo. 420; State v. Railroad, 242 Mo. 339; Barber v. Connelly, 113 U.S. 27; Weber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344. (5) The Legislature may not enact a bill under the police power unless it be a proper exercise of that power. State ex rel. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410; State ex rel. v. Gas Light Co., 102 Mo. 472; State v. Tower, 185 Mo. 79; State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 117; State ex rel. v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 661. (6) Sec. 6945, R. S. 1909, is an abridgement of the right of contract. Ex parte Harrison, 212 Mo. 88; Gladney v. Sydnor, 172 Mo. 328. (7) The statute is an incitement and a temptation to holders of life insurance policies to commit suicide, and is, therefore, in violation of Secs. 1, 4 and 30, Art. 2, Mo. Constitution. Ritter v. Ins. Co., 139 U.S. 169. (8) The section in question violates Sec. 5, Art. 12, Mo. Constitution, in that, it requires corporations to conduct their business in such a manner as to infringe the general well being of the State. State v. Railroad, 242 Mo. 339. (9) The section in question violates Article 3 of the Constitution, in that, it is an attempt of the Legislature to infringe upon the powers of the courts. Ziegler v. Railroad, 58 Ala. 594; Hoke v. Henderson, 5 Dev. Law. 1. (10) The plaintiff in her proofs of loss having admitted that her husband was sixty-one years old, is bound thereby in the absence of positive testimony that her statement of his age was incorrect. Castens v. K. & L., 190 Mo.App. 57; Stevens v. Ins. Co., 190 Mo.App. 673. (11) The policy issued to Vincent R. Andrus was not within the powers of the defendant to issue, and is null and void. Sec. 6956, R. S. 1909; Cass Co. v. Ins. Co., 188 Mo. 1; City v. Bank, 74 Mo.App. 365; Froehley v. Ins. Co., 32 Mo.App. 302.
James C. Smith for respondent.
(1) The policy sued upon makes of the contract "old line insurance." The policy provides for a fixed and definite sum to be paid at the time of the delivery of the policy and a fixed and definite sum to be paid quarterly thereafter. There is no provision made in said policy for any variation of those terms. There is no reference made in that policy to any by-laws of the order, nor is any reference made to any assessment or collections of premiums or any other sums from any other member of the order. R. S. 1909, sec. 6950; Toomey v. Supreme Lodge, K. P., 147 Mo. 129; Aloe v. Life Assn., 164 Mo. 675; Logan v. Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 115; Williams v. Ins. Co., 189 Mo. 70; Jacobs v. Life Assn., 146 Mo. 523; Wilson v. Benevolent Assn., 125 Mo.App. 597; Kribbs v. United Order of Foresters, 191 Mo.App. 524; Jennings v. National American, 179 S.W. 789; Young v. Ry. Mail Assn., 126 Mo.App. 332; McDonald v. Life Assn., 154 Mo. 618. (2) If insured had been at issuance of policy sixty-one years of age, the policy issued is not null and void. The doctrine of ultra vires may not be invoked. The statute does not declare such policies void. Cass County v. Ins. Co., 188 Mo. 15.
WHITE, C. Railey and Mozley, CC., concur.
The plaintiff sued as the widow of Vincent R. Andrus, deceased, upon a policy of life insurance issued to him by the defendant. The contract is what is termed an accident policy and insured against "loss resulting from bodily injuries, effected directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes contributing or proximate, through external, violent and accidental means (excluding suicide, sane or insane)."
It is alleged in the petition that the insured met his death "from bodily injuries, effected directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes contributing or proximate, through external, violent and accidental means, to-wit, by the drinking of carbolic acid on said 20th day of May, 1915."
Plaintiff prayed judgment for three thousand dollars, the amount named in the policy for loss of life.
Defendant filed an answer containing, first, a general denial; second, an allegation that Vincent R. Andrus at the time of the acceptance of the application and issuance of the policy was 61 years of age at his nearest birthday, that the defendant was a corporation organized under Article III, Chapter 61, Revised Statutes 1909, pertaining to insurance on the assessment plan, and was licensed to do business on that plan, and the policy issued was therefore prohibited by the statute of Missouri and was ultra vires; third, averments that the policy contained a provision excluding liability for suicide, voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, and Andrus voluntarily committed suicide by drinking carbolic acid with suicidal intent; and that Section 6945, Revised Statutes 1909, the suicide section, is unconstitutional, in violation of Section I of Article II, Section 4 of Article II, Section 30 of Article II, and Section 5 of Article XII, of the Constitution of Missouri.
Plaintiff introduced the policy and proofs of death. she swore that she didn't know how old her husband was at the time of his death.
The defendant offered its articles of association framed under the provisions of Article III, Chapter 119, Revised Statutes 1899, now Article III, Chapter 61, Revised Statutes 1909.
There was a second count in the petition, but it is stated that it was dismissed and the trial proceeded upon the first count. The terms of the policy and the statements in the application, the character of the company shown by its articles of association and the business transacted, and other facts, will be considered in treating of the several questions arising in the case. There was a judgment for plaintiff for the amount sued for and defendant appealed.
I. Appellant attacks the constitutionality of Section 6945, Revised Statutes 1909, which declares suicide shall not be a defense in suits upon policies of life insurance, and asks this court to examine that statute and the reasons advanced for its alleged conflict with certain provisions of the Constitution of Missouri, as mentioned in the answer. The argument is that it is unconstitutional because it abridges the right of contract; the constitutional guaranty of the right to liberty includes the right to make such contracts as the individual sees fit.
If the argument of appellant was sound as applied to individuals it would not necessarily apply to corporations which are creatures of the statute. This court has said in the case of Julian v. Kansas City Star, 209 Mo. 35, 66, 107 S.W. 496: "The Legislature in dealing with artificial creatures of the law may, in certain particulars, make them a class to themselves, and impose conditions upon them not imposed upon individuals." And further, on page 67: "The State in issuing the charter may impose its own terms and when accepted the corporation is bound by the terms."
The State in prescribing terms and conditions upon which a corporation may be organized and may be empowered to transact business merely exercises the ordinary power vested in the sovereign state. It could forbid accident insurance companies from doing business in Missouri altogether, which it would be powerless to do in regard to natural persons. It can limit the activities of a corporation and prescribe the manner and conditions under which it may transact business in a way that could not be applied to individuals. This has been determined so often that argument in support of the distinction between artificial and natural persons is unnecessary. [N. W. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 254, 51 L.Ed. 168, 27 S.Ct. 126; Applegate v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 153 Mo.App. 63, 82, 132 S.W. 2; Houston v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 249 Mo. 332, 338, 155 S.W. 1068.]
Appellant argues at length that the statute, by declaring suicide to be no defense to an action on an insurance policy, places a premium on suicide and is inimical to public welfare and to public morals. In that argument the appellant merely attacks the propriety and the policy of the statute -- a consideration which does not concern this court. It is within the discretion of the Legislature to determine the propriety of an enactment and decide whether it may have a beneficial effect upon the subject to which it...
To continue reading
Request your trial