Anglin v. State of Fla. Dept. of Transp., s. AT-276

• Decision Date: 02 July 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. AT-276,AT-277,s. AT-276
• Citation: 472 So.2d 784,10 Fla. L. Weekly 1622
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1622 Cleopatra Gayle ANGLIN and Thomas P. Anglin, her husband, Appellants, v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the State of Florida, Appellee. Cleopatra Gayle ANGLIN and Thomas P. Anglin, her husband, Appellants, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 784

472 So.2d 784

10 Fla. L. Weekly 1622

Cleopatra Gayle ANGLIN and Thomas P. Anglin, her husband, Appellants, v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the State of Florida, Appellee.

Cleopatra Gayle ANGLIN and Thomas P. Anglin, her husband, Appellants, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.

Nos. AT-276, AT-277.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

July 2, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1985.

Bill Whitaker and Karl Koepke of Whitaker & Koepke, Orlando, for appellants.

Ronald W. Brooks of Brooks, Callahan & Phillips, Tallahassee, and DuBose Ausley and William M. Smith of Ausley, McMullin, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor, Tallahassee, for appellees.

ZEHMER, Judge.

In these consolidated personal injury cases, plaintiffs below appeal a final summary judgment, contending the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that appellees were insulated from liability by unforeseeable independent intervening causes. We reverse.

On the night of September 3, 1979, Cleopatra Anglin, her husband, and her brother were traveling through drizzling rain in a 1965 Chevrolet pickup truck. Upon crossing a Seaboard Coastline Railroad track on Alternate U.S. 27 in rural Polk County, they unexpectedly hit an accumulation of water that covered both lanes of travel and was approximately six inches deep. The truck motor was doused with water, sputtered for some distance after hitting the pool of water, and then died. The Anglins attempted to start the motor by pushing the truck down the road and then "popping" the clutch once the truck reached a moderate speed. Approximately fifteen minutes after their truck hit the water, during which time they attempted in vain to push-start the truck several times, a car driven by Edward DuBose passed the Anglin truck heading in the opposite direction. A short distance after passing the truck, which was still on the road and, according to some witnesses, still being pushed, Mr. DuBose turned his car around and headed back toward the truck to render assistance. Unfortunately, Mr. DuBose failed to timely see the truck, hit his brakes, slid into the rear of the truck, and pinned Mrs. Anglin between the two vehicles, causing injury resulting in amputation of both legs. The distance between the pool of water and the accident scene was estimated by some witnesses as approximately 200 yards, by others up to three-tenths of a mile.

On February 16, 1981, Mrs. Anglin and her husband filed a complaint against the state Department of Transportation and Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company, alleging negligence in the design and maintenance of the road and railroad tracks by allowing the accumulation of water on the roadway immediately adjacent to the railroad tracks. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and, in addition to numerous depositions already taken, plaintiffs filed affidavits in opposition to the motion. A final summary judgment in favor of the defendants was entered on June 9, 1983, upon the trial judge's ruling as a matter of law that the actions of the plaintiffs in attempting to push-start their disabled pickup truck and the actions of Mr. DuBose in negligently losing control of his car and colliding with the plaintiffs' truck were independent, efficient intervening causes of the accident that were unforeseeable by the defendants, thereby breaking the chain of causation between the purported negligence of the defendants and the injury.

As a general rule, a tort feasor is liable for all damages proximately caused by his negligence. The term "proximate cause" (or "legal cause," in the language of the standard jury instructions) consists of two essential elements: (1) causation in fact, and (2) foreseeability. See generally, 38 Fla.Jur.2d, Negligence, §§ 29-48. Causation in fact is often characterized in terms of a "but for" test, i.e., but for the defendant's negligence, the resulting damage would not have occurred. In the present case, there is no question as to causation in fact because "but for" the defendants' alleged negligence in causing the pooling of water on the highway, there would have been no accidental stopping of plaintiff's truck and resulting injury. ¹

The second element of proximate cause, foreseeability, is, unlike causation in fact, a concept established through considerations of public policy and fairness whereby a defendant whose conduct factually "caused" damages may nevertheless be relieved of liability for those damages. Thus, proximate cause may be found lacking where the type of damage or injury that occurred is not within the scope of danger or risk created by the defendant's negligence and, thus, not a reasonably foreseeable result thereof. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So.2d 520 (Fla.1980); Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960); Padgett v. West Florida Electric Cooperative, Inc., 417 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). It is not necessary, however, that the defendants "be able to foresee the exact nature and extent of the injuries or the precise manner in which the injuries occur"; all that is necessary to liability is that "the tort feasor be able to foresee that some injury will likely result in some manner as a consequence of his negligent acts." Crislip v. Holland, 401 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Accord, Padgett v. West Florida Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra; Braden v. Florida Power & Light Co., 413 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In the instant case, it cannot be said as a matter of law that an injury to plaintiff was not within the scope of danger or risk arising out of the alleged negligence. In the field of human experience, one should expect that negligently permitting a pool of water on an open highway would likely pose a substantial hazard to motorists because a vehicle crashing unexpectedly into the water is likely to experience a stalled motor or other difficulty causing the vehicle to stop on the highway, thereby subjecting its occupants to the risk of injury from collision by other cars. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra.

Proximate cause may be found lacking, however, where an unforeseeable force or action occurring independently of the original negligence causes the injury or damage. This force or action is commonly referred to as an "independent, efficient intervening cause." Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra. For the original negligent actor to be relieved of liability under this doctrine, however, the intervening cause must be "efficient," i.e., truly independent of and not "set in motion" by the original negligence. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra; Loftin v. McCranie, 47 So.2d 298 (Fla.1950); Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So.2d 746 (Fla.1967); Braden v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra. The trial court's ruling that the conduct of the plaintiffs in pushing their truck down the road was an independent, efficient intervening cause of the accident was error because the existence of the pool of water set into motion the plaintiffs' subsequent actions in attempting to restart the motor that was stalled by driving through the water. These actions, having been "set in motion" by defendants' negligence, did not constitute an independent, efficient intervening cause. Whether the plaintiffs' conduct was negligent and caused the injury should be submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions on comparative negligence.

The trial court correctly characterized Mr. DuBose's negligent operation of his car as an independent intervening cause. The negligent pooling of water did not cause Mr. DuBose to negligently operate his vehicle into collision with the plaintiffs. ² The trial court erred, however, in ruling as a matter of law that such intervening cause warranted entry of summary judgment for defendants. If an intervening cause is reasonably foreseeable, the negligent defendants may be held liable. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra; Padgett v. West Florida Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra. Whether an intervening cause is foreseeable is ordinarily for the trier of fact to decide. Id.; Crislip v. Holland, supra. Only if reasonable persons could not differ as to the total absence of evidence to support any inference that the intervening cause was foreseeable may the court determine the issue as a matter of law. Padgett, 417 So.2d at 768; Overby v. Wille, 411 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In the circumstances of this case (the night was dark, it was raining, and the collision occurred in a rural area where traffic customarily moves rapidly), had DuBose come on the scene and collided with plaintiffs' stalled truck immediately after plaintiffs hit the pooled water, the question of foreseeability of that occurrence would most assuredly present a jury issue. The fact that plaintiffs attempted to push-start their stalled truck for approximately fifteen minutes and that Mr. DuBose collided with it while attempting to stop and provide assistance does not change this jury issue to a question of law. The plaintiffs' exposure to danger was created by defendants' negligence, and the fact that a collision might occur while plaintiffs were extricating themselves from such danger up to fifteen minutes later presents a jury issue on foreseeability. Gibson v. Avis-Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra; Loftin v. McCranie, supra. That is so because the...