Anilao v. Spota

Decision Date31 March 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–CV–00032 (JFB)(WDW).,10–CV–00032 (JFB)(WDW).
Citation774 F.Supp.2d 457
PartiesJuliet ANILAO, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Thomas J. SPOTA, III, Individually and as District Attorney of Suffolk County, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Druker, Kase & Druker, Esqs., Garden City, NY, for Plaintiffs.Oscar Michelen of Cuomo LLC, Mineola, NY, for Vinluan.Brian C. Mitchell, Suffolk, County Department of Law, Hauppauge, NY, for County defendants.Sarah C. Lichtenstein of Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Flowers, Greenberg & Eisman, Lake Success, NY, for Sentosa defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Juliet Anilao, Harriet Avila, Mark Dela Cruz, Claudine Gamaio, Elmer Jacinto, Jennifer Lampa, Rizza Maulion, James Millena, Theresa Ramos, Ranier Sichon (the “nurse plaintiffs or “nurses”), and Felix Q. Vinluan (“Vinluan”) (collectively plaintiffs) brought this action against Thomas J. Spota, III, individually and as District Attorney of Suffolk County (District Attorney Spota or “Spota”); the Office of the District Attorney of Suffolk County (“the DA's Office”); Leonard Lato, individually and as an Assistant District Attorney of Suffolk County (“Lato”); and the County of Suffolk (collectively the “County defendants), as well as against Sentosa Care, LLC (“Sentosa Care”); Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation and Health Care Center (“Avalon Gardens”); Prompt Nursing Employment Agency, LLC (“Prompt”); Francris Luyun (“Luyun”); Bent Philipson (“Philipson”); Berish Rubinstein 1 (“Rubinstein”) 2; Susan O'Connor (“O'Connor”); and Nancy Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald”) 3 (collectively the “Sentosa defendants), alleging that the County defendants and the Sentosa defendants violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4

The claims in this case stem from what was originally a contractual employment dispute between the nurse plaintiffs and the Sentosa defendants. 5 According to the Amended Complaint, the nurse plaintiffs, who had been recruited to work in the United States by Sentosa-affiliated entities, were displeased with their employment conditions upon arriving here and believed that the Sentosa defendants had breached the promises they had made to the nurses during the nurses' recruitment. The nurses sought the advice of Vinluan, an attorney, who advised the nurses that the Sentosa defendants had breached their employment contracts with the nurses in a variety of respects and that, accordingly, the nurses could terminate their employment with Avalon Gardens. After the nurses resigned, however, the Sentosa defendants allegedly took a series of retaliatory actions against plaintiffs, including reporting the nurse plaintiffs to the New York State Education Department (which is in charge of licensing for nurses), seeking a preliminary injunction against plaintiffs, and attempting to report plaintiffs to the Suffolk County Police Department. However, each of these actions taken by the Sentosa defendants ultimately was unsuccessful. In particular, the Education Department's investigation exonerated plaintiffs of any wrongdoing, the preliminary injunction was denied for failure to prove a likelihood of success on the merits, and the Police Department refused to take action because, according to the Amended Complaint, the police did not believe that any crimes had been committed. Consequently, the Sentosa defendants approached the DA's Office and met with District Attorney Spota to induce him to prosecute plaintiffs. As a result of this pressure from the Sentosa defendants, Spota allegedly entered into an agreement with the Sentosa defendants to prosecute plaintiffs for the benefit of the Sentosa defendants. Plaintiffs claim that, pursuant to this agreement, Spota assigned one of his Assistant District Attorneys, defendant Lato, to investigate plaintiffs. There appears to be no dispute that the investigation was conducted in the absence of any police involvement and, accordingly, was conducted solely at the direction of the DA's Office. Ultimately, ADA Lato presented the case to the Grand Jury—including a presentation of allegedly false testimony by defendant Philipson and possibly others—and procured an indictment charging plaintiffs with endangering the welfare of a child, endangering the welfare of a physically disabled person, conspiring to do the same, and solicitation. This indictment was returned by a Grand Jury approximately one year after the nurse plaintiffs' resignations.

The prosecution of plaintiffs was halted, however, when the New York State Appellate Division granted plaintiffs' Article 78 petition for a writ of prohibition based upon the fact that plaintiffs were being “threatened with prosecution for crimes for which they cannot constitutionally be tried.” Matter of Vinluan v. Doyle, 60 A.D.3d 237, 873 N.Y.S.2d 72, 83 (2009). Specifically, the Appellate Division found that the prosecution sought to punish the nurse plaintiffs for resigning from their employment at will and to punish Vinluan for providing legal advice to the nurses in connection with their resignation, and, as such, the court found that the prosecution violated plaintiffs' First and Thirteenth Amendment rights. After the prosecution of plaintiffs was accordingly prohibited, plaintiffs commenced this action in federal court, alleging that defendants violated their constitutional rights in a variety of respects. Specifically, plaintiffs have claimed not only that defendants violated plaintiffs' First and Thirteenth Amendment rights, but also that the indictment was procured in violation of plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights “in that the Grand Jury was not properly charged on the law, was given false evidence, and was not presented with exculpatory evidence.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 112.) Moreover, plaintiffs allege that the prosecutors also engaged in unconstitutional conduct during the investigative stage prior to the presentation of evidence to the Grand Jury. Accordingly, plaintiffs have brought this § 1983 action to vindicate the violation of the above-mentioned constitutional rights. Moreover, plaintiffs also have brought state-law claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest.

Before the Court now are the County defendants' and the Sentosa defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. As a threshold matter, the County defendants contend that they are absolutely immune for the actions they took in prosecuting plaintiffs. Also as a threshold matter, the Sentosa defendants contend that they were not acting under color of state law at any point and that, accordingly, they cannot be held liable under § 1983. Additionally, the Sentosa defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to plead essential elements of their malicious prosecution and false arrest claims.

For the reasons set forth herein, defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, as to the County defendants, the Court concludes: (1) the individual County defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct taken in their role as advocates in connection with the presentation of the case to the Grand Jury; (2) the individual County defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for alleged misconduct during the investigation of plaintiffs, and the Court cannot determine at the motion to dismiss stage, given the allegations in the Amended Complaint, whether the individual County defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in the investigation phase; (3) plaintiffs have sufficiently pled § 1983 claims against the individual County defendants for alleged Due Process violations in the investigative stage; and (4) plaintiffs have sufficient pled a claim for municipal liability against the County of Suffolk. As to the defendants Philipson, Luyun, Rubinstein, Sentosa Care, Prompt, and Avalon Gardens, the Court concludes: (1) plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they were acting under color of state law, and (2) plaintiffs have sufficiently pled claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest under both § 1983 and state law, as well as a § 1983 conspiracy claim. As to defendants O'Connor and Fitzgerald, the Court dismisses the claims against them without prejudice for: (1) failure to plead that they were acting under color of state law, and (2) failing to set forth allegations to properly plead the state-law malicious prosecution and false arrest claims as to these two individual defendants. Finally, as to the § 1983 conspiracy claim against all defendants, the Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a claim against all defendants except O'Connor and Fitzgerald, who, as noted supra, were not alleged to have been acting under color of state law for purposes of the § 1983 claims.

With respect to the individual County defendants, the Court emphasizes that, although the Amended Complaint contains a panoply of serious allegations of misconduct by prosecutors in connection with the Grand Jury presentation and initiation of the prosecution of the plaintiffs, there is no question, as a matter of law, that the prosecutors are cloaked with absolute immunity for their role in presenting that case to the Grand Jury and, thus, the constitutional claims arising from that alleged conduct (although extremely troubling, if true) cannot form the basis for a Section 1983 claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution. Moreover, under well-settled Second Circuit jurisprudence, the fact that this prosecution was halted by a New York State appellate court via a writ of prohibition does not eviscerate the existence of absolute immunity in connection with their advocacy role in the Grand Jury. Based upon the allegations in the Amended Complaint and the New York State's writ of prohibition, it is clear that, even if the prosecutors' charges constituted an impermissible infringement upon the constitutional rights of the nurses and their...

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