Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.
| Decision Date | 08 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 12-4407-SC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al. Defendants. |
DISMISS AND
Now before the Court is the above-captioned defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer this suit on the grounds that venue is improper in this district. ECF No. 16 ("Mot."). The motion is fully briefed.1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court has determined that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss and GRANTS Defendants' motion to TRANSFER this case to the Southern District of Florida.
Plaintiffs are three animal rights organizations, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, Orca Network, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., and four individuals, Howard Garrett, Shelby Proie, Patricia Sykes, and Karen Munro, (collectively, "Plaintiff(s)"). Of the Plaintiffs, only Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF") is located within the Northern District of California -- the others are located in Washington, Virginia, and Colorado. ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 6-7, 12, 17, 21, 26, 29, 31. On August 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the instant action naming as defendants the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") and, in their official capacities, USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack and the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's Eastern Regional Director Elizabeth Goldentyer (collectively, "Defendant(s)").
This case arises from Plaintiffs' concern for an orca named "Lolita." Lolita is currently exhibited at the Miami Seaquarium ("Seaquarium"), where Plaintiffs allege she is kept in inhumane conditions contrary to the requirements of the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 64-81. The AWA requires anyone requesting a license to exhibit certain animals, including orcas, to abide by USDA requirements relating to minimum enclosure sizes, weather shelters, and so forth. Id. Plaintiffs claim that the Seaquarium's facilities do not meet USDA standards and that, by granting the Seaquarium a license to exhibit Lolita, Defendants violated the AWA and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Compl. ¶¶ 88-91.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. Mot.at 3-4. Alternatively, per 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Defendants move to transfer this case to the Eastern District of North Carolina, the District of Columbia, or the Southern District of Florida. Mot. at 3-4. The Seaquarium, which joined the case as a Defendant-Intervenor, argues specifically in favor of transfer to the Southern District of Florida. ECF No. 24 ("Seaquarium Reply").
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a defendant to move to dismiss an action for improper venue. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(3). On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, "the pleadings need not be accepted as true, and the court may consider facts outside of the pleadings," but the court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004).
Venue is proper in an action against an agency of the United States or an officer or employee of the United States acting in his official capacity in any judicial district in which: (A) the defendant resides; (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).2 If venue is improper, districtcourts have discretion either to dismiss the action, or in the interest of justice, to transfer it to a district where it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Plaintiffs allege that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C), because ALDF has an office within the Northern District of California. Compl. ¶ 5. However, the parties dispute whether real property is involved in this case. See Mot. at 3-4; Opp'n at 3. If this case does in fact involve real property, then venue is improper under § 1391(e)(1) and this Court must dismiss the suit.
Defendants argue that this case involves real property because the AWA license at issue in the Complaint "directly affects a substantial part of the real property on which the Seaquarium is located." Mot. at 3. In support of this point, Defendants cite Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management ("CBD v. BLM"), a recent case from this Court finding that real property was involved in a case where the basis for venue was § 1391(e) because the action had to do with a federal agency's management of lands under federal law and adoption of a land management plan for a large piece of property in California. Mot. at 3 (citing C 08-05646 JSW, 2009 WL 1025606, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2009)). Plaintiffs respond that, in CBD v. BLM, the Court held that the touchstone for applying § 1391(e) is not whether real property is peripherally affected by the case at issue, but instead whether the action centers directly on the real property. Opp'n at3. Defendants apparently abandoned this issue in their reply brief, writing only in support of the motion to transfer. See Reply at 1.
In any event, Plaintiffs are right. CBD v. BLM distinguished several cases that "only peripherally" involved real property. 2009 WL 1025606, at *2-3.3 The Court held that if the nexus of a case only concerns real property peripherally, as when the cause of action does not directly arise out of real property (but rather, for example, an issue of regulatory interpretation), then the case does not "involve real property" per § 1391(e)(1)(C). Id. The distinction between direct and peripheral involvement with real property is, as Plaintiffs rightly argue, the touchstone that this Court uses in resolving disputes under § 1391(e)(1)(C). See id.
In the instant action, real property is only peripherally involved. The core issue here concerns an administrative licensing decision that happens to involve real property. No title, interest, or possession of real property would be affected if this case were resolved on the merits, even though the case involvesfacts derived from real property.
The Court finds that since Plaintiff ALDF is based in the Northern District of California and no real property is involved in this matter, venue in the Northern District of California is proper, and Defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue is DENIED.
Alternatively, Defendants move to transfer this case to the District of Columbia, the Southern District of Florida, or the Eastern District of North Carolina. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action for the convenience of the parties, witnesses, or in the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). District courts have broad discretion to transfer cases, though each transfer must be determined on an individualized basis. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). It is the movant's burden to demonstrate that an action should be transferred. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Court's analysis under § 1404(a) has two steps. First, the Court must decide whether the action "might have been brought" in a transferee court. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1985). If so, the Court moves to the second step, where it must consider whether transferring the case is best for convenience and fairness to the parties and the interests of justice. See GNC Franchising, 211 F.3d at 498-99. In deciding this second step, the Court may consider factors including (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties andwitnesses, (3) ease of access to evidence, (4) local interest in the controversy, (5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, and (6) relative congestion in each forum. See Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 11-00831 JSW, 2011 WL 996343, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). The Court will discuss the factors below.
The Court must first determine whether the venues proposed by Defendants are venues in which the present action might have been brought. Hatch, 758 F.2d at 414.
In their motion to transfer, Defendants do not specify any one district as the transferee forum. They propose three possibilities: the District of Columbia, where the USDA's main office is located; the Eastern District of North Carolina, where the USDA's regional office is located (and where the decision to grant the license was made); or the Southern District of Florida, where the Seaquarium and Lolita are located. Mot. at 4.
All of these venues are potentially proper venues under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The District of Columbia is proper because Vilsack resides there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A). Likewise, the Eastern District of North Carolina is proper because Elizabeth Goldentyer resides there. Id. The Southern District of Florida is appropriate as venue because the Seaquarium and Lolita are located there, and the Seaquarium's alleged treatment of Lolita gave rise to this case's underlying claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B). Plaintiffs do not dispute this, though they argue that convenience, fairness, and the interests of justice weigh against transfer. Opp'n at 3-7.
A plaintiff's choice of forum is generally accorded substantial weight, and the defendant therefore bears a considerable burden in justifying transfer. Pac....
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