Jones v. Stafford
| Decision Date | 20 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 8:12-cv-00891-AW |
| Parties | MS. GERALDINE M. JONES, Plaintiff, v. MS. KAREN STAFFORD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pro se Plaintiff Geraldine M. Jones brings this action against Defendant Ms. Karen Stafford. Plaintiff asserts federal claims under ERISA, the ADEA, and the ADA. Plaintiff also asserts a common law fraud claim. Pending before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Document Summary; and (3) Defendant's Motion to Strike. The Court has reviewed the entire record and deems no hearing necessary. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Document Summary, and DENIES AS MOOT Defendant's Motion to Strike.
The Court takes the following facts from pro se Plaintiff's Complaint, memoranda, miscellaneous correspondence, and associated documents. The Court incorporates the allegations from Plaintiff's memoranda, correspondence, and associated documents into the Complaint because, in many respects, the Complaint is unclear and deficient. Cf. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230 & n.10 (2000) (); Lewis v. MV Transp., Inc., Civil Action No. 8:12-cv-00983-AW, 2012 WL 4518541, at *1 (D. Md. Sep. 28, 2012) ().
Defendant Karen Stafford (Stafford) is a representative of the Food Employers Labor Relations Association and United Food and Commercial Workers Pension Fund (Fund). Pro se Plaintiff Geraldine Jones (Jones) is a former Giant employee who is participant in the Fund.
Apparently, while working at Giant, Jones acquired carpal tunnel syndrome. In October 1988, Jones was approved for leave of absence on account of her injury. During this period, Jones received accident and sickness leave and workers' compensation.
After learning that she would receive $186.55, Jones further alleges that she talked to Keith a lot at the Pension Fund, and I asked for a book to explain to me how my benefits are calculated. First I was told there was no such book. Then I was told later, I would be mailed one. I never received one until 2009.
Jones alleges that she requested the book in the 1990 period. See id.; Doc. No. 13-1 at 3. When she received the book, Jones alleges that she learned that Stafford had calculated her pension incorrectly, thereby costing her several hundred dollars per pension payment. In essence,Jones alleges that Stafford improperly calculated her pension payment based on accident and sickness leave when she was eligible for disability. Jones further alleges that the book she received details how Stafford incorrectly calculated her pension payment. Jones also appears to allege that Stafford incorrectly calculated her retirement date as 1988 when it was actually 1990.
Jones goes on to allege that she contacted Stafford, who has failed to remediate the erroneous calculation of her pension. In a series of unclear allegations, Jones alleges that Stafford withheld the book explaining the calculation of her pension and engaged in other acts in a "big scheme" to defraud her of her full pension benefit. Jones adds that Stafford is avoiding her and that the Fund failed to properly consider her "letter of appeal."
On March 22, 2012, Jones filed her Complaint. On May 22, 2012, Stafford moved to dismiss. Doc. No. 9. Stafford argues that she is not a proper party to an ERISA action and asks the Court to construe Jones's Complaint as one against the Fund. Stafford also argues that Jones's ERISA claims are untimely and procedurally barred. Stafford urges the Court to dismiss Jones's ADEA and ADA claims on the ground that neither Stafford nor the Fund has ever been Jones's employer. Finally, Stafford argues that Jones's fraud claim is facially implausible and preempted by ERISA. Jones has filed what purports to be a response to Stafford's Motion to Dismiss.
On September 13, 2012, Jones filed a document she captions as a Motion for Document Summary. Doc. No. 17. Jones's Motion for Document Summary is an unclear, meandering document in which she simply alleges that Stafford improperly calculated her pension. On October 16, 2012, Jones filed a similar document in which she requests the Court to order Stafford to produce unspecified documents that she allegedly never received. On October 31, 2012, Stafford moved to strike this document as redundant with her Complaint.
The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In two recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). These cases make clear that Rule 8 "requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This showing must consist of at least "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should first review the complaint to determine which pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1950. In so doing, the court must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
Although the Fourth Circuit has yet to fully resolve the issue, plaintiffs generally may institute an action to recover ERISA benefits against only the plan, plan administrator, or plan fiduciary. Cf. Gluth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1997 WL 368625, at *6 n.8 (4th Cir. July 3, 1997); Ankney v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 566, 574 (D. Md. 2006).
In this case, although there is no dispute that Stafford works for the Fund, Jones's allegations fail to create a plausible inference that Stafford is the plan administrator or a plan fiduciary. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Jones's ERISA claims against Stafford and treats them as claims against the Fund.1
The next question is whether Jones has stated a cognizable claim that the Fund has miscalculated her benefits. The Fund argues that Jones's claim for the miscalculation of benefits fails for three reasons: (1) Jones's failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the claim is largely time-barred; and (3) the claim is facially implausible. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
ERISA plan participants must pursue and exhaust plan remedies before gaining access the federal courts. See Gayle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 401 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2005). "[I]nternal appeal limitations periods in ERISA plans are to be followed just as ordinary statutes of limitations." Id. Consequently, "[f]ailure to file a request for review within [a plan's]limitations period is one means by which a claimant may fail to exhaust her administrative remedies." Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the dispositive issue is whether Jones filed a request for review within the plan's limitations period. "[T]he validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue." Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). When interpreting a plan, courts must pay due regard to its plain language. See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health and Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2000).
The Fund points the Court to Article IX, Section 9.2 of its plan.2 Thereunder, in the Fund's estimation, the plan participant must request administrative review within sixty days after notice of claim denial. The Fund argues that Jones received such notice in the 1990 period when Jones learned that she was entitled to only $186.55 a month. Therefore, because Jones did not request administrative review within sixty days of this period, the Fund concludes that she failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
However, this may be a misreading of the pertinent plan language. The provisions the Fund cites entail procedures for appealing the denial of a claim. Here, however, it is unclear that the Fund denied Jones's claim within the meaning of the plan. After all, Jones alleges, and the Fund does not dispute, that Jones received $186.55 a month. In other words, these provisions do not appear to address the situation in which a party believes that the Fund has...
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