Anguiano v. Michael D. Crews & Fla. Attorney Gen., Case No: 2:13-cv-830-FtM-38MRM
| Decision Date | 10 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:13-cv-830-FtM-38MRM |
| Parties | ERIC ANGUIANO, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL D. CREWS and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court upon a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Eric Anguiano ("Petitioner") (Doc. 1, filed November 25, 2013). Petitioner, a prisoner of the Florida Department of Corrections, attacks the convictions entered by the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Lee County, Florida for discharging a firearm from a vehicle and attempted second-degree murder with afirearm (Doc. 1 at 1). Respondent filed a response to the petition (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 19), and the petition is now ripe for review.
Petitioner raises seven claims in his petition. Upon due consideration of the pleadings and the state court record, the Court concludes that each claim must be dismissed or denied. Because the petition may be resolved on the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) ().
On June 13, 2008, the State of Florida charged Petitioner with discharging a firearm from a vehicle, in violation of Florida Statute § 790.15(2) (count one) and attempted second degree murder with great bodily harm, in violation of Florida Statute §§ 782.04, 777.011, and 775.087(2)(a)(3) (count two) (Ex. 1). A jury convicted Petitioner of both counts as charged (Ex. 2; Ex. 3). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of nine years in prison on count one and twenty-five years in prison on count two (Ex. 4; Ex. 5). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences without a written opinion (Ex. 8); Anguiano v. State, 17 So. 3d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
On January 20, 2010, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he raised one claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (Ex. 9). Florida's Second District Court of Appeals denied the petition on May 11. 2010 (Ex. 10).
On November 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 3.850 motion") (Ex. 11). The post-conviction court denied two of the claims raised in the Rule 3.850 motion (Ex. 14). After holding an evidentiary hearing on the third claim (Ex. 15), the post-conviction court denied the motion (Ex. 16). The denial of the third claim was affirmed by Florida's Second District Court of Appeal (Ex. 19); Anguiano v. State, 123 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
Petitioner signed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on November 20, 2013 (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Notably, a state court's violation of state law is not sufficient to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). That said, the Supreme Court has also explained that "the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since 'a general standard' from [the Supreme Court's] cases can supply such law." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). State courts "must reasonably apply the rules 'squarely established' by Court's holdings to the facts of each case." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).
Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," that federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11thCir. 2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). Moreover, "it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by Court." Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122.
Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) () (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010)).
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. Thisis a "doubly deferential" standard of review that gives both the state court and the petitioner's attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)).
The focus of inquiry under Strickland's performance prong is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Indeed, the petitioner bears the heavy burden to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable[.]" Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Petitioner's burden to demonstrate prejudice is high. Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). Prejudice "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. That is, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
The AEDPA precludes federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, fromgranting habeas relief unless a petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner "fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal...
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