Los Angeles County v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 21 January 1963
• Citation: 212 Cal.App.2d 160,28 Cal.Rptr. 32
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 26386.

Page 32

28 Cal.Rptr. 32

212 Cal.App.2d 160

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 26386.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Jan. 21, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1963.

Hearing Denied March 20, 1963.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and David D. Mix, Asst. County Counsel, for appellant.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, asst. City Atty., and Marcus E. Crahan, Jr., Deputy City Atty., for respondent.

FORD, Justice.

The County of Los Angeles brought an action against the City of Los Angeles wherein it sought a declaration that the county is not bound to comply with certain ordinances of the city in the course of its activities within the city's territorial limits. The determination by the trial court of the issues raised by the pleadings was adverse to the contentions of the county and the county has appealed from the judgment.

The findings of fact are in part as follows: 1. The county is engaged in using and occupying land and in causing construction of certain buildings and additions and alterations to buildings upon property owned by the county and located within the corporate limits of the city. 2. The city has adopted ordinances which are expressly applicable to the county and which regulate and control within the city's corporate limits the following matters: (a) the construction, maintenance and operation of elevators, escalators, boilers and pressure vessels; (b) the construction, maintenance, occupancy, repair, alteration and demolition of buildings and structures as well as the grading of land; (c) the construction, installation, maintenance and use of electrical wiring and equipment, plumbing and plumbing equipment, and heating, ventilating, and regrigerating apparatus and equipment. 3. The city has adopted ordinances which are expressly applicable to the county and which regulate and control the occupancy, use and subdivision of land within the city's corporate limits. 4. The city has not adopted the 'State of California Conservation and Planning Act as set forth in Sections 65300 through 65951 of the Government Code, but has enacted its own comprehensive zoning plan and land use regulations as set forth in Chapter 1 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code * * * and Sections 94 through 99 1/2 of the Los Angeles City Charter.' 5. The county is presently constructing buildings and structures within the corporate limits of the city, including a county jail facility, without securing building permits therefor and without any plan-checking or inspection by the city as required under the terms of the city's pertinent ordinances. 6. The county owns or leases in its own name many buildings and structures within the city's corporate limits which are not in conformance with the building regulations of the city. 7. The county is presently constructing buildings and structures within the city's corporate limits in its own name which are not in conformity with the city's building regulations. 8. The county, 'its officers, agents, employees and independent contractors have continuously and at all times prior to November 19, 1956 ¹ complied with all applicable ordinances adopted by [the city] * * * regulating the construction, repair, alteration, occupancy and maintenance of buildings and the use and occupancy of land' within the city's corporate limits.

By the judgment it was determined that, with respect to activities within 'the corporate and territorial limits' of the city, the county and its officers, employees, agents and independent contractors must comply with the building ordinances and the zoning and land use ordinances of the city. It was further declared that the county and the designated persons are required to comply with the provisions of the city ordinances relating to the construction, maintenance, repair, alteration and operation of boilers and pressure vessels within the city. The judgment also contains determinations that the city or any of its boards, departments or officers may 'refuse to render its municipally owned water, electric, sewage or waste disposal services to any particular installation owned or controlled' by the county within the city 'if such installation violates or fails to comply with the requirements contained in the aforesaid Building Regulations * * * which are applicable to such services,' and may refuse to render such services to any particular parcel of property owned or controlled by the county within the city if the county 'or any of its officers, employees, agents or independent contractors violates or fails to comply with the aforesaid Zoning and Land Use Regulations * * * with respect to such property.' ²

In its argument in support of the judgment the city places reliance upon section 11 of article XI of the Constitution of the State of California. ³ Its position is stated as follows: 'Respondent submits in this connection that regardless of the question of whether the matter is considered to be a state affair or a municipal affair, the City has the power to enact and enforce building and zoning regulations in the absence of conflicting State regulations in the same manner and to the same extent as does the State. Having enacted such regulations, having made them expressly applicable to the County (as the County concedes), and in the absence of conflicting State regulations, the County is required to comply with them the same as if enacted by the Legislature.' Moreover, a further contention is made to the effect that ordinances relating to building construction and the zoning of land are in the category of municipal affairs and that the governing law is as follows: 'In addition to the municipal police power, the people of this State have conferred upon chartered cities the power to make and enforce all laws with respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the express limitations contained in their respective city charters. (Cal.Const. Art. XI, Secs. 6 and 8); and have prohibited the Legislature from interfering with the exercise of such powers. (Cal.Const. Art. XI, Sec. 13.)'

The persuasive force of the city's argument is diminished when the nature of the essential function of the county is defined and the reasoning of the court in Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574, is studied in the light thereof. In County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal.2d 625, at pages 627-628, 59 P.2d 139, at page 141, 106 A.L.R. 903, it was said: 'Counties are not municipal corporations, but are political subdivisions of the state for purposes of government. Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 176 Cal. 84, 167 P. 514; Reclamation District [No. 1500] v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672, 154 P. 845. With certain exceptions, the powers and functions of the counties have a direct and exclusive reference to the general policy of the state and are, in fact but a branch of the general administration of that policy. County of Sacramento v. Chambers, supra [33 Cal.App. 142, 164 P. 613]; Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 64, 185 P. 985. Counties are vested by the state with a variety of powers, which the state itself may assume or resume and directly exercise. Reclamation District [No. 1500] v. Superior Court, supra; County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 P. 78, 621; see, generally, 7 Cal.Jur. 387, § 3 et seq. Counties perform many functions which are state functions, as distinguished from purely local functions, and expend large sums of money in the performance of those functions. Just as in the case of the cities, the spheres of operation of the counties and state overlap, but to a much greater degree.' (See also County of Marin v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 633, 638, 2 Cal.Rptr. 758, 349 P.2d 526; County of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Board, 199 Cal.App.2d 468, 473, 18 Cal.Rptr. 573; Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 64, 66, 185 P. 985; Crouch, McHenry, Bollens & Scott, California Government and Politics (2d ed. 1960), 216-217.)

In Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment which enjoined the city from enforcing its building ordinance against a building contractor who was engaged in erecting a school building for a school district. The city contended that it had the power under section 11 of article XI of the state Constitution to adopt building construction regulations applicable to such construction. The court said (47 Cal.2d at pp. 181-183, 302 P.2d at p. 577): 'School districts are agencies of the state for the local operation of the state school system. [Citations.] The beneficial ownership of property of the public schools is in the state. ⁴ * * * While a large degree of autonomy is granted to school districts by the Legislature, we are referred to no statute or constitutional provision which, as far as the question here involved is concerned, expressly makes school buildings or their construction any more amenable to regulation by a municipal corporation than structures which are built and maintained by the state generally for its use. When it engages in such sovereign activities as the construction and maintenance of its buildings, as differentiated from enacting laws for the conduct of the public at large, it is not subject to local regulations unless the Constitution says it is or the Legislature has consented to such regulation. Section 11 of article XI of the state Constitution, supra, should not be considered as conferring such powers on local government agencies.' The reasoning of the Hall case, when applied to the facts of the present case, appears to us to compel the conclusion that section 11 of article XI of the state Constitution does not empower the city to regulate the activities of the county in the ways involved in this case.

It is true that in the Hall case the...