Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 24 January 2007
• Docket Number: CV. No. 06-00166 DAE BMK.
• Citation: 475 F.Supp.2d 1041
• Parties: Napoleon T. ANNAN-YARTEY, Plaintiff, v. HONOLULU POLICE DEPARTMENT, Officer Pigrre Shawn, Chief of Police Boisse P. Correa, City and County of Honolulu, Municipal Corporation, Safeguard Security Company and Security Officers, Cades and Schutte, Ernest Nomura, Corporation Doe 1-10 et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

475 F.Supp.2d 1041

Napoleon T. ANNAN-YARTEY, Plaintiff, v. HONOLULU POLICE DEPARTMENT, Officer Pigrre Shawn, Chief of Police Boisse P. Correa, City and County of Honolulu, Municipal Corporation, Safeguard Security Company and Security Officers, Cades and Schutte, Ernest Nomura, Corporation Doe 1-10 et al., Defendants.

CV. No. 06-00166 DAE BMK.

United States District Court, D. Hawai`i.

January 24, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Napoleon T. Annan-Yartey, Honolulu, HI, pro se.

Kendra K. Kawai, Office of Corporation Counsel, Michele-Lynn E. Luke, Richards & Luke, Robert P. Richards, Richards & Luke, Peter W. Olson, Cades Schutte, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

DAVID ALAN EZRA, District Judge.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing. After carefully reviewing the motion and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion with regard to the section 1983 claims and the Hawaii Civil Rights Act, but DENIES the Motion with regard to the malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

BACKGROUND

On March 22, and March 23, 2006, prose plaintiff Napoleon T. Annan-Yartey ("Plaintiff') filed a Complaint for Damages ("Initial Complaint"), and an Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), respectively, against several defendants, including Safeguard Services, Inc., incorrectly identified as Safeguard Security Company, and its security guards (collectively "Safeguard Defendants"). Plaintiff also names the law firm of Cades Schutte, L.L.P. ("Cades"), and one of its partners, Ernest Nomura ("Nomura") (collectively "Cades Defendants") in his Complaint. In addition, Plaintiffs Complaint identified the Honolulu Police Department ("HPD"), its chief of police, two police officers, and the City and County of Honolulu as defendants. They do not join Cades and Safeguard Defendants' motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs claims against them are not addressed in this Order.

On July 3, 2006, Cades Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6) ("Motion to Dismiss"). On July 11, 2006, Safeguard Defendants filed a motion to join the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim ("Opposition") on July 31, 2006. On October 10, 2006, Cades and Safeguard Defendants filed a reply brief ("Reply").

Plaintiffs relevant factual allegations, contained in his Amended Complaint and Opposition, are as follows: On June 15, 2004, Plaintiff went to the address of 1000 Bishop Street ("Cades building") to serve a court document to Nomura and Cades. (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 18.) As Plaintiff attempted to serve Cades, Safeguard Guards detained him, and in the process pushed Plaintiff, held his arms, and forced him to sit on the ground. (Opp'n at 31.) The Safeguard Guards detained Plaintiff for more than two hours before the police arrived. (Id.)

When the police arrived, Nomura told them that he had filed, but not served, a temporary restraining order ("TRO") against Plaintiff. (Amended Compl. at ¶ 19.) The Safeguard Guards corroborated Nomura's story, telling the police that a restraining order had been filed on the previous day. (Amended Compl. at ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants made these statements despite knowing that the TRO did not exist. (Opp'n at 42.) Acting on this information, the police arrested Plaintiff, and took him into custody.

Plaintiffs factual allegations following his arrest are somewhat convoluted. Plaintiff claims maltreatment at the hands of the police officers during custody. (Opp'n at 41.) He states at one point that his incarceration period lasted for twelve hours (Opp'n at 46), and later states that it lasted twenty-four hours. (Opp'n at 47). Plaintiff also alleges that after appearing in court at least three times on September 15, 2004, the district court dismissed all charges against him related to the alleged TRO. (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 22, 26, 27.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss will be granted where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir.2005). Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1994).

Allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Livid Holdings, 416 F.3d at 946. "However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754-55). "Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Id. (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001)). Thus, "conclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.1988).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court has an obligation to construe his Complaint liberally. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.2003) ("Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints."). Pro se plaintiffs in a civil rights action must be afforded the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). Additionally, "[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is `absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.'" Id. (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). "Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint's deficiencies." Id. This does not mean that the district court must act as legal advisor to the plaintiff, but that the court must "draft a few sentences explaining the deficiencies." Id. at 625 (quoting Noll, 809 F.2d at 1449).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges twelve causes of action in his Amended Complaint: 1) Count 1: Arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) Count 2: Detention and confinement in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) Count 3: Plaintiff neglects to list a Count 3, skipping instead to Count 4; 4) Count 4: Conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 5) Count 5: "Refusing or neglecting to prevent" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 6) Count 6: Malicious prosecution; 7) Count 7: Malicious abuse of process; 8) Count 8: Violation of the Hawaii Civil Rights Act; 9) Count 9: False arrest and imprisonment; 10) Count 10: Assault; 11) Count 11: Battery; 12) Count 12: Conspiracy; and 13) Count 13: Intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In a footnote to their Motion to Dismiss, Cades and Safeguard Defendants assert that as private parties, they are not liable to Plaintiff for any federal statutory and constitutional claims. (Mot. to Dis. at 3 n1.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff has made no allegations that they acted under "color of law," and as a result, they did not address Counts 1 through 5. (Reply at 2.) Defendants assert that only the four following causes of action in the Complaint apply to them: 1) Count 6: malicious prosecution; 2) Count 8: violation of the Hawaii Civil Rights Act; 3) Count 12: conspiracy; and 4) Count 13: intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff s claims against them on the grounds that his complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Thus, they argue, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)").

A. Section 1983 Claims

In Counts 1 through 5, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") by sharing with HPD the common goal of depriving him of his constitutional rights by having him arrested and detained. This, Plaintiff claims, serves as the basis for a conspiracy between Defendants and HPD.

To state a section 1983 claim, a "plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendant acted under color of state law." Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.2003) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)).

Although section 1983 actions do not generally apply to private parties, they "can lie against a private party when `he is a willing participant in joint action with the State or its agents.'" Id. (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980)). "One way the joint action test is satisfied is if a conspiracy is shown." Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.1983) (internal quotations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit requires more than "a relationship of cause and effect between the complaint and the prosecution" to prove conspiracy. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 784 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020, 122 S.Ct. 545, 151 L.Ed.2d 423 (2001). A plaintiff must allege an "`agreement or meeting of the minds' to violate constitutional rights" between a private party and the government. Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142...