Angelo's Aggregate Materials, Ltd. v. Pasco Cnty.

• Decision Date: 14 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2D12–3112.,2D12–3112.
• Citation: 118 So.3d 971
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: ANGELO'S AGGREGATE MATERIALS, LTD., a Florida limited partnership, Appellant, v. PASCO COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida; and Debra M. Zampetti, in her capacity as zoning administrator, Appellees.

118 So.3d 971

ANGELO'S AGGREGATE MATERIALS, LTD., a Florida limited partnership, Appellant,
v.
PASCO COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida; and Debra M. Zampetti, in her capacity as zoning administrator, Appellees.

No. 2D12–3112.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District.

Aug. 14, 2013.

[118 So.3d 972]

Alan F. Wagner of Wagner, Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa; and Thomas G. Pelham, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Donald E. Hemke of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa; and Jeffrey N. Steinsnyder, County Attorney, David A. Goldstein, Chief Assistant County Attorney, and W. Elizabeth Blair, Senior Assistant County Attorney, New Port Richey, for Appellees.

Amy Taylor Petrick, West Palm Beach, for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of County Attorneys.

CRENSHAW, Judge.

Angelo's Aggregate Materials, Ltd. (Angelo's) appeals the dismissal of its suit for declaratory relief against Pasco County and its zoning administrator, Debra Zampetti (together the County). In the two-count complaint, Angelo's sought a declaration of its vested rights under the prior land use regulation and a declaration that certain portions of the County's Land Development Code (LDC) were unconstitutional. Because the circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and to exhaust administrative remedies based on county ordinances, we reverse.

Factual Background¹

Angelo's requested a conditional use permit from Pasco County in order to build a landfill adjacent to another landfill Angelo's operates. At the time of the application, the County's comprehensive plan denominated the relevant future land use as “AG/R” with an “A–C zoning district,”

[118 So.3d 973]

which only required a conditional use permit for a landfill such as the one Angelo's sought to construct. Angelo's, based on communications with the County, also requested permits from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection. The Department required studies and filing fees of its own in addition to the resources Angelo's expended in working with the County.

In 2009, the county attorney advised the Board of County Commissioners that county staff determined that a comprehensive plan future land use map amendment to a “P/SP” designation would be required for Angelo's landfill.² The prospect of an unexpected requirement for a comprehensive plan amendment upset Angelo's expectations, as seeking such an amendment would require significantly more time and resources than a conditional use permit, and logically would extirpate Angelo's investment in the permit. Subsequently, the County unanimously adopted the proposed changes over Angelo's objections. The County then placed Angelo's conditional use permit application on hold until there was a land use change to “P/SP.” The County has rejected Angelo's appeals to the County placing the application “on hold.”

Angelo's then brought a declaratory judgment action against Pasco County in circuit court in order to determine if Angelo's had vested rights in having its application considered under the comprehensive plan in effect as of the time of the application for the conditional use permit. Relying on the LDC, the circuit court dismissed the count for “equitable estoppel/vested rights” for Angelo's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.³ The circuit court dismissed Angelo's claim that provisions of the LDC were unconstitutional for failing to state a cause of action. Angelo's appeals, raising various constitutional challenges to the circuit court's dismissal of its case.

“[A]dhering ‘to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should endeavor to implement the legislative intent of statutes and avoid constitutional issues,’ ” we need not discuss Angelo's constitutional arguments in depth because our resolution of this dispute does not require it. State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458, 459–60 (Fla.2003) (quoting State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.1995)). The cause of action before the circuit court was for declaratory relief pursuant to chapter 86, Florida Statutes. We note that the Declaratory Judgment Act ⁴ specifically calls for its liberal construction, § 86.101, Fla. Stat. (2011), and dictates that the availability of another remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment. § 86.111, Fla. Stat. Thus we are called upon to decide whether the circuit court could hear the case for a declaratory action.

Legal Framework

This court has previously addressed the standard of review on a motion to dismiss in an action for a declaratory judgment:

[118 So.3d 974]

When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must accept the material allegations as true and is bound to a consideration of the allegations found within the four corners of the complaint. Thus, the question of whether a complaint states a cause of action is one of law and the standard of review is de novo.

A complaint for declaratory judgment should not be dismissed if the plaintiff established the existence of a justiciable controversy cognizable under the Declaratory Judgment Act, chapter 86, Florida Statutes (2007).

Murphy v. Bay Colony Prop. Owners Ass'n, 12 So.3d 924, 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citations omitted).⁵ Specifically, the complaint must allege that

there is a bona fide dispute between the parties and that the moving party has a justiciable question as to the existence or non-existence of some right [ or] status, ... or as to some fact upon which the existence of such right [ or] status ... does or may de[p]end, that plaintiff is in doubt as to the right [or] status, ... and that there is a bona fide, actual, present need for the declaration.
Smith v. City of Fort Myers, 898 So.2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphases added) (quoting Bell v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 143 So.2d 904, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)). Where a complaint for declaratory action meets these requirements it should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Id.; see also Murphy, 12 So.3d at 926.

In determining why this case is appropriate for declaratory relief, a historical account is instructive. The first supreme court case that fully considered the Declaratory Judgment Act states:

Viewed in its proper perspective, the ... Act is nothing more than a legislative attempt to extend procedural remedies to comprehend relief in cases where technical or social advances have tended to obscure or place in doubt one's rights, immunities, status or privileges. It should be construed with this objective in view.... There is no reason whatever why the highway to justice should be strewn with hurdles and pitfalls that make one who secures it wonder if the “game is worth the candle.”

Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 157 Fla. 27, 24 So.2d 808, 809 (1946). Justice Brown agreed:

I was impressed with the apparently almost unlimited scope of the [A]ct, and was reminded of the words of one of Shakespeare's characters who said: “Give me a charter as wide as the wind, to blow on whom I please.” [sic] However, upon further study of the statute I became convinced of its usefulness if properly construed....

Id....