Los Angeles County v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 18 August 1967
• Citation: 62 Cal.Rptr. 435,253 Cal.App.2d 670
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a body politic, Peter J. Pitchess, as Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, Evelle J. Younger, as District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, Thomas Reddin, as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, and Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. Eason MONROE, on behalf of himself and persons similarly situated, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 31619.

Page 435

62 Cal.Rptr. 435

253 Cal.App.2d 670

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a body politic, Peter J. Pitchess, as Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, Evelle J. Younger, as District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, Thomas Reddin, as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, and Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Eason MONROE, on behalf of himself and persons similarly situated, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 31619.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Aug. 18, 1967.

Hearing Denied Oct. 11, 1967.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Los Angeles, Robert C. Lynch, Asst. County Counsel, Mitchell L. Lathrop, Deputy County Counsel, Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Los Angeles, Robert B. Burns and John A. Daly, Asst. City Attys., for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence R. Sperber, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

Flint & Mackay and Edward L. Compton, Los Angeles, Johnson & Johnson and George R. Johnson, Long Beach, Robert C. Lobdell, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Robert S. Warren, Cummins, White & Breidenbach and Francis Breidenbach, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

McCOY, Associate Justice pro tem. ^*

The proceeding before us relates to an action pending in the respondent court entitled Eason Monroe, etc. v. City of Los Angeles, et al., number 892044. The defendants, the City of Los Angeles, its board of police commissioners and its chief of police, and the County of Los Angeles and its sheriff and its district attorney, here seek a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent court from issuing a proposed preliminary injunction and from taking any further proceedings against them in that action. For convenience we refer to the petitioners as the defendants and to the real party in interest as the plaintiff. We have concluded that a writ of prohibition must issue as prayed.

Plaintiff commenced his action in August 1966. In his amended and supplemental complaint filed in November he alleges that he brings the action pursuant to section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, ¹ to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds and property of the city and of the county. After identifying the several defendants he alleges that 'Among the duties of the individual defendants, their deputies, subordinates and agents, is to accord, and to assure, to all persons accused of crime, their constitutional rights including the right to fair trial; and said officials have the duty not to make any statements to the press, which may result in depriving any accused of such right to fair trial.'

In his first cause of action plaintiff alleges that in recent years deputies of the district attorney and of the sheriff and police officers while on public duty, 'but beyond the scope, of their employment,' have made out of court statements and provided, out of court, information to representatives of news media about persons who have just been arrested and about defendants facing trial in pending criminal cases, based on sources not open to the public or to the persons arrested or charged. Some of these statements and information were publicly printed and broadcast over radio and television. Eighteen 'examples of such statements' as they appeared in newspapers are pleaded in Haec verba, and others are set forth in exhibits to the amended complaint. It is also alleged that said law enforcement officers, upon the arrest of persons accused of crime have permitted the press to photograph for publication 'evidence which the prosecution intended to offer at the trial but which evidence had not yet been received at the trial, and to take photographs of defendants inside the police facilities.'

Plaintiff alleges that the making of such statements and the supplying of such information about persons who have been arrested to the mass communication media are in excess of said officers' authority, in that they violate the constitutional right of such persons to a fair trial, and their right to privacy, and that the time spent by such officers while making such statements while being paid public monies constitutes an illegal expenditure of public funds. Defendants have refused to comply with plaintiff's demand that they discontinue such practices.

It is then alleged that there is a lapse of time in the usual case of from one to three days before a person arrested is brought before a judge; that in the majority of cases the accused is not represented by counsel when he first appears before a judge and does not have funds with which to employ counsel; and that 'Prior to the making by law enforcement officers, as above set forth, of a statement pertaining to an accused at or about the time of his arrest, no court in Los Angeles County, other than this court of equity, acquires jurisdiction, or has the authority, to make appropriate orders, protecting the accused from statements by public officials abridging his right to a fair trial.' The first cause of action concludes with the allegation that plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, and that he is entitled to relief under section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure. The allegations of the remaining five causes of action do no more than set forth alternative theories for the granting of the relief plaintiff seeks. ²

The prayer of the amended complaint as to all causes of action is that the defendants and their agents be enjoined from expending public funds by making statements and furnishing information out of court concerning persons who have been arrested until the defendant appears in court and is represented by counsel or waives counsel, other than with respect to the identity of the defendant, the law under which he is charged, and the office in which a complaint or indictment has been filed, provided 'that such injunction shall not be in effect if the defendant or his counsel makes any public statement pertaining to his case.'

Upon the filing of the original complaint the court issued an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued. The matter was heard on the demurrers to and motions to strike the amended and supplemental complaint and on the order to show cause. When the matter was heard the California Newspaper Publishers Association, several newspapers published in Los Angeles County, and a radio station in Los Angeles County and some of its news reporters and editors, herein sometimes referred to as 'news media' appeared as amici curiae on behalf of defendants. It was stipulated by the plaintiff at the hearing that the only relief sought relates to the 'pre-arraignment period,' that is, 'from the arrest of an accused until his arraignment.'

In February 1967 the respondent court entered a minute order overruling defendants' demurrers and denying their motions to strike. In its minute order the court stated that unless otherwise commanded by the court of superior jurisdiction it would make an order granting a preliminary injunction in substance as set forth in paragraph VII of the minute order.

The proposed decree would until further order of the court enjoin 'Defendants and each of them, their Officers, Agents, Employees and Agencies, engaged in the enforcement or administration of law and thereby the administration of Justice, and all persons having knowledge, actual or constructive, hereof and acting in concert with said Defendants or their said Officers, Agents, Employees and Agencies, * * * during and from the time of the arrest of an accused until his Arraignment (P.C. §§ 976, 978) upon the Accusatory Pleadings (P.C. § 691, par. 4) in any cause within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, from, directly or indirectly, by any manner or means: I. Releasing or authorizing the release of any extra-judicial statements for dissemination by any means of public communication, relating to the alleged charge or the Accused and concerning: I (i) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments or other charges of crime), or the character or reputation of the Accused, excepting only a factual statement of the Accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if he has not been apprehended, may release any information reasonably necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any probable danger he may present; or I (ii) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the Accused or his refusal or failure to make any statement; or I (iii) The performance of any examinations or tests, or the Accused's refusal or failure to submit to an examination or test; or I (iv) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, excepting only the identity of the alleged victim; or I (v) The possibility of a plea of 'guilty' to the offense charged or a lesser offense; or I (vi) The Accused's guilt or innocence; or I (vii) Any other matters relating to the merits of or the evidence in the case, excepting only the arrest, including the time and place thereof, the identity of the investigating Officer or agency, and the length of the investigation and the nature, substance or text of the alleged charge, including a brief description of the offense charged, and may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the Court in the cause, the scheduling or result of any stage to and including said arraignment.' By its proposed decree the court would retain jurisdiction to amend, modify or terminate the proposed preliminary injunction.

The Issues

The basic question before us is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to issue the proposed preliminary injunction and to take any further proceedings in the action. Defendants contend that in doing so the court would be acting without or in excess of...