Aneke v. Design

• Decision Date: 24 February 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:20-cv-00270-KGB
• Parties: ERNEST ANEKE PLAINTIFF v. DAVISON DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC. DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

ERNEST ANEKE PLAINTIFF v. DAVISON DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC. DEFENDANT

Case No. 4:20-cv-00270-KGB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

February 24, 2021

ORDER

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss and compel arbitration filed by defendant Davison Design & Development, Inc. ("Davison"), on August 4, 2020 (Dkt. No. 6). Also pending before the Court are a motion for order filed by plaintiff Ernest Aneke and a motion for continuance filed by Davison (Dkt. Nos. 21, 23). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants Davison's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration and stays this action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.¹ The Court denies as moot Mr. Aneke's motion for order and Davison's motion for continuance (Dkt. Nos. 21, 23).

I. Factual And Procedural History

On March 13, 2020, plaintiff Ernest Aneke, proceeding pro se, filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and a complaint against Davison,² alleging a single claim for breach of contract (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2). In his complaint, Mr. Aneke claims that he contracted with Davison to assist him with the development of his invention, a security light with an alarm system, but that a competing project is now on the market (Dkt. No. 2, at 4). Mr. Aneke further claimsthat, under the terms of his contract with Davison, he is not allowed to contact any other company for assistance in developing his invention (Id.). Mr. Aneke seeks monetary damages against Davison in the amount of $500,000,000 (Id.). Mr. Aneke filed an addendum to his complaint on March 20, 2020 (Dkt. No. 3).

On July 8, 2020, the Court granted Mr. Aneke leave to proceed IFP, screened his complaint, and found that service was appropriate (Dkt. No. 4). On August 4, 2020, Davison filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that Mr. Aneke entered into a valid arbitration agreement with Davison that covers the parties' dispute (Dkt. No. 6).

In support of its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, Davison alleges that, on July 18, 2016, Mr. Aneke and Davison executed an agreement (the "Agreement"), which contained an arbitration clause (Id., ¶ 2). A copy of the Agreement is attached to Davison's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 6-1) and included as part of Mr. Aneke's addendum to his complaint (Dkt. No. 3, at 6-9). The Agreement provides, as relevant here, that:

This Agreement shall be governed by the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and is deemed to be executed, entered into and performed in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. For any dispute, the parties agree to seek to resolve the dispute through good faith negotiation. For any dispute not resolved through good faith negotiation, the parties agree that all disputes shall be resolved through arbitration before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania using the Commercial Arbitration Rules in effect on the date that the claim is submitted to the AAA. Client agrees that any claim must be brought in an individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.

(Dkt. Nos. 3, at 7; 6-1, at 2). The Agreement was signed by both Mr. Aneke and a representative of Davison (Dkt. Nos. 3, at 9; 6-1, at 4).

Davison asserts that, based on the above provision of the Agreement, the parties have "agreed that all disputes arising under the Agreement shall be resolved through arbitration." (Dkt.No. 6, ¶ 3). Davison claims that "Mr. Aneke filed a complaint against Davison for claims arising under the Agreement, notwithstanding the parties' unambiguous consent to submit claims of this type to arbitration." (Id., ¶ 4). Contending that "Mr. Aneke's complaint falls within the scope of the Agreement's arbitration provision," Davison maintains that "[t]he Court should enforce the parties' Agreement and compel Mr. Aneke to arbitrate his claims," and that "[t]he Court should stay this litigation pending resolution of this dispute in arbitration." (Id., ¶¶ 8, 9, 10).

Mr. Aneke filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss and compel arbitration on August 10, 2020 (Dkt. No. 9), to which Davison replied on August 28, 2020 (Dkt. No. 14). In his response brief, Mr. Aneke alleges that Davison "expos[ed]" his project to other companies and refused to meet with him to discuss why a company beat him to the market with the same idea (Dkt. No. 9, at 1). Mr. Aneke insists that Davison's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration should be denied because this "has become a case of stealing" and the parties have "moved pass[ed]" the Agreement (Id.). On August 19, 2020, Mr. Aneke submitted to the Court an e-mail, dated May 3, 2017, from Ellen Gallucci, Assistant to the Director of Licensing for Davison, to Mr. Aneke, discussing efforts by the company's licensing department to market his invention (Dkt. No. 11).

Davison then filed a reply and an amended reply in support of its motion (Dkt. Nos. 14. 19). In its reply, Davison cites additional legal authorities and describes the nature and timeline of several communications between Mr. Aneke and Davison (Dkt. No. 19, at 4-5). Mr. Aneke filed several notices with the Court that include, as attachments, electronic mail messages and documents (Dkt. Nos. 15, 20). In his first notice, Mr. Aneke seems to request that the Court make inquiries on his behalf of Davison (Dkt. No. 15 ("Therefore I am pleading with the court to ask Davison design and development. . . .")). Mr. Aneke also describes his interactions withemployees and individuals from Davison and makes additional allegations about Davison's purported treatment of him as this dispute has progressed (Dkt. No. 20 ("I have suffered intimidation and racial profiling by some of the davison designed and development employees.")).

Mr. Aneke then filed a motion for order (Dkt. No. 21), to which Davison responded (Dkt. No. 22). Mr. Aneke requested that the Court conduct on his behalf the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference, as Mr. Aneke represents that he could not retain an attorney for reasons he explains (Dkt. No. 21). Davison then filed a motion to continue (Dkt. No. 23).

These motions are ripe for review and, for the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Davison's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 6).

II. Governing Law

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., applies in this case. The FAA provides, as relevant here, that "[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The United States Supreme Court has described this provision as reflecting both "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary," Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), and "the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract," Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). In line with these principles, "courts must 'rigorously enforce' arbitration agreements according to their terms." Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).

"[T]hreshold questions of arbitrability are for a court to decide, unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence the parties intended to commit questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator." Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v. FJM Props. of Willmar, LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) ("[C]ourts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.").

"[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). To that end, the Court's task is to determine: (1) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) whether the particular dispute falls within the terms of that agreement. See Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004); Arkcom Digital Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 289 F.3d 536, 537 (8th Cir. 2002); Larry's United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2001). "When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). While "[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration," Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), the party seeking to compel arbitration carries the burden to prove a valid and enforceable agreement, see Shockley v. PrimeLending, 929 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2019). "If the parties have a valid arbitration agreement that encompasses the dispute, a motion to compel arbitration must be granted." Robinson v. EOR-ARK, LLC, 841 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2016).

Finally, because Mr. Aneke relies on matters outside the pleadings when responding to Davison's motion, the Court will review the motion to dismiss and compel arbitration under the standards for summary judgment, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). See Neb. Mach. Co. v. Cargotec Sols., LLC, 762 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 2014). Summary...