Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Public Utilities Com'n of State

• Decision Date: 15 September 1959
• Citation: 52 Cal.2d 655,343 P.2d 913
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF STATE of California, Respondent. S. F. 20049.

Page 913

343 P.2d 913

52 Cal.2d 655

LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF STATE of California, Respondent.

S. F. 20049.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Sept. 15, 1959.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Gerald G. Kelly and Jesse R. O'Malley, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Everett C. McKeage and William M. Bennett, Chief Counsel, Roderick B. Cassidy, Asst. Chief Counsel, San Francisco, and William C. Bricca, Senior Counsel, San Francisco, for respondent.

Gordon, Knapp, Gill & Hibbert, Frank W. Doherty and Frank P. Doherty, Los Angeles, amici curiae on behalf of respondent.

TRAYNOR, Justice.

The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (referred to hereafter as Authority) seeks the annulment of an order of the Public Utilities Commission granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Charter Bus Transportation Company (referred to hereafter as Charter).

Charter's operations include seasonal passenger stage services to the Santa Anita, Hollywood Park, and Los Alamitos racetracks, all of which are located in the vicinity of Los Angeles. On April 18, 1958 Charter applied to the Commission for a certificate to engage in passenger stage service to and from the site of the home games of the Los Angeles Dodgers Baseball Club. Specifically, it requested authority 'to operate bus service during the baseball season between Los Angeles, Huntington Park, Lakewood, Bellflower, Downey, Culver City, Inglewood, La Crescenta, Montrose, Glendale, San Fernando, Torrance, Gardena, Compton, Lynwood, South Gate, Burbank, Beverly Hills, and Santa Monica, California and the Los Angeles Coliseum, Los Angeles, California, (and any other place or places wherein said professional games may be played in the future) with pickups at certain hereinafter designated intermediate points.'

The proposed service would be confined to those wishing transportation to and from the baseball games. The routes the busses were to follow were shown at the hearing to overlap and parallel existing routes of the Authority and of protesting transit lines. Passenger pickups were to be made from specified stops along the various routes from the foregoing cities. Only round-trip service was to be provided. The proposed fares, ranging from $1.20 to.$2.80, entitled the passengers to transportation to the ball grounds before the beginning of the game and to return transportation to the original point of pickup on the same bus at the end of the games to be played that day. The various protestants, particularly the Authority, conduct regularly scheduled operations throughout the area to be served by Charter, but none presently provide the proposed type of direct, roundtrip service.

Protests were filed by the Authority, Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., Santa Monica Municipal Bus Lines, Inglewood City Lines, Culver City Municipal Bus Lines, the City of Gardena, and the City of Torrance. Public hearings were held before a Commission hearing officer on May 2, May 20, and June 4, 1958. On August 5, 1958 the Commission filed its opinion and order authorizing the passenger stage operation requested by Charter except for minor modifications not here involved.

The Authority contends that the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957, St.1957, p. 1609 (referred to hereafter as the 1957 Act) precludes the Public Utilities Commission from authorizing new passenger stage operations in Los Angeles County. The Public Utilities Commission contends that the 1957 Act does not preclude the Commission from authorizing such operations.

If the Commission retained jurisdiction to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for passenger stage service in Los Angeles County after the enactment of the 1957 Act, the question whether the differences between the proposed service and the existing service justified the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity would be a matter for the expert judgment and discretion of the Commission and we would therefore affirm its order. Pub.Util.Code, § 1757; California Portland Cement Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 49 Cal.2d 171, 176, 315 P.2d 709; San Diego & Coronado Ferry Co. v. Railroad Comm., 210 Cal. 504, 508-511, 292 P. 640.

The crucial question in this case therefore is whether or not the 1957 Act precludes the Commission from authorizing new passenger stage operations in Los Angeles County.

The original Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act was enacted in 1951 to alleviate the transit problems of Los Angeles County. Stats.1951, ch. 1668, p. 3804. ¹ This legislation proved to be inadequate.

The 1957 Act gives the Authority greatly increased powers to establish an integrated mass rapid transit ² system in Los Angeles County. The Authority may operate the system ³ itself, ⁴ may jointly ⁵ use facilities owned by itself or by existing transit systems, and may contract with existing corporations for the superintendence ⁶ of the Authority's system. It is given broad powers to acquire and dispose of property. ⁷ When its economic engineering studies show that it would not be feasible for it to operate transit facilities in a particular area, it may propose and support a special tax-supported transit district in that area. ⁸

The 1951 Act gave the Authority some of the foregoing powers, but expressly provided that it could exercise its powers only under the regulatory control of the Public Utilities Commission. ⁹ The Authority's routes ¹⁰ and rates, ¹¹ and contracts ¹² were also subject to control by the Public Utilities Commission. Under the 1957 Act the Commission has no control over the Authority with respect to any of these matters. In the absence of legislation otherwise providing, the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate public utilities extends only to the regulation of privately-owned utilities. City of San Bernardino v. Railroad Comm., 190 Cal. 562, 213 P. 980; Civic Center Ass'n of Los Angeles v. Railroad Comm., 175 Cal. 441, 445, 166 P. 351; Colman v. Montebello, 24 C.R.C. 930, 931.

The legislative policy that prompted the adoption of the 1957 Act is stated in section 1.1 as follows: 'It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of California to develop mass rapid transit systems in the various metropolitan areas within the State for the benefit of the people. A necessity exists within Los Angeles County * * * for such a system. Because of the numerous separate municipal corporations and unincorporated populated areas in the * * * (County), only a specifically created authority can operate effectively in said metropolitan area. Because of the unique problem presented by that metropolitan area and the facts and circumstances relative to the establishment of a mass rapid transit system therein, the adoption of a special act and the creation of a special authority is required.' (Italics added.)

The Authority contends that this declaration of policy and the plenary powers granted to it to establish an integrated transit system constitute a legislative determination binding on the Commission that 'public convenience and necessity' in Los Angeles County do not require additional privately-operated public transit services.

Section 1031 of the Public Utilities Code provides that 'No passenger stage corporation shall operate or cause to be operated any passenger stage over any public highway in this State without first having obtained from the commission a certificate declaring that public convenience and necessity require such operation * * *.' Unlike its limitations on certain of the Commission's other powers, ¹³ the 1957 Act does not expressly curtail the Commission's power to grant new certificates of public convenience and necessity in Los Angeles County, nor does it expressly provide that public convenience and necessity do not require additional privately-operated public transit services in that area. Moreover, we have concluded that such provisions may not be implied from the powers granted to the Authority, the declaration of policy, or both.

In creating the Authority, the 1957 Act necessarily looked to the future, and by stating that 'only a specially created authority can operate effectively in said metropolitan area,' it clearly contemplates that ultimately there shall be a single integrated system of public transportation in Los Angeles County, operated by the Authority. The 1957 Act recognizes and protects existing publicly-owned and privately-owned transit systems, however (§ 4.21), and provides that such systems cannot be condemned by the Authority without the consent of their owners. § 4.6. One of the purposes of the 1957 Act 'is to coordinate any operations of the Authority with the operations of any then existing system. * * *' § 4.21 Thus, despite its ultimate goal, the 1957 Act contemplates that for some time independent publicly-owned and privately-owned transit systems and the Authority shall all provide transit service in Los Angeles County. If the public is to be adequately served, such service must grow to meet the needs of the county's ever increasing population. The 1957 Act does not expressly provide that such additional service must be undertaken by the Authority, and it recognizes that there may be extensions of privately-owned transit systems. Thus, section 4.21, which extends an option to private companies to compel their condemnation by the Authority in the event the Authority establishes a new competitive service, expressly excludes 'any subsequent extension or rerouting' of the existing privately-owned system. Moreover, even if the 1957 Act were completely silent with respect to extensions of privately-owned systems, unless it clearly appeared that the machinery provided by that Act was adequate to meet the public need and that new privately-operated service would defeat the ultimate objective of a single integrated system, we could not reasonably imply an abridgment of the...