Anfinson v. State

• Citation: 758 N.W.2d 496
• Decision Date: 17 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-0076.,06-0076.
• Parties: Heidi Ann ANFINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

758 N.W.2d 496

Heidi Ann ANFINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 06-0076.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 17, 2008.

Rehearing Denied December 3, 2008.

Alfredo Parrish and Brandon Brown of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble Cook Parrish and Gentry, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joe Weeg, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

Heidi Anfinson was convicted of second-degree murder for the drowning death of her infant son. In this postconviction relief action, we consider whether trial counsel rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance in failing to sufficiently inquire into and present evidence of Anfinson's postpartum depression in furtherance of her defense theory that the child's death was accidental. We conclude Anfinson's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance that resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse Anfinson's conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

Heidi Anfinson gave birth to a son, Jacob, on September 5, 1998. Fifteen days after his birth, Jacob went missing while in Anfinson's care. Jacob's father contacted the police, who began searching for the child. While officers were searching for Jacob, Anfinson and her husband were transported to the police station. Anfinson told the officers that while bathing Jacob, she left the room to use the telephone; and when she returned, she discovered Jacob had drowned. Anfinson led police to Saylorville Lake, where they discovered Jacob's body submerged under rocks in shallow water. During a later interview with police, Anfinson stated she "freaked" when she found Jacob's dead body in the bath water, put it in the car, took it to the lake, and placed it in the water.

The State charged Anfinson with first-degree murder and child endangerment. Iowa Code §§ 707.1, .2, 726.6(1), .6(2) (1997). Anfinson pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. The first trial resulted in a mistrial as the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision. In a second trial involving the same charges, the jury convicted Anfinson of second-degree murder. Id. § 707.3. On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Anfinson, No. 00-0511, 2002 WL 1426588 (Iowa Ct.App. July 3, 2002).

Anfinson filed an application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She presented evidence tending to prove her trial counsel summarily dismissed the notion of raising insanity or diminished capacity defenses despite evidence she was suffering from severe postpartum depression at the time of Jacob's death. She also asserted trial counsel, who chose to present the defense theory that Jacob died accidentally, was ineffective in failing to present evidence of her postpartum depression in furtherance of that theory. Anfinson further contended trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the testimony of the investigating officers who described Anfinson's lack of emotion shown during the interview at the police station when she denied knowledge of Jacob's whereabouts.¹

In a detailed ruling, the district court dismissed Anfinson's application. The court concluded trial counsel breached an essential duty by failing to investigate Anfinson's mental and physical condition, but reasoned Anfinson was not entitled to relief because she failed to prove the requisite prejudice resulting from the breach. The court also found Anfinson failed to prove prejudice resulting from the admission of the officers' testimony describing Anfinson's lack of emotion during questioning. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition, and we granted further review.

II. Scope of Review.

We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence "(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice." State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). We may affirm the district court's rejection of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking. State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). To establish prejudice, a claimant must demonstrate "`there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698). The probability of a different result must be "`sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Id.

III. Discussion.

A. Failure to Investigate and Assert Defenses Based on Postpartum Depression. On our de novo review, we find that trial counsel was aware of the probability Anfinson suffered from postpartum depression after Jacob's birth and categorically rejected any suggestion that this condition be explored in her defense. Anfinson's sisters observed Anfinson behaving strangely soon after Jacob was born on September 5, 1998. While attending a baby shower, they observed numerous "sores" on Anfinson's legs and perceived her to be "exhausted," "wooden," and "unjoyful."² Anfinson appeared to be afraid to handle Jacob.

On September 22, 1998, after trial counsel undertook Anfinson's defense, trial counsel and several of Anfinson's family members were present when Anfinson was released on bail. As they left the jail, an unidentified woman approached. The woman disclosed she had experienced postpartum depression, claimed she knew what Anfinson was going through, and attempted to hand an envelope to one of Anfinson's family members. Trial counsel snatched the envelope and proclaimed he "didn't want to hear any talk of postpartum depression." He was quoted in a newspaper article published the next day, suggesting postpartum depression was not a factor in the baby's accidental death.³

Although Anfinson was hospitalized on September 26, 1998 and medicated for depression, suicidal ideation, and panic attacks, trial counsel failed to request or obtain copies of Anfinson's medical records.⁴ He also failed to conduct an investigation which would have divulged Anfinson experienced prior episodes of depression after she gave birth and consented to the adoption of her first child in 1980, and again following an abortion in 1985.

Additional evidence supports our finding trial counsel rejected from the outset the notion evidence of Anfinson's mental condition might be relevant to her defense. After Anfinson's discharge from the hospital, she was treated by a grief counselor for several months. When the counselor called to discuss Anfinson's mental state, trial counsel was dismissive of her opinion that Anfinson had exhibited symptoms consistent with postpartum depression.

Members of Anfinson's family also attempted on several occasions to communicate to trial counsel their concerns about Anfinson's mental state. Anfinson's father, who paid trial counsel's fees and litigation expenses, urged trial counsel to approve, and offered to pay for, a mental evaluation of Anfinson at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. Counsel rejected the idea, again affirming postpartum depression would play no part in the defense.⁵ When Anfinson's sister and husband attempted to speak to trial counsel about their observations of Anfinson's mental state, he cautioned them against making comments to the press about postpartum depression and reminded them the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity would not be pursued.

Anfinson contends the evidence of her severe depression was essential not only to prove potential insanity and diminished responsibility defenses which were summarily and improvidently rejected by her trial counsel, but also to support the accidental death defense counsel presented unsuccessfully to the jury. The State contends trial counsel breached no duty in rejecting insanity and diminished capacity defenses, and his assertion of the accidental death theory of defense was based on reasonable strategic considerations.

Generally, "ineffective assistance is more likely to be established when the alleged actions or inactions of counsel are attributed to a lack of diligence as opposed to the exercise of judgment." Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). "[M]ere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 143.

[C]laims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or strategic decisions of counsel must be examined in light of all the circumstances to ascertain whether the actions were a product of tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of an attorney guaranteed a defendant under the Sixth Amendment.

Id. However, not all tactical or strategic decisions shelter an attorney from a claim of ineffectiveness. Id.

While strategic decisions made after "thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable," strategic decisions made after a "less than complete investigation" must be based on reasonable professional judgments which support the particular level of investigation conducted.

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695).

Moreover, reasonable strategic considerations may justify the rejection of one theory of defense in favor of another theory reasonably perceived by counsel to be in the accused's best interest. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235, 244 (1973); State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1984) (counsel not ineffective in making sound tactical decision to...