Los Angeles County Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Civil Service Com.

• Citation: 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 150,8 Cal.App.4th 273
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 21 July 1992
• Parties: LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF The LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Defendant; John A. CASTANEDA, Real Party in Interest and Appellant. Civ. B054689.

Page 150

10 Cal.Rptr.2d 150

8 Cal.App.4th 273

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF The LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Defendant;

John A. CASTANEDA, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Civ. B054689.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

July 21, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1992.

Review Denied Oct. 15, 1992.

Robin Hood Foundation and Rees Lloyd, Montebello, for real party in interest and appellant.

Hausman & Sosa, Jeffrey M. Hausman and Larry D. Stratton, Encino, for plaintiff and respondent.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

Appellant John A. Castaneda is employed as a golf course manager by Los Angeles County, Department of Parks and Recreation. Appellant was one of four county golf course managers applying for promotion to the position of assistant golf director in the Department of Parks and Recreation. Another of the four candidates was selected. Appellant requested and was granted a hearing before the Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles on his allegation that the Department unlawfully discriminated against him on account of his Mexican-American ancestry.

A hearing officer made findings in appellant's favor, and the Civil Service Commission adopted the hearing officer's findings. The Commission ordered that appellant be appointed to the next available vacancy in the position of assistant golf director.

The department of parks and recreation petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to set aside the Commission's decision on the ground there was no substantial evidence of unlawful discrimination. The superior court issued the writ, finding alternatively under either Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 or 1085 ¹ that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding of discrimination. Appellant appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The parties dispute whether the trial court's review of the Commission's action lay under ordinary mandamus (§ 1085) or administrative mandamus (§ 1094.5) and, if the latter, whether the trial court was entitled to exercise its independent judgment as to the weight of the evidence (§ 1094.5, subd. (c)). The trial court issued the writ on either ground alternatively, holding that whether the court exercised its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence or merely reviewed the administrative record for substantial evidence, there was no substantial evidence to support the finding of discrimination.

Administrative mandamus, rather than ordinary mandamus, applies when an administrative decision was made "as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given [and] evidence is required to be taken." (§ 1094.5, subd. (a).)

Appellant contends that under the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules ² the Commission had discretion whether to grant appellant a hearing. ³ Therefore, he contends, a hearing was not required by law, and section 1094.5 does not apply. (E.g., Weary v. Civil Service Com. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 189, 195, 189 Cal.Rptr. 442.)

Respondent contends that the alleged denial of a promotional opportunity on the ground of racial or ancestral discrimination involves such an important right that the law required a hearing even if otherwise discretionary under the Rules. (E.g., Chavez v. Civil Service Com. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 324, 332, 150 Cal.Rptr. 197.)

We need not decide whether a hearing was "required by law." This dispute is only preliminary to appellant's main point that the superior court was not entitled to exercise its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence. We conclude that even if administrative mandamus applies, this case does not involve circumstances entitling the superior court to exercise its independent judgment.

Section 1094.5, subdivision (c) leaves to the courts the ultimate task of deciding in which cases a trial court is "authorized by law" to exercise its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence. (County of Alameda v. Board of Retirement (1988) 46 Cal.3d 902, 906, 251 Cal.Rptr. 267, 760 P.2d 464.) ⁴ Here the decision by the Civil Service Commission was in favor of the employee, and it was the Department of Parks and Recreation, the employer, which sought to have the trial court exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. It is well established that an employer 's right to discipline or manage its employees is subject to civil service and anti-discrimination regulation and is not a fundamental vested right entitling the employer to have a trial court exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. (Lowe v. Civil Service Com. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 667, 675-676, 210 Cal.Rptr. 673; Carpenter v. Civil Service Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 446, 450-452, 220 Cal.Rptr. 407; County of Santa Clara v. Willis (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1240, 1250, 225 Cal.Rptr. 244; see American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 603, 607, 186 Cal.Rptr. 345, 651 P.2d 1151; Northern Inyo Hosp. v. Fair Emp. Practice Com. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 14, 22-23, 112 Cal.Rptr. 872; County of Alameda v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 499, 503, 200 Cal.Rptr. 381; Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 517, 530-531, 267 Cal.Rptr. 158; Donald Schriver, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1986) 220 Cal.App.3d 396, 403, 230 Cal.Rptr. 620; cf. City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 984 & fn. 7, 236 Cal.Rptr. 716 [employee has fundamental vested right to promotional opportunity free of racial discrimination].)

Therefore the trial court was not authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. The question for both the trial court and this court is whether substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the Commission's findings. (City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at pp. 983-984, 236 Cal.Rptr. 716.) Issuance of the writ of mandate without the trial court's independent judgment on the weight of the evidence was proper if there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding of unlawful discrimination. (See Coelho v. State Personnel Bd. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 968, 971 & fn. 2, 257 Cal.Rptr. 557.)

OVERVIEW OF BURDEN OF PROOF

In employment discrimination cases, California courts have frequently adopted the standards set by the United States Supreme Court for proving intentional discrimination under title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 United States Code § 2000e, et seq. (Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316-1319, 237 Cal.Rptr. 884; University of Southern California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1035, 272 Cal.Rptr. 264.) The Supreme Court has allocated the burden of proof and the burden of going forward. The plaintiff must first carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This is done by showing that plaintiff belongs to a racial minority plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; despite plaintiff's qualifications plaintiff was rejected; and after plaintiff's rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668.) ⁵

If the plaintiff meets the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 802-803, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1824.) The employer does not, however, have the burden to persuade the court that it had convincing objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant over the plaintiff. The employer need only raise a genuine issue of fact to rebut the prima facie case. (Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248, 254-255, 257, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207.) To accomplish this the employer must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. (Id. at p. 255, 101 S.Ct. at p. 1089.)

If the employer meets this burden of going forward, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 253, 256, 101 S.Ct. at pp. 1093, 1095.) The plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact that the reason offered by the employer was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 804, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1825.) "The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [Plaintiff must] demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination. [Plaintiff] may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." (Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 256, 101 S.Ct. at p. 1095; U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens (1983) 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403.)

The employer does not have the burden to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. The employer is not required to give preferential treatment to the minority candidate and has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates provided the decision is not based on unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think the employer misjudged the qualifications of the...