Ankney v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Civil Action No. BPG-05-1636.

• Decision Date: 05 July 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. BPG-05-1636.
• Parties: Daniel ANKNEY, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Co., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

438 F.Supp.2d 566

Daniel ANKNEY, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Co., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. BPG-05-1636.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 5, 2006.

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Brian Douglas Bennett, Law Offices of Terziu and Bennett, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Elise M. Balkin, David A. Carter, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA, Baltimore, MD, Regina H. Lewis, Nexsen Pruet LLC, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

GESNER, United States Magistrate Judge.

The above-referenced case, brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., has been referred to me for all proceedings with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Plaintiff, Daniel Ankney, filed a complaint for breach of contract in the District Court of Maryland against defendants Verizon Wireless Messaging Services LLC (Verizon Wireless) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) for recovery of short-term disability (STD) benefits under a "Managed Disability Plan" (Plan). The Plan was sponsored by plaintiffs employer, defendant Verizon Wireless, and administered by defendant MetLife. On June 15, 2005 defendants removed the case to this court on the grounds that plaintiffs claim for benefits under the Plan presented a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Plan was governed by ERISA. Currently pending are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Response and Motion to Remand to Maryland District Court, or in the Alternative, Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice, and Defendants' Reply (Paper Nos. 24, 25, 26). Although the court originally scheduled a hearing on this matter, this hearing was cancelled after the parties informed the court that they would prefer to rely on their prior submissions. (Paper No. 29). For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 14, 2003 in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. (AN 0032).¹ Plaintiff sustained injuries to his lumbar and cervical spine, right leg, and left arm and hand. (Id.). At the time of the accident, plaintiff was employed by defendant Verizon Wireless. (Id.). Because of his injuries, plaintiff was unable to return to his job as a "scheduler" at Verizon Wireless. (Id.).

As an employee of defendant Verizon Wireless, plaintiff was covered by its Managed Disability Plan which included coverage for STD benefits and long-term disability (LTD) insurance benefits for injured employees. (AN 0130, 0133). Defendant Verizon Wireless contracted with defendant MetLife to administer the Plan. (AN 0142).

After being treated by his physician on October 21, 2003, plaintiff submitted a claim to defendant MetLife for STD benefits. (AN 0037). Plaintiff was granted STD benefits from October 15, 2003 through November 10, 2003. (Id.). Plaintiffs benefits were extended twice thereafter; first until December 1, 2003 and again until December 14, 2003. (AN 0045, 0072). On December 29, 2003 defendant MetLife notified plaintiff that it would not extend his STD benefits beyond December 14, 2003, because it had determined, based on the medical documentation submitted with plaintiffs application for an extension of benefits, that plaintiff was able to return to his job. (AN 0085-86).

On March 2, 2004 plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore County against defendants, alleging that they breached the Plan by failing to extend his STD benefits. On June 15, 2005, defendants removed the case to this court on the grounds that plaintiffs complaint raised a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987).

If there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The only facts that are properly considered "material" are those that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence favoring the non-moving party is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the existence of only a "scintilla of evidence," is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, all facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must show that specific, material facts exist to create a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

On those issues for which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to oppose the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other evidence specified in the rule. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The summary judgment inquiry thus scrutinizes the plaintiffs case to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient proof, in the form of admissible evidence, that could carry the burden of proof of his claim at trial."). If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. Discussion

Defendants assert four arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. First, defendants argue that this case was properly removed to federal court because plaintiffs complaint raises a federal question. Second, defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs State law cause of action is substantively preempted by ERISA. Third, defendants argue that they are not proper parties in this case because only an ERISA plan itself is the proper defendant in a case involving the administrative denial of benefits. Finally, defendants argue that even if the court rejects their second and third arguments, defendant MetLife did not abuse its discretion when it determined that plaintiffs STD benefits should not be extended.

For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that: 1) this case was properly removed to federal court under the "complete preemption" doctrine; 2) plaintiffs cause of action is to be treated as having been brought under ERISA originally and, therefore, is not substantively preempted; 3) the proper defendant in this case was the Plan administrator, defendant MetLife, and not the Plan sponsor, defendant Verizon Wireless; and 4) defendant MetLife's decision to terminate plaintiffs STD benefits was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendants is appropriate.

A. Removal Jurisdiction

Plaintiff argues that this case was improperly removed to this court from the District Court of Maryland.² (Paper No. 25 at 2). Defendant argues that the removal was proper because plaintiff's State cause of action has been "completely preempted" by ERISA and, therefore, raises a federal question (Paper No. 24 at 9).³ The application of the doctrine of complete preemption to ERISA claims is well-established. See King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 424-25 (4th Cir. 2003). An action brought in State court may be removed to federal court, "`if it might have been brought in [federal court] originally.'" Sonoco Products Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Darcangelo v. Verizon Comm., Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir.2002)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts possess original jurisdiction over "federal questions," which are claims that "arise under" federal law. Therefore, if an action brought in State court arises under federal law, the defendant in that action may remove the case to federal court.

In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the courts apply the so-called "well-pleaded complaint" rule. This rule provides that "`a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.'" Sonoco, 338 F.3d at 370 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)). The doctrine of complete preemption is a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. This doctrine holds that a basis for federal jurisdiction exists "where Congress so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character, the state law claims are converted into federal claims, which may be removed to federal court." Sonoco, 338 F.3d at 371 (internal quotations and citations omitted).⁴

The Supreme Court has held that causes of action that fall within ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), have been completely preempted. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, see also Darcangelo, 292 F.3d at 187. Section 502(a) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] civil action may be brought ... by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary ... to...