Anonymous Member of State Bar of Arizona, Matter of

• Decision Date: 24 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. SB-219,SB-219
• Citation: 128 Ariz. 238,624 P.2d 1286
• Parties: In the Matter of an ANONYMOUS MEMBER OF the STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, Petitioner.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1286

624 P.2d 1286

128 Ariz. 238

In the Matter of an ANONYMOUS MEMBER OF the STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, Petitioner.

No. SB-219.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Feb. 24, 1981.

Daughton, Feinstein & Wilson by Allen L. Feinstein, Jeffrey S. Leonard, Phoenix, for petitioner.

Levy, Mason, Spector & Sherwood, P. A., by Mark R. Santana, Bar Counsel, Phoenix, for respondent.

HOLOHAN, Vice Chief Justice.

The petitioner challenges certain actions of the Disciplinary Board in a pending disciplinary proceeding. Under the privacy requirements of Rule 32(d), Rules of the Supreme Court, the name of petitioner is not disclosed.

Since this matter involves the regulation of the practice of law, this court has the ultimate authority over the subject matter. See Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Commission, Ariz., 619 P.2d 1036 (1980). We accepted jurisdiction to resolve the question presented.

The essential facts are that on February 18, 1976, a complaint of professional misconduct against eight members of the State Bar, including petitioner, was made to the Board of Governors of the State Bar. The complaint was referred for investigation to Local Administrative Committee 5N, under docket number 76-3-5N.

The Administrative Committee after preliminary investigation concluded that there was no probable cause to believe that the petitioner and others had been guilty of misconduct. The Administrative Committee determined that a formal complaint should not be instituted, and the Committee entered an order dismissing the complaint against petitioner and the others named in the complaint.

The report of the Administrative Committee was forwarded to the Disciplinary Board. One member of the Disciplinary Board recommended that the complaint be referred to another local administrative committee and that a formal complaint be issued against petitioner and two other lawyers.

The matter was referred to Local Administrative Committee 5G, and that committee ultimately instituted a formal complaint against petitioner alleging a violation of the disciplinary rules. Petitioner presented to the administrative committee a motion to dismiss the formal complaint. The motion was denied. Petitioner appealed to the Disciplinary Board and moved that the Board dismiss the complaint. On November 21 1980, the Board granted the motion to dismiss "for procedural reasons," but the Board remanded the matter to Local Administrative Committee 5G for further proceedings including determination of probable cause.

Petitioner sought relief in this court. The question presented is whether the Disciplinary Board may review a finding of no probable cause by an administrative committee.

The answer to the question is found in the provisions of Rule 33(b)(2), Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides in part:

"2. When a complaint is referred to a committee the committee shall conduct such preliminary investigation as will enable it to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the member in question is or may be guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary action. If, after such preliminary investigation, the committee is of the opinion that no such probable cause exists, it shall so report to the board in writing. The board shall advise the complainant, if any, in writing of the action taken by the committee. If, after such preliminary investigation, the committee is of the opinion that such probable cause does exist, it shall conduct such additional investigation as it deems necessary to enable it to institute a formal complaint against the member in question and shall designate...