Los Angeles County Civil Service Com'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
| Citation | 73 Cal.App.3d 998,141 Cal.Rptr. 126 |
| Decision Date | 06 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | R,L,AFL-CI,S |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065 LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 434, Service Employees International Union,ocial Service Union, Local 535, Service Employees International Union,os Angeles County Employees Association, Local 660, Service Employees International Union,eal Parties in Interest. Civ. 49450. |
John H. Larson, County Counsel, William F. Stewart, Acting Div. Chief, Joe Ben Hudgens, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Steven L. Houston, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for petitioner.
Geffner & Satzman, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.
The issue in this writ proceeding is whether petitioner, the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, has the power to adopt or amend civil service rules without first complying with the "meet and confer" provisions of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. (Gov.Code, § 3500, et seq.; hereafter "MMB".) The respondent court issued a peremptory writ commanding such compliance. This opinion reviews the correctness of that decision.
The facts are undisputed. Article IX of the Los Angeles County Charter provides for the civil service. Section 30 creates the Civil Service Commission ("commission"). Section 34 mandates the commission to make and amend rules for the classified civil service "which shall have the force and effect of law, . . ." Such rules must provide for "layoffs or for mandatory reductions in lieu of layoff . . . for reasons of economy or lack of work." (Section 30(18).) Further, the rules must provide "for reinstatement within one year of persons who without fault or delinquency on their part are separated from the service or reduced; . . ." (Rule 34(10).) Finally, the charter directs the Civil Service Commission to make rules for "the adoption and amendment of rules only after public notice and hearing." (Section 34(16).) Pursuant to this mandate, the commission adopted its rule 27 to the effect that civil service rules could be amended only "after giving at least seven business days' notice . . . and after holding a public hearing thereon . . . ."
In February and March 1976, the commission held public hearings to consider amendments to certain of its rules. 1 Written notice of these public hearings was duly sent to each of the real parties in interest several employees' union locals ("unions") who attended the hearings under protest, claiming that MMB entitled them to "meet and confer" with the commission concerning the proposed amendments. Without waiving this asserted right, they expressed their views at the public hearings. At the close of the March 3, 1976, hearing, the commission adopted amendments to its rules. On April 16, 1976, the unions petitioned the respondent court for a writ of mandate, to compel the commission to set aside the amendments and to meet and confer with them before readopting any rules relating to lay-offs or mandatory reductions in lieu of lay-offs. On June 7, 1976, the respondent court issued its writ to that effect. On the commission's representation that lay-offs for reasons of economy were imminent and that the remedy by appeal was, therefore, inadequate, we, in turn, granted the commission's petition for an alternative writ of mandate. (Duran v. Cassidy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 579, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793, and cases cited.) 2
Government Code section 3505 3 requires that public agencies affected by MMB or their designated representatives "confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of . . . recognized employee organizations, . . ." If this negotiating process is successful, it results in a non-binding memorandum of understanding (§ 3505.1). It is clear that the right to meet and confer is more than just the right to be heard. It involves negotiation, a "serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground." (Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 25, 129 Cal.Rptr. 126, 138.) To be blunt, it leads to a bargaining session.
The commission asserts that it was not required to meet and confer concerning the civil service rules in issue because: (1) the statutory requirement to meet and confer is irreconcilable with the charter requirement that the rules be adopted "only after public notice and hearing." On this premise the commission argues that certain home rule provisions of the California Constitution applicable only to charter counties make section 3505 inapplicable to Los Angeles County; (2) the commission asserts that, in any event, the statutory language of MMB does not compel it to meet and confer concerning civil service rule changes.
Article XI of the California Constitution, as revised at the June 2, 1970, election, contains two separate home rule clauses affecting charter counties. When applicable, they nullify state laws inconsistent with a county charter. 4 Although neither clause has been extensively interpreted, it is clear that charter county home rule is not limited to "municipal affairs" a meaningless concept in the context of county government. The "municipal affair statewide concern" dichotomy being irrelevant, real parties' argument to the effect that MMB deals with a matter of statewide concern (Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 294-295, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158) is therefore off the mark. Nevertheless, application of either of the two home rule clauses to parts of MMB inconsistent with county charters presents certain difficulties. 5 Since, however, we have concluded that a charter requirement for a public hearing and a statutory command to meet and confer can peacefully coexist, we need not attempt to solve them.
If the commission, in adopting civil service rules, acted in a judicial capacity, we might have some difficulty in explaining how the Legislature can command the "judges" to negotiate an agreement with one of the litigants before taking the "bench" at a public hearing. 6 Although the commission undoubtedly has judicial functions particularly in connection with disciplinary matters affecting individual employees its rule making powers are not judicial but legislative. Section 34 of the Los Angeles County Charter starts as follows: "The Commission shall prescribe, amend and enforce rules for the classified service, which shall have the force and effect of law, . . ." Unlike a court which, ideally, knows nothing about a controversy until the parties seek its aid, and which has no interest in the outcome of the litigation, a legislative body creates controversy, often by self-generated proposals to enact, adopt, amend or repeal laws. The fact that such a body may or, as in the case of the commission, must give notice of what it proposes to do and afford interested parties or groups a chance to be heard, does not mean that it must or even should approach the public hearing without at least a tentative view of what it will do after everyone has had his say. Further, it is commonly accepted practice, not at all incompatible with the concept of a public hearing, for agencies such as the commission to receive staff recommendations before the hearing. These recommendations often, if not usually, become the ultimate action of the agency. The complexity of matters before legislative bodies simply does not permit them to act only on input received at the hearing. (California Optometric Assn. v. Lackner (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 500, 508, 131 Cal.Rptr. 744.) Realistically, a public hearing by a legislative body is often nothing but an order to show cause why tentatively predetermined action should not be taken. Viewed in that light, we can see no irreconcilable conflict between a tentative understanding reached after a bargaining session with affected unions and the charter mandated public hearing. 7
Another consideration is relevant: MMB deals with the bargaining rights of public employees. Although our Supreme Court keeps implying that the issue is not yet settled, the Courts of Appeal keep holding that such employees do not have the right to strike. (See City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898, 912-913, 120 Cal.Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403; In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 151, 65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273; City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 41, 47-48, 137 Cal.Rptr. 883.) At a minimum a strike by public employees demands a willingness to take certain legal risks which private employees need not fear. The ability to sit down with an agency which represents the employer under the auspices of MMB appears a reasonable trade-off for the apparent inability of public employees to wield the ultimate weapon of a labor stoppage.
The commission claims that it is exempt from complying with section 3505 because of the admittedly puzzling language in section 3500 stating that MMB shall not "be deemed to supersede the provisions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances, and rules of local public agencies which establish and regulate a merit or civil service system or which provide for other methods of administering employer-employee relations . . . ." It has been noted that a literal reading of that language would make MMB inapplicable to any local government which wants to go to the trouble of passing an ordinance that covers the same ground as MMB, even if it does so in a manner less beneficial to public employees. (Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 Hastings L.J., pp. 719, 724.) Any doubts concerning the...
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