Animah v. Agyei

• Decision Date: 27 March 2019
• Docket Number: 302550/2016
• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Parties: Eunice ANIMAH, Plaintiff, v. Tabi AGYEI and DTG Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.

63 Misc.3d 783
97 N.Y.S.3d 440

Eunice ANIMAH, Plaintiff,
v.
Tabi AGYEI and DTG Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.

302550/2016

Supreme Court, Bronx County, New York.

Decided March 27, 2019

97 N.Y.S.3d 441

James Newman, Esq., James Newman, P.C., Bronx, NY, for plaintiff

Summer Tinnie, Esq., Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for defendants

John R. Higgitt, J.

63 Misc.3d 784

This motion presents a fundamental, recurring issue in motor vehicle accident litigation: does an assertion that the driver of a rear-ended vehicle made a sudden stop immediately before the accident raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver of the rear-ending vehicle has a non-negligent explanation for the accident? For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that an assertion that the driver of a rear-ended vehicle made a sudden stop on a local public roadway within the City of New York, standing alone, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver has a non-negligent explanation.¹ In light of this conclusion, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendants' liability is granted.

On June 28, 2017, plaintiff was a passenger in a taxi operated by a non-party driver. The vehicle occupied by plaintiff

97 N.Y.S.3d 442

was traveling on East Tremont Avenue near its intersection with Castle Hill Avenue in the Bronx when the accident giving rise to this litigation occurred. There is no dispute as to the basic facts underlying the subject accident: (1) a vehicle operated by non-party Vinson was double parked in a lane of East Tremont Avenue; (2) the vehicle occupied by plaintiff stopped behind the double-parked vehicle; and (3) defendants' vehicle (operated by defendant Agyei and owned by defendant DTG Enterprises, Inc.) struck the rear of the vehicle occupied by plaintiff.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident, and defendants interposed an answer.

63 Misc.3d 785

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the issue of defendants' liability, invoking the familiar principle that a rear-end collision with a stopped (or stopping) vehicle gives rise to a prima facie showing that the operator of the rear-ending vehicle is liable for injuries sustained by a plaintiff in the vehicle that was struck in the rear (see, e.g., Tutrani v. County of Suffolk , 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 [2008] ). In support of her motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit, which provides the facts necessary to trigger the prima-facie-case principle, and the police accident report generated as a result of the accident.²

Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that it is premature because depositions have yet to be conducted, and that triable issues of fact exist as to defendants' liability for plaintiff's injuries. With respect to the latter argument, defendants assert that a sudden stop by the vehicle that was rear ended can constitute a reasonable explanation for a hit-in-the-rear accident, and that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger brought the vehicle to a sudden stop. Defendants provide the affidavit of defendant Agyei, who avers that the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger "stopped short in front of [defendants'] vehicle," causing the hit-in-the-rear collision between the two vehicles.

The operator of a motor vehicle is required to follow myriad rules when operating a vehicle. Among those rules are the fundamental obligations of a driver to make reasonable use of his and her senses (and, concomitantly, be aware of traffic conditions), drive at a safe rate of speed under the existing conditions, and maintain a safe distance from other vehicles under the existing conditions (see Miller v. DeSouza , 165 A.D.3d 550, 89 N.Y.S.3d 79 [1st Dept. 2018] ). In light of these fundamental obligations, "a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the second vehicle [i.e., the vehicle that struck the rear end of another vehicle]" ( Johnson v. Phillips , 261 A.D.2d 269, 271, 690 N.Y.S.2d 545 [1st Dept. 1999] ; see , e.g. , Tutrani v. County of Suffolk , supra ; Bajrami v. Twinkle Cab Corp. , 147 A.D.3d 649, 46 N.Y.S.3d 879 [1st Dept. 2017] ; Matos v. Sanchez , 147 A.D.3d 585, 47 N.Y.S.3d 307 [1st Dept. 2017] ; Maisonet v. Roman , 139 A.D.3d 121, 30 N.Y.S.3d 24 [1st Dept. 2016] ; Morgan v. Browner , 138 A.D.3d 560, 28 N.Y.S.3d 594 [1st Dept. 2016] ; Cruz v. Lise , 123 A.D.3d 514, 999 N.Y.S.2d 41 [1st Dept. 2014] ; Cabrera v. Rodriguez , 72 A.D.3d 553, 900 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept. 2010] ). After all, a driver

63 Misc.3d 786

making reasonable use of his or her senses, driving at a safe rate of speed under the existing conditions, and maintaining a safe distance from other motor vehicles should not hit the vehicle in front of him or her.

97 N.Y.S.3d 443

Of course, though, non-tortious accidents do happen. Thus, the law recognizes that the presumption of liability on the part of the driver of the rear-ending vehicle is rebuttable: that driver may avoid liability if he or she provides a non-negligent explanation for the accident (see , e.g. , Johnson v. Phillips , supra ). Does an assertion that the driver of the rear-ended vehicle made a sudden stop raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver of the rear-ending vehicle has a non-negligent explanation for the accident? Generally, such an assertion is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

"A claim that the lead driver came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the rearmost driver was negligent and the stopped vehicle was not negligent" ( Ly Giap v. Hathi Son Pham , 159 A.D.3d 484, 485, 71 N.Y.S.3d 504 [1st Dept. 2018] ; see , e.g. , Bajrami v. Twinkle Cab Corp. , supra ; Morgan v. Browner , supra ; Cruz v. Lise , supra ; Cabrera v. Rodriguez , supra ; Francisco v. Schoepfer , 30 A.D.3d 275, 817 N.Y.S.2d 52 [1st Dept. 2006] ; Woodley v. Ramirez , 25 A.D.3d 451, 810 N.Y.S.2d 125 [1st Dept. 2006] ; Johnson v. Phillips , supra ).³ This is because, as noted above, a driver has a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her vehicle and the vehicle ahead so as to avoid a collision with the latter should it stop (see , e.g. , Morales v. Consolidated Bus Transit, Inc. , 167 A.D.3d 457, 89 N.Y.S.3d 163 [1st Dept. 2018] ;

63 Misc.3d 787

Chame v. Kronen , 150 A.D.3d 622, 55 N.Y.S.3d 228 [1st Dept. 2017] ; Tejeda v. Aifa , supra ; Corrigan v. Porter Cab Corp. , 101 A.D.3d 471, 955 N.Y.S.2d 336 [1st Dept. 2012] ; Dattilo v. Best Transp. Inc. , 79 A.D.3d 432, 913 N.Y.S.2d 163 [1st Dept. 2010] ; Dicturel v. Dukureh , 71 A.D.3d 558, 897 N.Y.S.2d 87 [1st Dept. 2010] ; Soto-Maroquin v. Mellet , 63 A.D.3d 449, 880 N.Y.S.2d 279 [1st Dept. 2009] ). The contours of that duty in a given situation depend on the prevailing conditions (e.g., density of traffic, condition of roadway, weather) (see Renteria v. Simakov , 109 A.D.3d 749, 972 N.Y.S.2d 15 [1st Dept. 2013] ; Mitchell v. Gonzalez , 269 A.D.2d 250, 703 N.Y.S.2d 124 [1st Dept. 2000] ). If a driver fulfills that duty, he or she should not hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of the driver's vehicle, even if the lead vehicle stops suddenly.⁴

97 N.Y.S.3d 444

The general rule that a sudden stop by the...