Anglin v. City of Columbus

• Decision Date: 13 June 1907
• Citation: 57 S.E. 780,128 Ga. 469
• Parties: ANGLIN v. CITY OF COLUMBUS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

57 S.E. 780

128 Ga. 469

ANGLIN v. CITY OF COLUMBUS.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 13, 1907

Syllabus by the Court.

In an action for damages for personal injuries, as a general rule the amount of damages is a question for the jury; but if the evidence authorizes a recovery by the plaintiff, and the verdict finding in favor of the plaintiff's right to recover fixes such a small amount of damages as will justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias, a new trial should be granted.

Under the evidence submitted in this case, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $100 was so small as to require the grant of a new trial under the rule above stated.

Error from Superior Court, Muscogee County; Wm. A. Little, Judge.

Action by D. A. Anglin against the city of Columbus to recover damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff's motion for new trial was overruled, and she brings error. Reversed.

Hatcher & Carson, for plaintiff in error.

T. T Miller, for defendant in error.

ATKINSON J.

While as a general rule, the question of damages is one for the jury, it does not follow that the court may not interfere where the damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias. Civ Code 1895, § 3803. By the verdict the jury has found that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on account of the defendant's negligence. There was no evidence upon which the jury could have found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The evidence disclosed that the plaintiff's husband had lived in the house to which the shed was attached eight or nine years prior to the injury. The plaintiff testified: "So far as I could see, the shed was perfectly sound. I never examined the shed, but the shed seemed to be all right. I did not anticipate any danger at all from it. I have seen water back up along the street. I have seen the sidewalk covered with water two or three times. I lived there in that house with my husband all the time. *** I was living in that house at the time the sidewalk caved in. I saw how the sidewalk was fixed at the time it was repaired by the city, 18 months or 2 years before the accident. *** I could not say whether the hole in the sidewalk went to the cellar door or not. I never noticed it particularly. *** That is the only hole I remember being washed out before the accident." There was no other evidence tending to show knowledge upon the part of the plaintiff of the dangerous condition of the shed. In order for her to have assumed the risk of any danger incident to going under the shed, there must either be knowledge of the danger upon the part of the plaintiff, or the danger must be so obvious as that she would be charged with notice thereof. If she knew of the danger, or if the danger was so obvious as that she would be charged with notice thereof, it might be said, under authority of Samples v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 110, 22 S.E. 135, that she voluntarily assumed the risk, and would be chargeable with negligence of some degree, merely by going into a dangerous place. But the facts are not such as to show that she knew of the danger, or that the danger was so apparent as to charge her with notice; and consequently it could not be said that she voluntarily assumed any risk. It is said that if the facts show negligence upon the part of the city, they of necessity show negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, because she had equal opportunities of knowing of...